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Abstract 
Research suggests that social engineering attacks pose a significant security 
risk, with social networking sites (SNSs) being the most common source of these 
attacks. The term “social engineering” refers to attacks that deceive, persuade or 
influence an individual to provide information or perform an action that will benefit 
the attacker. Fraudulent and deceptive individuals use social engineering traps and 
tactics through SNSs to trick users into obeying them, accepting threats and falling 
victim to various crimes such as phishing, clickjacking, malware installation, sexual 
abuse, financial abuse, identity theft and physical crime. Although organisations, 
researchers and practitioners recognise the serious risks of social engineering, there 
is little understanding and control of such threats. This may be partly due to the 
complexity of human behaviours in approaching, accepting and failing to recognise 
attackers in the virtual environment of SNSs. This research aims to investigate the 
impact of source characteristics on users’ susceptibility to social engineering 
victimisation in SNSs, particularly Facebook. Using a sequential exploratory mixed 
method, the qualitative grounded theory is used to explore what and how source 
characteristics influence Facebook users to judge an attacker as credible. Quantitative 
experiments are then run to test the findings of the qualitative phase and to 
investigate the effectiveness of each source characteristic on the users’ susceptibility 
to social engineering victimisation based on the users’ demographics. The results of 
this study have shown that every factor of the perceived sincerity, competence, 
attraction, and worthiness of a source are significant predictors of susceptibility to 
social engineering victimization. The results also explained which, and to which 
extent, Facebook-specific source characteristics influence Facebook users to judge an 
attacker according to one of the identified source credibility dimensions.  
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Information security generally aims to ensure three main elements of an 
information system, namely, the integrity, confidentiality and availability of the 
system. Breaking, damaging or harming any of these elements can be done through 
exploiting the vulnerability of technology or the vulnerability of people. It has been 
observed that people are the weakest link in security (Nohlberg 2009; West et al. 
2009). Social engineering is the practice of deceiving and tricking people to help 
attackers to reach their goals. Deceiving people to gain information from them or 
persuading them to perform an action that benefits the attacker in some way is 
known as social engineering (Hadnagy 2010; Thornburgh 2004; Workman 2007). 
While technology-based threats have been well discussed and addressed in 
many studies, the topic of human-based threats seems to be less attractive to 
researchers in the information technology field, perhaps because of the complexity of 
understanding and predicting human behaviours associated with users’ susceptibility 
to social engineering victimisation. Social engineering is a type of security attack that 
exploits human vulnerabilities to meet the desires of the attacker (Mitnick and Simon 
2001). Social engineering attacks pose the most significant security risks and are 
challenging to control (Hadnagy 2010; Twitchell 2006). The literature states that 
contemporary cyber attacks have more to do with manipulating people than ever 
before (Blunden 2010).  
Since the first recognisable appearance of social networking sites (SNSs) in 
1997, with the “SixDegrees.com” site (Ellison 2007), people have been attracted to 
SNSs that enable them to construct profiles and communicate with each other in 
 2 Chapter 1: Introduction 
different ways depending on the nature of the site. SNSs also implement a wide 
variety of technical features that enable people, companies, organisations or 
government agencies to perform a variety of services (Ellison 2007). As the number 
of SNS users has been increasing dramatically, the amount of sensitive and private 
information of people, companies, organisations or government agencies available 
online has also increased dramatically. This not only makes SNSs attractive to 
faithful users but also makes SNSs the perfect breeding grounds for malicious users 
and attackers. Information is always under threat, and it can be intercepted, modified 
or exposed. The facilities that are set up to monitor such attacks are also constantly 
under attack (Zhang et al. 2010). Such attacks shape the challenges of providing 
usability and sociability, which are the main purposes of SNSs, and of ensuring 
integrity, confidentiality and availability, which are the standard principles of 
security. 
Through analysing the literature, it can be recognised that the theoretical 
concepts of social engineering are limited to what are seen in the marketing 
discipline as means of persuasion, especially the principle of influence proposed by 
Cialdini (2001). Although those concepts provide some examples of how people may 
be tricked or deceived, they are not sufficient to explain the full meaning of social 
engineering. Therefore, this study commenced by reviewing the related concepts, 
definitions and philosophical theories related to social engineering based on other 
disciplines than information technology, such as psychology, sociology, human 
communication, marketing and behaviourism.  
It has been found that the attacker’s ability to victimise people in social 
engineering attacks is strongly affected by the characteristics that the attacker 
displays. The risk of social engineering attacks in SNSs is associated with the level 
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of difficulty for users to make accurate judgments in the virtual environment of 
SNSs. Persuasion research shows that people are more likely to obey, believe or 
accept a message when the source’s presentation appears to be credible (Hovland et 
al. 1953).  
Source credibility is a multidimensional concept that indicates how the receiver 
evaluates the source in relation to the information being conveyed. The term “source 
credibility” is commonly used to imply “a communicator’s positive characteristics 
that affect the receiver’s acceptance of a message” (Ohanian 1990, p. 41). Source 
credibility is a multidimensional concept that indicates how the receiver evaluates the 
source in relation to the information being conveyed. This evaluation correlates with 
the capability of the receiver to attribute multiple dimensions of credibility to the 
information, such as the dimensions of reality, truth, professionalism or substance, or 
more or fewer dimensions, and to make a global evaluation regarding the credibility 
of the source based on these multiple dimensions (Hovland and Weiss 1951). 
Credibility is a perception (Tseng and Fogg 1999). Many factors can impact the 
perceived credibility of a source, depending on the characteristics of the medium, the 
channel or the environment (Metzger et al. 2003). 
Deception research reveals that the outcome of an attempted deception depends 
more on the liar’s credibility than on any other factors (Bond Jr and DePaulo 2008). 
The same phenomenon is observed in SNSs, where the social engineer’s ability to 
launch an attack involves wearing a suitable “hat” and playing a suitable character. 
This character can be a very poor person, a sexy girl, an authority, a celebrity, a 
wonderful friend, and so on. A social engineer can also impersonate a real person 
who the victim knows well, such as a friend, boss, relative or even a famous person 
(Peltier 2006). This task is much easier in SNSs, where the attacker can create 
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multiple fake profiles and choose their names, photos, locations and other details 
easily. Concurrently, it is more difficult for the victim to uncover the deception 
through SNSs than in it would be in a face-to-face, real-life situation. Research 
suggests that there is a significant difference between human behaviours in real life 
and virtual environments (Zinoviev and Duong 2009). 
Moreover, research shows that people, based on their demographics, are 
different in their interests, needs and emotional reactions, and therefore different in 
their vulnerabilities (Sherif and Hovland 1961). Depending on the victim’s 
vulnerabilities, the social engineer can use distance, anonymity and an absence of 
authentication mechanisms to abuse a victim and make the victim feel trusting and 
safe, and thereby, can encourage the victim to accept the trick.  
The present study therefore intends to investigate the impact of source 
characteristics on users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation on SNSs. 
This is done by discovering how Facebook users perceive and make judgments about 
the credibility of attackers. In other words, this research aims to investigate how 
Facebook users determine whether they are encountering an attacker or a legitimate 
user based on the characteristics of the source. In addition, this research develops a 
theoretical model that explains what and how source characteristics influence 
Facebook users to judge the attacker as credible. Finally, this research investigates 
the influence of each source characteristic on the users’ susceptibility to social 
engineering victimisation based on their demographics, such as their age, gender, 
educational level, relationship status or frequency of Facebook usage. 
To reach these objectives, a sequential exploratory mixed method was used, 
starting with a qualitative phase followed by a quantitative phase. For the qualitative 
phase, the grounded theory method, along with the triangulation approach, were 
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utilised, with the data drawn from different sources using different data collection 
methods (Flick 2004). The triangulation approach included observations, interviews 
and open-ended questionnaires to explore all the possible source characteristics that 
influence users to judge attackers as credible. For the quantitative phase, a role-play 
(scenario-based) experiment was used to examine the extent to which the source 
characteristics identified in the first (qualitative) phase affect users’ victimisation and 
to link those source characteristics to users’ demographics. 
1.2 Motivation 
Because of the difficulty of understanding social engineering, it has become an 
important problem in information security. The risk of social engineering has 
received more attention since 2005, when the Institute of Management and 
Administration reported that social engineering was the top security threat in that 
year (Thompson 2013). Around 70% of information security incidents are caused 
primarily by employees’ behaviours, and around 3% of an organisation’s profit is 
potentially lost due to those incidents (McIlwraith 2006). The risk of social 
engineering continues to be a challenging problem. Research indicates that several 
organisations recognise the importance of predicting and controlling social 
engineering, but many fail to reach that goal (Brody 2012). Social engineering 
threats have been found to be on the rise despite continued improvements in 
protections against technology-based threats (Thompson 2013).  
Fraudulent and deceptive individuals use social engineering traps and tactics by 
using SNSs to trick victims into obeying them, accepting threats and falling victim to 
various crimes and attacks such as phishing, clickjacking, malware installation, 
sexual abuse, financial abuse, identity theft, impersonation, physical crime, and many 
other forms of attack. The simple trick of offering free mobile phone minutes 
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accounted for the largest number of attacks on Facebook users in 2013, increasing 
from 56% in 2012 to 81% in 2013 (Mazzuca 2014). Recent research on SNS security 
showed that most social engineering threats, such as spamming, identity cloning and 
social bots, rely mainly on fake identities (Fire et al. 2014). This provides an 
explanation for why around 83 million Facebook accounts (8.7% of all accounts) are 
estimated to be fake (Couper 2013). This also reflects the high demand for research 
that investigates the role of source characteristics in influencing users to fall victim to 
social engineering in SNSs such as Facebook. 
According to a survey by Dimensional Research (2011) on 850 IT and security 
professionals in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia 
and New Zealand, 48% of the participants had been victims of social engineering 
attacks and, on average, had experienced 25 or more attacks in 2010 and 2011. 
Dimensional Research reported that social engineering attacks cost victims an 
average of US$25,000 to US$100,000 per security incident. Of the participants, 39% 
believed that SNSs were the most common source of social engineering threats 
(Dimensional-Research 2011).  
A study of more than 4,000 Facebook users found that most of the participants 
were willing to provide large amounts of personal information in SNSs, thus 
exposing themselves to various physical and cyber risks (Gross and Acquisti 2005). 
The use of SNSs as one of the main tools of social interaction results in a loss of 
privacy (Rosenblum 2007), which opens users and their organisations or networks to 
the risk of becoming targets of major security threats (Gibson 2007). 
In its introduction to security issues in the use of SNSs and highlighting some 
threats in SNSs, the European Network and Information Security Agency describes 
SNSs as dangerous weapons in the hands of spammers, unscrupulous marketers and 
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social engineers who may take criminal advantage of users (Hogben 2007). Nagy and 
Pecho (2009) analysed and validated the possible SNS misuse that arises due to the 
irresponsible behaviour of users. In addition, the baseline success rate for using 
information obtained from SNSs in phishing attacks has been established (Jagatic et 
al. 2007). Because of the lack of users’ awareness, social engineering is considered a 
low-cost and effective form of attack (Mataracioglu and Ozkan 2011). Moreover, 
researchers have demonstrated the possibility of automating social engineering to 
launch many attacks such as hijacking and phishing in SNSs (Huber 2009; Huber et 
al. 2009). 
The risk of social engineering in SNSs is expected to increase in the future due 
to the fact that the information that users provide about themselves is the most 
valuable asset for SNS providers. Therefore, SNS providers will continue to 
encourage users to reveal and share more personal information. Researchers have 
given examples of some of the tactics that SNS providers use to persuade users to 
share their personal information (Fogg and Iizawa 2008; Weiksner et al. 2008). 
Providers of SNSs use such information in marketing and advertisements in which 
they select specific groups of users, based on their specifications, to receive specific 
product advertisements. Therefore, it is expected that social engineering exploits will 
increase in SNSs unless effective countermeasures are deployed. 
 SNSs are also expected to continue being the perfect place for social engineers 
to launch their attacks, owing to some particular characteristics of SNSs, such as 
being easy to use and free to join. The variety of content that social engineers can 
make and use in SNSs, such as news, stories, hyperlinks, photos, videos and 
applications, allows attackers to employ them in many different attacks (Abu-Nimeh 
et al. 2011). Curtailing the increase of social engineering in SNSs requires research 
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and interventions that are ahead of the attackers and scammers who aim to take 
advantage of users’ vulnerabilities. By realising that most social engineering 
attackers rely on the ability to impersonate a credible source, and that the perception 
of source credibility is the key element of users’ decision to accept or reject social 
engineering attacks, the present study represents a crucial step towards understanding 
the susceptibility of users to social engineering attacks in SNSs. 
1.3 Complexity 
People, in general, think that they are good at detecting deception and lies. 
However, research indicates that people perform poorly in detecting social 
engineering attacks (Grazioli 2004; Qi 2007). At the organisational level, research 
suggests that social engineers could succeed even among those organisations that 
identify themselves as being aware of social engineering techniques (Kvedar et al. 
2010). Marett, Biros and Knode (2004) explained that people perform poorly in 
detecting deception because of the “lie detector bias”, which is the assumption that 
most people are telling the truth. The research on social engineering indicates that the 
main causes of weaknesses that lead people to fall victim to social engineers are 
socio-psychological characteristics (Bezuidenhout et al. 2010; Mohebzada et al. 
2010; Pattinson et al. 2012; Twitchell 2006).  
Although the extant literature applies the concepts of persuasion and influence 
to understand human vulnerabilities in the domain of marketing, the literature 
provides no theoretical framework specifically grounding the study of the factors 
affecting social engineering threats in SNSs. Sun, Yan and Feng (2012) stated that 
those factors are complicated and challenging to identify, even if they seem to be 
simple.  
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 West, Mayhorn, Hardee and Mendel (2009) divided the factors that lead users 
to make poor security decisions into three categories: 1) user factors, such as 
problem-solving limitations and decision-making heuristics and experiences; 2) 
technology factors, such as the appearance of credibility and personal relevance of an 
email or a website that tricks the users; and 3) environmental factors, such as time 
pressure and inattention blindness, whereby users may not perceive the details of the 
threat. In relation to SNSs in particular, users have different behaviours than in real-
life situations (Zinoviev and Duong 2009). Moreover, the technological and 
environmental factors in SNS usage are unique and therefore warrant specific 
investigation (Kane et al. 2014). 
Another aspect of the complexity of understanding and controlling social 
engineering threats in SNSs relates to the fact that social engineering involves 
different areas of study, such as behaviourism, human communication, information 
technology, sociology and psychology. As a serious (technical) problem, social 
engineering is related to many socio-psychological problems, and therefore its 
measurement, prediction or control is complex. The complexity of social and 
psychological behaviours has been described by Weinberg (1967) as follows: 
Social problems are much more complex than are technological 
problems… People don’t behave rationally; it is a long, hard business to 
persuade individuals to forego immediate personal gain or pleasure (as 
seen by the individual) in favor of longer term social gain. (Weinberg 
1967, p. 7) 
The challenge of investigating this topic is associated with several difficulties. 
First, the sensitivity of the topic may make individuals and organisations who have 
experienced social engineering attacks hesitant to participate in such a study as they 
wish to avoid embarrassment and maintain their reputation. Second, most people 
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think (falsely) that they are good at detecting deception. Third, most people tend to 
present themselves to others (such as a researcher) in a certain positive light rather 
than reporting their actual experience. Therefore, if they are asked how they are 
tricked and deceived, most people are likely to say “we are aware of deception and 
we don’t get deceived”. In the best situation, they will say “we don’t know how we 
get deceived”. However, research shows that individuals and organisations are 
extremely weak in detecting deception and social engineering tricks (Grazioli 2004; 
Qi 2007). Consequently, discovering how Facebook users make judgments about 
credibility and fall victim to deception requires an effective strategy and the use of 
different methods, including observations, interviews and questionnaires, to gather as 
much knowledge as possible in the first phase of research. Moreover, to test the 
findings of the first phase quantitatively requires a creative experimental design that 
avoids ethical issues, allows the effectiveness of every factor to be measured 
accurately, and allows the testing of each factor to be combined within one study in 
order to draw a comprehensive and theoretical conclusion. 
1.4 Statement of the Problem 
Social engineering in SNSs is a major issue in information security; however, 
other than anecdotal materials, there is little to help managers, organisations and 
researchers to address the problem because the relationships among personal 
judgment, source credibility perception and social engineering outcomes have not 
been thoroughly investigated. By realising the strong impact of source characteristics 
on users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation, realising that human 
susceptibility to social engineering threats will be different from context-to-context 
and from person-to-person, realising that users’ perceptions of credibility and risk are 
affected by many factors such as risk belief, awareness level and users’ 
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demographics, and by considering the question of how the vulnerabilities of a given 
user can be predicted, two main aims need to be addressed in this study. The first aim 
is to explore what, how and to what extent do the source characteristics influence 
Facebook users to fall victim to social engineering. The second aim is to investigate 
whether or not there is any relationship between the influence of those source 
characteristics and the users’ demographics. 
1.5 Research Questions 
The following research questions were formed to address the problem 
identified in the above discussion: 
1. What source characteristics influence Facebook users to judge an attacker as 
credible? 
2. How do source characteristics influence Facebook users to judge an attacker 
as credible? 
3. To what extent do each of these source characteristics influence Facebook 
users to judge an attacker as credible? 
4. Is there any relationship between the influence of any of the source 
characteristics on users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation in 
Facebook and users’ demographics such as age, gender, education, relationship 
status and level of awareness? 
5. Is there any relationship between users’ demographics and their 
susceptibility to social engineering victimisation on Facebook in general? 
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1.6 Key Concepts 
1.6.1 Social Engineering 
The term “social engineering” was first introduced in around 1899 by the 
American publicist William Tolman to denote solutions to social problems (Hansson 
2006). It was adapted later in areas such as sociology and politics. In the information 
technology domain, the term was adopted in around 2000 by renowned hacker Kevin 
Mitnick to refer to deceiving people to gain valuable information from them, or to 
influence them to perform an action that benefits the attackers in some way. In The 
Art of Deception, Mitnick indicates that he compromised several information systems 
solely by using the passwords and codes that he gained through social engineering 
(Mitnick and Simon 2001). Explaining the risks associated with social engineering, 
Mitnick stated that “the weakest link in the security chain is the human element” and 
advised managers that “you could spend a fortune purchasing technology and 
services…and your network infrastructure could still remain vulnerable to old-
fashioned manipulation”. Social engineering involves social skills that deceive 
people as a way to gain information and unauthorised access privileges from them by 
building inappropriate trust relationships with them or persuading them to perform an 
action that will benefit the attacker (Hadnagy 2010; Thornburgh 2004; Workman 
2007). The commonly used attacks associated with social engineering include 
phishing, impersonation, clickjacking, cloned attack, and others. These are described 
in detail in Chapter 3. 
1.6.2 Social Networking Sites 
SNSs have been defined by Boyd and Ellison (2007) as “web-based services 
that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a 
bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a 
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connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by 
others within the system. The nature and nomenclature of these connections may 
vary from site to site” (Ellison 2007, p. 2). Boyd and Ellison suggest that the use of 
the term “networking” in SNSs emphasises relationship initiation, often between 
strangers. However, other researchers point out that it is difficult to differentiate 
between those types of sites while there are common aspects like tagging, profiles 
and “friending” (Beer 2008). 
1.6.3 Source Characteristics 
Persuasion comprises three main elements: the source or the sender, the 
meaning or the message, and the recipient (O'Keefe 2002). According to O’Keefe 
(2002), persuasion must involve a goal and the intent to achieve that goal on the part 
of the sender, while the recipient must have free will and must not be persuaded by 
force. In the case of social engineering in SNSs, the source is the social engineer or 
attacker, the message is the trick or technique, and the recipient is the user. 
In this research, the source is investigated and discussed through two levels. 
The first level is the Facebook-specific (or Facebook-based) level. The Facebook-
specific source characteristics are the specifications, qualities or features belonging 
typically to Facebook users. The Facebook-specific source characteristics are those 
shown on Facebook profiles or observed through the activities performed by users in 
the context of Facebook, including users’ photos, logos, gender, friends, groups, 
names, beliefs, events, education, location and posts. The investigation in this study 
targets any source characteristic that influences Facebook users’ judgments when 
deciding whether or not to accept a message from a source. 
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The second level is the perception level, in which the source is investigated by 
reference to the dimension of perception. Perception is “the mental act or process by 
which we acquire knowledge, including sensing (our five senses) and our intuition” 
(Olson 2014, p. 3). Plapp and Werner (2006) explained that perception is an 
“everyday subjective assessment process that is based on experience and on available 
information without referring to reliable data, series and complex models” (Plapp 
and Werner 2006, p. 101). The investigation conducted in this study targets the 
perceptions that influence Facebook users to judge an attacker as credible, and 
therefore influence them to accept a message from such an attacker. 
1.6.4 Source Credibility 
Credibility is a phenomenon of communication (Eisend 2006). Source 
credibility is a multidimensional concept that enables the receiver to rate the source 
regarding a particular message or information. This rating correlates with the ability 
of the receiver to make a global evaluation and attribute believability to the 
information source based on reality, truth and other dimensions of credibility 
(Hovland and Weiss 1951).  
Several operationalisations of source credibility appear in the literature (as 
discussed later in Chapter 3), making it difficult to define the concept. The 
operationalised definition most closely related to the purpose of the present study 
was proposed by Ohanian (1990), who defined source credibility as “a term 
commonly used to imply a communicator’s positive characteristics that affect the 
receiver’s acceptance of a message” (p. 41). Credibility research has its roots in 
persuasion, especially in human communication research. Source credibility theory 
views credibility as the extent to which a particular source meets a receiver’s needs 
(Hovland et al. 1953). According to source credibility theory, people are more likely 
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to believe and obey a message when the source is perceived as credible. In SNSs, 
obeying a message involves complying with a request, such as a request to click a 
link or accept an offer. 
1.6.5 Susceptibility to Victimisation 
In the online environment, susceptibility is the risk of falling victim to an 
attack performed through techniques such as phishing, spying, snooping or 
impersonation. Victimisation in information security refers to the breach, damage, 
disabling or obstruction of an information system that prevents the system from 
ensuring its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality and non-repudiation 
(Maconachy et al. 2001). This kind of victimisation can be executed through the 
vulnerabilities of technologies or the vulnerabilities of people. The National Institute 
of Standards and Technology defined victimisation as “any circumstance or event 
with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, 
functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, or individuals through an 
information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of 
information, and/or denial of service” as well as the potential for a threat-source to 
successfully exploit a particular information system vulnerability (Furlani 2009, p. 
9). 
1.7 Objectives of the Study 
The main objectives of this study are achieved by addressing the research 
questions set out above in Section 1.5. The main objectives of this research are the 
following: 
1- Developing a theoretical model that explains what and how source 
characteristics influence Facebook users to judge an attacker as credible.  
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2- Presenting the foundation for a practical solution that predicts Facebook 
users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation through profiling 
users based on their demographics. 
3- Identifying how Facebook users mistakenly develop trust and safety when 
dealing with attackers in the virtual environment of Facebook. 
In addition, by addressing the research questions, the following benefits are 
anticipated: 
1- Helping organisations to reduce the risk of social engineering in SNSs by 
identifying the source characteristics that influence Facebook users to accept 
social engineering tricks. Reduction of the risk can be achieved through 
policy making or training programs. 
2- Enhancing individuals’ awareness by identifying their vulnerabilities 
regarding the making of accurate judgments on Facebook and by identifying 
which users are more affected by particular source factors. 
3- Helping SNS providers to establish mechanisms that can help users make 
better judgments about the credibility of others, and therefore reduce the risk 
of social engineering. 
1.8 Significance of the Study 
This research is of significance in a number of ways. First, understanding the 
cognition, attitudes, behavioural intentions and behavioural compliance of 
individuals in response to attacks is a key element in information security. The 
concept of social engineering is relatively new to information technology, poses 
significant security risks, and is challenging to control (Hadnagy 2010; Twitchell 
2006). To the best of the author’s knowledge, this research is the first study that 
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attempts to explore the source characteristics upon which users base their judgments 
regarding the source credibility of social engineering attackers in Facebook. 
Furthermore, the study focuses on the influence of source characteristics. This focus 
goes to the core of the problem, as recent research showed that most social 
engineering attackers rely on fake identities (Fire et al. 2014). By pinpointing some 
of the key elements in a user’s decision to accept or reject social engineering attacks, 
the findings from the current study represent a crucial step towards understanding 
user susceptibility to social engineering attacks in SNSs.  
The significance of the study lies in its attempt to solve a serious information 
security problem. As explained in Section 1.2, the setting of the study also reflects 
the significance of the contribution, as SNSs are now believed to be the most 
common source of social engineering attacks (Chitrey et al. 2012; Dimensional-
Research 2011; Hogben 2007; Jagatic et al. 2007; Nagy and Pecho 2009). 
In addition, the way in which this study investigates the impact of demographic 
variables on susceptibility to social engineering attacks appears to be unique. Studies 
conducted on phishing attacks (which also usually use social engineering-based 
persuasion but in a different environment from SNSs) have indicated that there is a 
relationship between falling victim to phishing emails and demographic variables 
such as age, gender and educational level (Darwish et al. 2012). However, the 
present study investigates social engineering victimisation in a new environment, 
(Facebook), and goes further by investigating the relationship between demographic 
variables and the different impersonation tricks used by attackers to influence users. 
An investigation of susceptibility should also focus on the type of trick being used, 
and not only whether or not the user became a victim as has been the tendency in 
email phishing studies. 
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Moreover, this study makes a practical contribution towards addressing the 
high risk of social engineering in SNSs. This can be seen by comparing the scope of 
this study with the social engineering solutions proposed in the literature for SNSs 
such as spamming and cloning detection. All of the proposed solutions focus on 
technology. Notwithstanding the importance of those solutions, this study’s focus is 
on the main and weakest link, namely, the user. None of the social engineering-based 
attacks could succeed unless the users themselves accept, succumb and perform the 
requested action.  
Furthermore, while the contribution of this research is of particular relevance to 
the knowledge on social engineering in SNSs, the findings of this study make a 
significant contribution to the knowledge in several other areas, especially the 
understanding of source credibility. For example, this study proposes a new 
dimension of source credibility, which hasn’t been reported as a dimension of source 
credibility in more than 30 previous studies on many different types of contexts and 
sources; thus establishing the study’s significant contribution toward the existing 
knowledge on source credibility.   
The overall results of this study highlight the ease with which individuals can 
be deceived in SNSs, the theoretical reasons for why and how individuals fall victim 
to social engineering attacks, and the ways in which organisations’ security defences 
can be compromised through such deceptions. The findings of this study have a 
number of important implications. First, identifying the links between the 
characteristics of the source and the characteristics of the users (as receivers) is a 
crucial step in data science, because it provides a theoretical foundation for 
developing effective applications and user profiling mechanisms, which can 
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automatically predict users’ susceptibility to social engineering attacks based on their 
demographics.  
The results of this study are also crucial for organisational policy makers who 
aim to control insider threats based on theoretical knowledge. The findings of this 
study are useful for security education, training and awareness (SETA) programs, 
policy making and computer monitoring, all of which have been suggested as the 
best practices for deterring human-based information security incidents (D'Arcy et al. 
2009). The findings can be helpful for software engineers and SNS providers, 
because they point out the technical factors that help attackers mislead users and 
make an SNS a dangerous weapon in the hands of the scammers and social engineers 
who may take criminal advantage of users. 
1.9 Suitability of the Methodology 
The study uses a sequential exploratory mixed method, starting with a 
qualitative phase followed by a quantitative phase. Using a mixed-methods design 
ensures the validity and reliability of the study by eliminating the bias and 
subjectivity of interpretation; such biases can occur in a qualitative study where the 
researcher has to interpret the data to explore the most important source 
characteristics. The qualitative phase used the grounded method approach, which 
involved between-method triangulation, including observation, interviews and an 
open-ended questionnaire. Grounded theory has been found to be extremely useful in 
information systems for developing theories within different and new contexts 
(Urquhart et al. 2010). Using triangulation ensures that an account is robust, rich and 
comprehensive (Denzin 1970; Patton 1999). This approach strengthened the study’s 
(qualitative) exploration of the source characteristics that influence users to accept 
social engineering requests on Facebook. 
 20 Chapter 1: Introduction 
The quantitative phase involved a larger sample to test the extent to which the 
findings of the first phase were accurate, and to link the findings to the users’ 
demographic variables. The quantitative phase used the role-play experimental 
method, which included the treatment, control and manipulation of the independent 
variables. The advantage of the experimental method is its emphasis on internal 
validity (Recker 2012). Moreover, the design of the experiment used in the second 
phase was similar to a randomised control trial, which is considered to be the best 
and most valid experimental design (Kirk 1982; Myers 1972). The aim of this study, 
as well as the methodology used, help to fill an important gap in the information 
systems literature. Cao et al. (2014) concluded a review of studies on SNSs published 
in major information systems journals between January 2004 and August 2013 with 
the following comment: 
We believe that future online OSN [online social networks] research 
needs to focus on (1) OSN-specific construct validation and theory 
development; (2) individual characteristics or factors that play a role in 
OSN research; (3) multiple research methods, especially qualitative 
methods and data analytics. (p. 25) 
1.10 Scope, Context and Limitations 
 
There are different entities involved in social engineering in SNSs, and each 
entity affects the social engineering phenomenon in a specific way. Those entities 
include SNSs (the environment), the social engineer (the attacker), the message (the 
trick), and the SNS user (the victim), as explained in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3. 
The roles of all of those entities are discussed in the literature review; however, the 
main focus of this study is on the source characteristics and their impact on SNS 
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users, based on the users’ demographic variables, and within the virtual environment 
of Facebook. 
The SNSs with large numbers of users at the time of this study included 
Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, Instagram, Snapchat and others. Among these, Facebook 
was chosen as the setting for this research. Facebook was chosen in particular for 
several reasons. First, Facebook is a ubiquitous SNS with a user base that far exceeds 
other SNSs. At the time of writing, Facebook is the biggest SNS in terms of both 
global reach and total active users. According to Facebook as April 2015, the site had 
more than 1.44 billion global monthly active users, with a 13 percent increase year 
over year. In addition, as of May 2013, 4.5 billion likes were being generated every 
day. This represented a 67% increase in the total number of likes from August 2012. 
Moreover, 3.936 million users logged onto their accounts every day in March 2015, 
which represented a 17% increase on the previous year. This represents a vast 
increase in the number of people who use Facebook, and who are consistent in their 
usage.  
The second reason for choosing Facebook as the setting for this research is that 
Facebook is less specialised than other platforms. For example, Linkedin is mostly 
used by professionals for career-related purposes, Snapchat is used by those 
concerned with privacy, Instagram is mostly a photo-sharing platform, Twitter is 
mostly a microblogging tool, and so on. Facebook has a publicly open structure, 
loose behavioural norms and plenty of tools and features that members use to leave 
cues for each other (Papacharissi 2009). This makes Facebook the ideal setting in 
which to study the impact of source characteristics on users’ perceptions and 
judgments and therefore their susceptibility to social engineering victimisation in 
SNSs. 
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In terms of methodology, a sequential exploratory mixed method was chosen, 
starting with a qualitative study followed by quantitative study. While the mixed 
method approach offers quality and reliability, the qualitative method has some 
limitations, such as the subjectivity of the interpretation whereby the researcher has 
to interpret the data to explore the most important factors. To minimise this problem 
and to increase the objectivity, between-method triangulation was used in the first 
phase, whereby the data were drawn from different sources, at different times and 
using multiple methods. Another limitation of this study is that the sample of 
participants did not represent all demographic variables, such as all religions or 
cultures. This was not possible due to geographical isolation, time and fund 
limitations. However, efforts were made to ensure the sample was as broadly 
representative as possible as explained in Chapter 4. 
The findings of the second phase (the quantitative phase) must be viewed in 
light of some limitations. The first limitation relates to the use of a role-play 
experiment in the second phase. This was necessary due to the challenges of the 
ethical issues associated with running an experiment in the actual Facebook 
environment, permission issues from the owners of Facebook, and the need to 
conduct the study in accordance with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in 
Research Involving Humans. The results obtained from a role-play (scenario-based) 
experiment to measure users’ behaviours may arguably be different from the results 
obtained from an actual experiment. However, the degree of realism and involvement 
that can be achieved in scenario-based or role-play experiments has been confirmed 
in a number of studies from the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., (Haney et al. 1972; Mixon 
1972; O'Leary et al. 1970; Olson and Christiansen 1966)) until more recent years 
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(e.g., (Dhamija et al. 2006; Downs et al. 2007; Furnell 2007; Pattinson et al. 2012; 
Sheng et al. 2010)). 
Several reliability and validity tests were performed on the collected data, with 
the results suggesting that there was no reason to believe that the performance of the 
predictors described in this study would differ in role-play behaviour compared to 
real-life or actual behaviour. In addition, in order to increase the validity of the 
experiment, some effective strategies were used. Literature of deception includes 
several practices that have been found to be effective, useful and morally justifiable 
strategies in experimental research (e.g., (Gibbins 1992; Kimmel 2000)). The 
experiment design also adapted the strategy of testing both the low and high levels of 
the treatment using the same method. That is, only the change was measured in the 
present study. Finally, the results of the demographics analysis provided more 
evidence that the experiment mimicked real-life situations, as explained in detail in 
relation to the quantitative results (Chapter 6). 
 The second limitation of the second phase (the quantitative phase) is that, 
while extensive steps were taken to ensure the use of representative social 
engineering requests in the experiment, it cannot be guaranteed that all types of tricks 
that can be used by attackers have been covered. Social engineering is very broad, 
and it is sometimes difficult to classify a request as an attacking attempt or legitimate 
request (purely risky or purely safe). However, the focus of this study was on the 
characteristics of the source who sends the message, not the characteristics of the 
message itself; thus, a few examples should be sufficient. In addition, adequate 
consistency among the requests in all the experiments and sufficient variance 
between each experiment (treatment) and other treatments were established, 
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suggesting that the validity of the requests used to measure social engineering 
susceptibility was achieved. 
The third limitation relates to the second phase participants and sample. The 
participants of the quantitative experiment were chosen from three organisations 
located in Saudi Arabia. This means that the sample didn’t include all demographic 
variables, such as all religions or cultures. This limitation is common in research, and 
is inevitable due to geographical isolation, time and fund limitations. This limitation 
is perhaps more justifiable in experimental research since treatments must be 
engineered based on specific sample. For example, one of the treatments in this study 
involved the use of a celebrity’s identity; a celebrity known in one country may not 
be known in another country. As the organisations involved in the second phase of 
the study were located in Saudi Arabia, the characters (e.g., celebrities) used as 
experimental treatments were relevant to that country. 
1.11 Thesis Outline 
Mixed method studies, such as this study, are difficult to organise. Using 
grounded theory, which is considered to be reverse engineering, in the first phase 
might increase this difficulty (Dunne 2011). In line with grounded theory, some 
researchers suggest that the review of the literature should be conducted after data 
collection. Other researchers (e.g., (Dunne 2011; Urquhart 2000)) suggest that there 
is a need to conduct an initial literature review (especially when the researcher is a 
student) as it is important not to repeat earlier work. Dunne (2011) also argued that 
conducting the literature review before data collection is important in order to help 
researchers develop sensitised concepts and theoretical sensitivity. Such concepts 
enable the researcher to be sensitive to the subtleties of the meaning of the data, and 
increase the awareness of the empirical implications. This study followed the 
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recommendation by both Urquhart (2000) and Dunne (2011) that conducting the 
literature review is necessary at the beginning. This approach is reflected in the 
organisation of this thesis.  
The thesis is presented in eight chapters. Chapter 1 has presented the 
background of the problem, the motivation for the study, the research problem and 
research questions, the purpose, significance and scope of the study, and the 
limitations of the study. Chapter 2 reviews the literature in the areas pertinent to the 
research problem. This is an integrative literature review drawing on the disciplines 
of information technology, sociology, psychology, behaviourism, marketing and 
human communication. Chapter 3 reviews the literature with a particular emphasis 
on research conducted on SNSs. Chapter 4 presents the research methodology with 
an emphasis on the qualitative phase. Chapter 5 presents the results of the qualitative 
phase. Chapter 6 presents the research methodology with an emphasis on the 
quantitative phase. Chapter 7 presents the results of the quantitative phase. Finally, 
Chapter 8 presents the discussion and the conclusion of the thesis. 
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 Integrative Literature Review – Toward an 
Understanding of Social Engineering 
2.1 Overview 
Social engineering attacks are acts performed to influence others in order to 
gain information from them or to persuade them to perform an action that will 
benefit the attacker in some way (Hadnagy 2010; Thornburgh 2004; Workman 
2007). The concept of social engineering is therefore broad and complicated, 
especially in the virtual environment of SNSs. Some of the complexity of 
understanding and controlling social engineering threats in SNS arises because it 
involves different areas of research, such as information technology, sociology, 
psychology, behaviourism, marketing and human communication. In grounded 
theory research it is recommended that the related concepts and theories in multiple 
areas of study are reviewed in order to enhance the researcher’s theoretical 
sensitivity.   
Theoretical sensitivity refers to the researcher’s analytic capability to work 
with the collected data in both sensitive and theoretical ways (Glaser 1978; Glaser 
1992). Reviewing diverse areas of studies before conducting the research is 
important in grounded theory in order to provide the researcher with the sensitising 
concepts (Dunne 2011). The sensitising concepts are the initial ideas related to the 
research problem; they are the important concepts that influence the types of 
questions that the researcher investigates (Charmaz 2008). Such concepts enable the 
researcher to be sensitive to the subtleties of the meaning of the data, and increase 
the awareness of the empirical implications. 
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In order to conduct an effective review of the literature in multiple areas of 
research, a cyclical strategy was adopted in the present study (Figure 2.1) involving 
the following steps: 
1) Review the state of the art in social engineering publications. 
2) Discover any new area of research that is related to the phenomenon. 
3) Review the state of the art in that area of research in terms of social engineering. 
4) Find any other sub-related area of research. 
4) Understand the relationship between social engineering and that new area of 
research. 
5) Add the result and describe the relationship in a concise way. 
6) Go back to Step 1 if needed. 
The use of this strategy provides a researcher with a complete picture of the topic 
under study. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Literature Review Cycle 
 
This chapter first discusses social engineering as a type of dishonest persuasion 
(Section 2.2), taking into consideration the effectiveness of persuasion techniques in 
marketing to influence the customer to buy a product or service, and the possibility 
of using the same techniques in social engineering to trick and attack victims in an 
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SNS environment. Then, social engineering is discussed by reference to a range of 
novel concepts (Figure 2.2) as follows: social engineering as manipulation (Section 
2.3); social engineering as the exploitation of trust (Section 2.4); social engineering 
as the creation of misleading perceptions (Section 2.5); social engineering as 
deception (Section 2.6); social engineering as the dishonest seeking of help (Section 
2.7); and social engineering as the exploitation of human motivations and drives 
(Section 2.8). The conclusion of the chapter is then presented (Section 2.9). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Concept of Social Engineering 
 
2.2 Social Engineering as Dishonest Persuasion 
Persuasion is human communication that is “designed to influence others by 
modifying their beliefs, values, or attitudes” (Simons 1976, p. 21). Persuasion has 
been studied in marketing in order to both understand customer behaviours and learn 
how to persuade customers to buy a product or service. The findings of such studies 
suggest that emotion and reason are the essential elements in persuading customers 
(Chaudhuri 2012). Other studies suggest that the source credibility, such as the 
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speaker’s or seller’s credibility, is an important element in persuading the audience 
(Burgoon et al. 1990; Tormala and Petty 2004).   
In another field, human socio-psychology has been discussed in relation to 
social engineering to understand why humans are the weakest link in information 
security (Bezuidenhout et al. 2010; Gragg 2003; Mitnick and Simon 2001; Mouton et 
al. 2014; Nohlberg 2008; Peltier 2006). The discussions in these studies are mainly 
based on persuasion and influence in marketing, especially the principles of 
influence outlined by Cialdini (2001). The main limitation of these works is that the 
nature and purpose of persuasion and influence in marketing are different from the 
nature and purpose of social engineering in information security. In marketing, 
persuasion is considered to be an ethical way to convince potential customers about 
the benefits of buying a particular product, brand or service, while social engineering 
is an entirely unethical way of manipulating a victim for the benefit of the attacker. 
The fact that not all social engineering techniques involve persuasion or influence 
and, furthermore, that not all forms of persuasion or influence are considered to be a 
form of social engineering, illustrates the difference between these two concepts. 
Marketing research has established that most of the factors involved in 
persuading online customers to buy a product are intrinsic; furthermore, people can 
be influenced by persuasion to react to a trick used on the Internet (Yang et al. 2006). 
However, if the factors are extrinsic, then the surroundings must first change in order 
for an online user to comply; that is, customising the persuasive arguments for 
different consumers is a critical strategy for the initial building of online trust (Yang 
et al. 2006). The elaboration likelihood model (ELM) describes how attitudes are 
formed and changed (Petty and Cacioppo 1986), and it has been used to increase 
sales in a number of online businesses through studying new methods of persuasion. 
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Telemarketers use the results of these findings to convince online buyers to buy their 
products (Joyner et al. 2002).  
Social engineers and online marketers persuade people for different reasons. 
The marketers want to convince potential buyers to make purchases, while the aim of 
social engineers is to obtain valuable information or other kinds of benefits (Orgill et 
al. 2004). An experiment conducted by Workman (2007) used the analysis of a threat 
and the elaboration probability to examine the efficacy of the ELM in providing an 
explanation of deception. The results of this experiment can help explain how the 
same factors can be used in social engineering. Other research has investigated the 
design of persuasion used by marketers, with most of these studies based on the 
ELM. For example, De Vries (2009) investigated the use of psychological and social 
factors to persuade customers and analysed 50 different ways to persuade customers 
through a focus on the psychological factors of individual susceptibility, fear, trust 
and loyalty.  
 In the marketing literature, the understanding of human weaknesses and the 
resulting implications for persuasion has given rise to a number of principles of 
influence, namely, consistency, commitment, reciprocity, mutualism, fondness, 
liking, authority, fear, scarcity, and social proof. The literature on each of these 
principles is reviewed in the following sub-sections. This is followed by a discussion 
on the theories of persuasion and how these theories can be used to design social 
engineering attacks, with a particular focus on how social judgement theory, 
cognitive dissonance theory, source credibility theory and the ELM explain the 
concept of persuasion and the relationships between the components of persuasion.   
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2.2.1 Consistency and Commitment 
The idea of consistency is a subject of corporate research. Consistency as a trait 
enables a person to act in the same way repeatedly over time (Cialdini 2001). The 
normal consistency demonstrated by people comes from the belief that it is their 
obligation or custom to be consistent towards a person, organisation or task (Baker 
and Hart 2008). This consistency plays an important role in shaping the behaviour of 
people in a society. According to the cognitive discord and consistency hypothesis, 
in order to develop a feeling of wholeness, people have a high motivation to sustain 
unity between acceptable social behaviour and their approaches toward people and 
situations (Brafman and Brafman 2011).  
Workman (2007) identified three types of commitment behaviour that 
contribute to the success of social engineers: normative commitment, continuance 
commitment, and affective commitment. The mannerisms differ from one person to 
another depending on their psychological disposition towards maintaining 
relationships with a group of people, which compels them to evaluate the benefits 
that they are getting from such a relationship. Some people choose to be committed 
to a given group of people while others do not, because some people can be 
influenced to maintain their membership more easily (Workman 2007).  
People work toward maintaining social ties that provide satisfactory feelings 
attached to a person or a group of individuals (Hadnagy 2010). Because of these ties, 
there are people who will study the behaviour exhibited by individuals to make them 
participate more in their activities. Online marketing companies have tapped into this 
human psychological need in order to persuade buyers to maintain their purchases of 
certain products that elevate them to a class of people to which they aim to be tied 
(Foxall et al. 1998).  
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The feeling that one is being watched, for example by a friend or a group that 
the person has committed to, makes the person conform to certain habits (Bateson et 
al. 2006). Other individuals are so susceptible that they try to emulate people they 
have not even met, and those individuals give out personal information even if the 
other party does not reveal themselves or does not express a need for their 
information.  
The act of giving out valuable information is a common observation in SNSs 
such as Facebook, where swindlers befriend users and dupe them into revealing 
crucial information regarding their personal or work information. Swindlers make the 
victims believe that their relationship with a social circle holds more importance than 
the information that they are about to reveal (Baker and Hart 2008). Finally, on the 
topic of consistency and commitment, it is important to mention that training on 
social engineering defence and awareness is most beneficial for people who have 
higher levels of commitment (Workman 2008). 
2.2.2 Reciprocity and Mutualism 
When people receive gifts or assistance from other people, they develop a 
feeling of discordance until the favours are reciprocated (Hadnagy 2010). Most 
individuals wish to give back in equal measure when an opportunity presents itself. 
The degree to which people reciprocate favours depends on the intrinsic value 
assigned by the receiver to the gift (Cialdini 2001). For example, a flower offered to 
a fiancée could be worth thousands of dollars depending on who is offering it. People 
exchanging gifts have a way of determining the value of their gifts. Moreover, they 
will expect the mutual relationship to be fair (Navarro and Karlins 2009). 
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People tend to sustain such a relationship even if the other party falls short of 
fulfilling obligations (Mitnick and Simon 2001). For example, two people agree to 
exchange a gift for a given piece of information, but the person who was supposed to 
offer the gift fails for some reason. The other party, however, may choose to remain 
loyal and still fulfil his or her end of the bargain, and social engineers can use this 
psychological phenomenon to get valuable information from unsuspecting users 
(O'Connor and Seymour 2011).  
The concept of consistent behaviour explains that people develop a trusting 
disposition towards consistent others and will feel compelled to return a favour even 
in the absence of sufficient proof of the other’s identity. The commitments that have 
been discussed so far are concerned with simple acts of mutual behaviour where a 
person feels obligated to return a gift or benefit in order to sustain a relationship. 
This behaviour involves a series of investments in the form of time and resources 
that build from the perception that, without such a relationship, one is at a loss 
(DeVries 2009). Therefore, the parties involved will be loyal to each other directly or 
implicitly. 
With continued reciprocity, a psychological commitment to adhere to decisions 
made in the past is cultivated, and it will sustain a consistent behaviour that is 
attached to the decisions a person makes (O'Connor and Seymour 2011). This has 
been observed in the business world where businesspeople will continue to invest 
more funds into an enterprise or undertaking even when they have sufficient 
information suggesting these actions may be wrong. This is a never-say-die attitude 
in which people believe that, in the end, this consistency will lead to increased 
profitability.  
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2.2.3 Fondness and Liking 
It has been established in research that most people are drawn closer to 
individuals they are fond of and they end up developing trust in them (Seiter and 
Gass 2010). This explains why people tend to believe online professionals even if 
their expertise, identity, or credentials is not reflected in their online activities. This 
fact can be used by social engineers to pretend to be celebrities endorsing a product 
to draw the attention of their victims (Hadnagy 2010; Mitnick and Simon 2001). 
People tend to be fond of others who are attractive, charismatic, popular or 
charming (Cialdini 2001; Ekman 2007). Ekman (2007) explained that characteristics 
such as these can be used by those who have them to influence others and gain their 
affection. People with those traits can cause real damage to others while thinking that 
their behaviours are realistic and appropriate. The triggering of emotions that comes 
from interacting with individuals who possess those kinds of characteristics can lead 
some people to act in ways they may regret later. 
Social engineers communicate with their victims very confidently. They 
explain that they could be their match or pretend to be important people in order to 
trick users into maintaining ties with them (Hadnagy 2010). Such traits can draw an 
SNS user into believing that they have met an important person and therefore the 
user will keep visiting a particular site in order to catch up on a conversation. This is 
one example that shows the great impact of source characteristics on users’ 
susceptibility to attackers. 
2.2.4 Authority and Fear 
Online marketers and people who collect debts employ tactics such as instilling 
panic and using their influence to make others comply (Cialdini 2001). Social 
 Chapter 2: Integrative Literature Review – Toward an Understanding of Social Engineering 35 
engineers adopt these practices to deliver authoritative instructions and create a sense 
of panic in order to obtain valuable information from victims (Mitnick and Simon 
2001). One method involves sending emails containing messages that persuade the 
recipient to abide by their requirements: for example, “Equity Bank requires some 
details from you” or “Your Facebook profile will be held on probation” or “Wrong 
data entry”.  
The email messages usually have threats or warnings of serious outcomes if the 
recipient fails to comply. Some sites also use this tactic by posing as legitimate 
websites and adopting a formal approach in communicating with potential victims. 
Victims are given a procedure to follow and some data fields to fill in. Fraudsters 
pose as government authorities and target elderly members of the community by 
making calls or sending text messages (O'Connor and Seymour 2011). They then 
proceed to pressure victims, instilling panic in them in order to get them to make 
financial contributions to schemes.  
The research has provided a proof of the degree to which a person should give 
in to the wishes of a person in authority (Navarro and Karlins 2009). Compliance is a 
behaviour that makes a person continue to conform to the wishes of those who are 
more powerful or influential. The use of influence or authority to instil terror or panic 
causes people to submit to instructions because they fear losing a benefit or 
experiencing an attack. Social engineering thrives on those people who give in to 
fear and orders from influential people (Mitnick and Simon 2001).  
It is worth noting that the extent of compliance to instructions and the degree of 
obedient behaviour varies from one person to another. Traits such as confidence 
determine the degree to which people will comply, even if they are surrounded by 
people who are very domineering (Tomba 2004). In addition, individuals who 
 36 Chapter 2: Integrative Literature Review – Toward an Understanding of Social Engineering 
perceive themselves as the subjects of dominance tend to resist domineering 
behaviours by psychologically training themselves to confront people in positions of 
authority. These reactions are spurred by a perception that their fundamental rights 
are being overlooked and that the mandate of the person with authority is being 
overstepped. This motivates a person to try and recover a liberty that has been lost in 
order to avoid losing more freedom.  
In the face of attempts to instil panic or fright, people’s responses will depend 
on the loss that they stand to incur, the likelihood of the threat occurring, and the 
efficiency of the reaction (Posey et al. 2014). Social engineers employ the use of fear 
by issuing threats and monitoring how people respond to the threats (O'Connor and 
Seymour 2011). Those who show a greater concern or reply to their messages are 
more likely to become the victims of schemes (Workman 2008). Workman (2008) 
suggests that punishment as a deterrent is the most beneficial solution for those who 
perceive greater fear. 
2.2.5 Scarcity 
A perception of scarcity can trigger a sense of panic and this weakness is 
exploited by online attackers to make users respond quickly to a social engineering 
trick. Once a perceived shortage is created, people will react due to the tendency to 
hoard in order to benefit from the shortage in the long-term or to avoid later 
deprivations. People will respond almost immediately so that they do not miss the 
(false) opportunities that are posted on web pages and in social media messages. 
Therefore, social engineers collect information or elicit a response from users by 
creating a perception of scarcity based on the knowledge that victims will react faster 
to avoid losing out on a rare and valuable commodity or opportunity (Brafman and 
Brafman 2011).  
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Reactance theory holds that people will modify their thoughts and behaviours 
when they perceive that someone or some constraint such as time may prevent them 
from obtaining certain goods or services (Cialdini 2001). People tend to believe that 
they have alternatives to certain benefits and opportunities, but in situations where 
the options to access those benefits and opportunities are threatened, a person will 
feel forced to comply (Joyner et al. 2002). 
People perceive threats differently, and their reactions to threats vary, more so 
when a threat is concerned with a scarcity rather than a direct threat (Hadnagy 2010). 
In the case where a social engineer creates the perception of scarcity about an item or 
creates a time limitation for obtaining a product or service, those who respond faster 
and more willingly to shortage threats are more likely to succumb to the social 
engineering tricks than those who do not demonstrate urgency in their reaction to a 
perceived deficiency (Mitnick and Simon 2001). 
Cialdini (2001) explained that scarcity can be observed in everyday marketing 
and advertisements, where terms such as “limited supply” or “for limited time only” 
are frequently used. He pointed out that consumers might buy something even if they 
don’t need it if they are told that it is the last one available. 
2.2.6 Social Proof 
The term “social proof” refers to doing what others do regardless of the 
importance or correctness of that action. It encompasses the influence of others on 
the behaviour of an individual. It can lead people to do things that might not be in 
their interest, such as wearing specific clothes at a specific event because of the 
popularity of those kinds of clothes, or purchasing products because of their 
popularity (Cialdini 2001). 
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Social proof has been found to be one of the more powerful strategies in 
persuasion (Cialdini et al. 1999). The implication of this principle from the security 
perspective is that people behave according to the general attitude rather than 
according to an understanding of what is secure. Even if security policy is written in 
a way that prevents a threat, the users can be influenced by the behaviour of the 
majority to accept threats (Sasse et al. 2001). 
2.2.7 Theories of Persuasion 
Persuasion comprises the following three main elements: the sender or the 
source, the mean or the message, and the recipient (O'Keefe 2002). According to 
O’Keefe (2002), persuasion must involve a goal and the intent to achieve that goal on 
the part of the sender, while the recipient must have free will and must not be 
persuaded by force. In the case of social engineering in SNSs, as depicted in Figure 
2.3, the sender is the social engineer or the attacker, the message is the trick or the 
technique, and the recipient is the user. The concept of persuasion and the 
relationships between the three main elements involved in it can be understood by 
reference to four theories of persuasion, namely, social judgement theory, cognitive 
dissonance theory, source credibility theory and the ELM. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Main Elements of Social Engineering in SNSs 
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Social Judgment Theory 
Social judgment theory suggests that people evaluate and judge the content of 
any message based on their anchors, or stance, on a particular topic or message; that 
is, people accept the message or reject it based on their cognitive map (Sherif and 
Hovland 1961). The principle behind this theory is that there are three areas in which 
an individual accepts or rejects a particular persuasive message. The first is the 
acceptance area, which is where the individual places the message they consider to 
be acceptable. The second is the latitude of rejection area, which is where the 
individual places the message they consider to be rejectable. The third is the latitude 
of non-commitment, which is where the individual places the message in a “no 
opinion” area as they find it neither acceptable nor rejectable. 
Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that when individuals are faced with two 
good choices, they find themselves unsure about the choice to make. They will tend 
to downplay one choice in order to reassure themselves about selecting the other 
(Festinger 1962). Cognitive dissonance theory explains this by assuming that, when 
individuals are persuaded to do something or not to do something, an outside source 
simply has to provide enough ammunition to change attitudes or beliefs; that is, 
individuals cannot engage in actions that they believe are wrong, and therefore they 
either stop the action or believe that they are right. For example, to convince a victim 
to perform an action, a social engineer first needs to convince the victim that it is a 
good action; however, if the victim’s beliefs do not match this action, the social 
engineer first needs to persuade the victim to change their beliefs.  
 40 Chapter 2: Integrative Literature Review – Toward an Understanding of Social Engineering 
Source Credibility Theory 
Source credibility theory states that people are more likely to be persuaded 
when the source presents itself as credible (Hovland et al. 1953). The theory is 
broken into the following three models: the factor, the functional, and the 
constructivist model. The aim of these models is to narrow the wide scope of the 
theory. The factor model helps determine to what extent the receiver judges the 
source as credible. The functional model views credibility as the degree to which a 
source meets a receiver’s needs. The constructivist model shows what the receiver 
does with the persuader’s proposal or message. This theory is explained in more 
detail in Chapter 3. 
Elaboration Likelihood Model 
The ELM states that there are two routes or methods to influence others: the 
central route and the peripheral route (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). The central route 
uses message elaboration and can produce a positive attitude change and encourage 
the receiver to obey. Centrally-routed messages include a wealth of information, 
rational arguments and evidence to support a particular conclusion. If the argument 
of the message is strong, it will create a positive cognitive response in the mind of 
the receiver while also positively aligning the receiver’s beliefs with the views of the 
persuader. On the other hand, if the argument is weak, it will produce a negative 
cognitive response to the persuasive message, which in turn prevents an attitude 
change and causes the receiver not to obey. 
The peripheral route relies on a receiver’s emotional involvement and thus 
persuades the receiver through more superficial means. The principles of influence 
that were explained earlier, such as authority, commitment, liking, scarcity and social 
proof, are all examples of peripheral cues or routes. 
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2.3 Social Engineering as Manipulation 
Manipulation is very similar to persuasion, in that they have the same three 
main elements, namely, the sender or the source, the mean or the message, and the 
recipient. Both manipulation and persuasion also use emotion and reason to achieve 
the goal, and the credibility of the sender likewise plays a vital role in both. 
However, researchers and philosophers have discussed the difference between 
persuasion and manipulation. For example, as Van Dijk (2008) observed:  
The crucial difference in this case is that in persuasion the interlocutors 
are free to believe or act as they please, depending on whether or not they 
accept the arguments of the persuader, whereas in manipulation 
recipients are typically assigned a more passive role: they are victims of 
manipulation. This negative consequence of manipulative discourse 
typically occurs when the recipients are unable to understand the real 
intentions or to see the full consequences of the beliefs or actions 
advocated by the manipulator. (Van Dijk 2008, p. 212) 
In addition, Nedelea and Nedelea (2008) argued that manipulation and 
persuasion are different in that manipulation “is based on persuasion, meaning the 
tendency of being responsive to influences…. Manipulation is an instrument, its 
ethics are set by the person who’s using it and not by the instrument itself” (Nedelea 
and Nedelea 2008, p. 46). Further, Fishkin (2009) noted that: 
A person has been manipulated by communication when she has been 
exposed to a message intended to change her views in a way she would 
not accept if she were to think about it on the basis of good conditions. 
(Fishkin 2009, p. 14) 
Consequently, it can be seen that social engineering is a form of manipulation 
that uses characteristics of persuasion to trick the victim. Emotion and reason are the 
essential elements of a persuasive message (Chaudhuri 2012), and a social engineer 
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can abuse this fact and use dishonest emotion or value to trick and encourage the 
victim to obey. On the other hand, the source credibility plays an important role in 
persuading the recipient to obey (Burgoon et al. 1990; Tormala and Petty 2004), and 
this fact can be abused by social engineering attackers as they can impersonate any 
character with a certain amount of credibility, such as a friend, an expert, a celebrity, 
or a representative of an organisation that the victim trusts, in order to trick the 
victim. The main theory that addresses manipulation is information manipulation 
theory, which is discussed next. 
Information Manipulation Theory 
Information manipulation theory states that a speaker purposefully and covertly 
violates one of the conversational maxims of quantity, quality, relation and manner 
with the intention of deceiving their listener (McCornack 1992). The maxim of 
quantity is related to the amount of information that should be provided within a 
message. It refers to the person’s expectation that the argument will be as 
informative as possible. The maxim of quality is related to expectations about the 
veracity of the information. It refers to the person’s expectation that they will be 
presented with information that is clear, truthful and complete. The maxim of 
relation is related to the expectation of contributing relevant information to the 
argument. Finally, the maxim of manner refers to the way in which the message and 
argument are presented and delivered rather than who sent or presented it; that is, it 
refers to how a message is presented rather than the actual content of the message. 
The significance of information manipulation theory is that it explains the different 
types of deception as well as the multiple ways in which deception can occur. 
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2.4 Social Engineering as an Exploitation of Trust 
Trust plays a vital role in social engineering; however, “trust” is a complicated 
term with multiple dimensions that lead to multiple meanings. There has been little 
agreement on the definition of trust (Bhuiyan et al. 2010). Nevertheless, some 
researchers (e.g., (Charbaji and Jannoun 2005; Chen and Barnes 2007)) indicate that 
some people have a greater tendency to trust generally than do others. The trusting 
nature varies among human beings, and people believe what others say depending on 
the trust that has been built. According to Mitnick and Simon (2001), a person who is 
under-trusting stands to lose a given benefit or opportunity. Such a person may be 
paranoid or continually tense. In contrast, those who are overly trusting will monitor 
their actions less often and will be less efficient and possibly incompetent; therefore, 
social engineers will tend to target them, which could result in the loss of money or 
useful information. Being overly trusting limits the cognitive functions of people in 
relation to their surroundings, such that they become so comfortable that their 
thoughts, actions and attention are limited, making them vulnerable to manipulation 
(Workman 2008). 
Trust has been studied in marketing in relation to persuasion, and it has been 
found that the characteristic of trusting people over the Internet is important in 
formulating marketing tricks (Chen and Barnes 2007). Internet retailers utilise the 
weakness of overly trusting others to deceive users about products having the 
endorsement of celebrities or even to feign legitimacy through high-quality websites 
in order to gain the trust of consumers (Cialdini 2001).  
Social engineers may employ these tricks in fake websites or in emails. They 
may also take an emotive or individualistic approach in communicating with people 
who could potentially fall victim to their activities (Mitnick and Simon 2001). All 
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this is done with the aim of making a user feel similar to them through appealing to 
common feelings such as anxiety or loneliness in order to gain trust (Cialdini 2001). 
There has been significant research in marketing on how people trust others over the 
Internet. Such studies indicate that there are different factors that affect trust and 
therefore affect how people deal with the threat (Fam et al. 2004; Wu et al. 2010). 
There are also a number of key aspects that may affect the trustworthiness and 
effectiveness of communications on cyber-security risks (Nurse et al. 2011). Two 
theories relevant to the exploitation of trust are the theory of psychosocial 
development and the Ben Franklin effect theory, each of which is discussed next.  
Theory of Psychosocial Development 
The theory of psychosocial development attempts to answer the question about 
who we can trust. According to this theory, the trust versus mistrust stage occurs 
between birth and approximately 18 months of age (Erikson 1950; Munley 1975). 
During this stage of life, trust is built and personality is shaped through the child’s 
experience and learning whether or not they can trust the people around them. For 
example, the child starts trusting those who provide care when they cry, are 
frightened or feel pain.  
This theory reflects the two important factors that determine whether or not an 
individual trusts or mistrusts others even during the early stage of life. These factors 
are needs (such as feeding) and emotions (such as fright). Based on this theory, it can 
be said that a person trusts those who can satisfy their needs and emotions. 
Ben Franklin Effect Theory 
The Ben Franklin effect theory states that, when we do a person a favour, we 
tend to like them more as a result (Jecker and Landy 1969). The reverse effect is also 
true. That is, when we like someone we are more willing to do them a favour. In 
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other words, this theory states that when we do someone a favour, we are more likely 
to do it again. Jecker and Landy (1969) tested this theory by involving students in an 
intellectual contest where they expected to win a specific amount of money. Later on, 
the students were divided into three groups: 
 Group 1 was approached by the researcher who asked the members to do him 
a favour and return the money they had won as he had been using his own 
funds and was running short. 
 Group 2 was approached by a secretary who asked the members to return the 
money they had won as it was from the psychology department; they were 
also told that the funds in the department were low. 
 The members in Group 3 were allowed to keep their winnings. 
The members of all three groups were then surveyed to see how much they 
liked the researcher. Group 2 rated the researcher lower than Group 3, and Group 1 
rated the researcher higher than Group 3.  
2.5 Social Engineering as the Creation of Misleading Perceptions 
Through the creation of a misleading perception (illusion), the attacker makes 
the victim feel safe and therefore not able to perceive the threat. Safety is defined as 
“the condition of being protected from or unlikely to cause danger, risk, or injury” 
(oxforddictionaries.com, 2013). According to Greenberg et al. (1997), when people 
are threatened, they will alter their behaviour depending on the number of risks they 
can accommodate. This modification is a psychological reaction that is determined 
by the seriousness of an attack and the amount of loss that the individual thinks they 
will incur because of the occurrence of a hazard (Rosenstock 1974). For attackers, 
the ability to determine the maximum amount of threat that a person is willing to 
accommodate helps them to determine the optimal time to launch the attack (Mitnick 
and Simon 2001). 
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As a result of their scrutiny of the evaluation of a threat and the behavioural 
response to a risk, O'Connor and Seymour (2011) proposed that these behavioural 
responses are based on the following psychological principles: (1) People regard 
their lives, liberty and property to be more important than anything else; (2) In as 
much as people may be wary of risks, they have some level of acceptance, 
preference, tolerance and wishes toward some risks; and (3) The extent of the danger 
a person can accept is determined by balancing the perceived benefits over losses in 
choosing to behave in a certain way.  
People adapt to certain habits based on what they believe in and the 
postulations that they have about life (Foxall et al. 1998). Moreover, this is what 
guides them in the activities they choose to undertake. A set of values is built over a 
period of time, after which the person tends to know what to expect from their 
surroundings. However, the person is not aware that the way he or she responds to 
the environment starts with the suppositions that he or she has made (Foxall et al. 
1998). Generally, the delusion of insusceptibility is a protective measure against fear, 
depression and the anxiety associated with ill fortune (Navarro and Karlins 2009). 
This knowledge can be applied to the study of social engineering in the information 
security field in order to identify the factors that lead users to feel safe or threatened. 
Two theories relevant to the creation of misleading perceptions are the health belief 
model and the protection motivation theory. Each of these theories is discussed next, 
followed by an overview of the factors that researchers believe have a particular 
effect on the creation of misleading perceptions through social engineering.  
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Health Belief Model 
Rosenstock (1974) illustrated the relationship between behaviour and threat 
through the health belief model. According to the model, the probability of 
performing a risky action is determined by four main elements: 
 The perceived threat of taking the action 
 The perceived benefit of taking the action 
 The perceived susceptibility to the threat 
 The perceived seriousness of the threat.  
 
Aldoory and Van Dyke (2006) stated that the problems of performing a risky 
action are explained by both the health belief model and the situational theory of 
publics. The latter suggests that a population can be classed depending on how its 
members behave, that is, whether they are active or passive (Aldoory and Van Dyke 
2006). The psychological issues concerned with this theory include: (1) the extent of 
activity in behaviour, (2) familiarisation with problems, and (3) the knowledge of 
constraints (Brafman and Brafman 2011).  
Zimbardo (2007) explained that the level of familiarisation with problems is 
different among people; some people will think that a predicament is more relevant 
to them, whereas others will not be concerned with the same anguish. The extent of 
activity in this behaviour varies depending on the feelings a person attaches to a 
predicament and the amount of loss that they believe they may incur in case an attack 
occurs (Orgill et al. 2004). Knowledge of constraints shows the degree to which 
people consider their mannerisms to be restrained by issues that are uncontrollable. 
Orgill et al. (2004) stated that the psychological trait of neuroticism causes anxiety 
and paranoia depending on the nature of the attack. 
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Protection Motivation Theory 
The protection motivation theory proposes that individuals protect themselves 
based on four factors: the perceived severity of a threatening event, the perceived 
vulnerability (the probability of the occurrence of that threat), the efficacy of the 
recommended preventive action or behaviour, and the perceived self-efficacy (Posey 
et al. 2014). Due to the fact that many security-related behaviours are difficult to 
examine while ensuring compliance with the ethical requirements associated with 
running such experiments in real life, protection motivation theory provide a solid 
theoretical foundation for research in information security. 
Relying on protection motivation theory, several studies in the information 
systems domain have investigated individuals’ susceptibility to security victimisation 
by studying employees’ compliance with organisations’ security policies (e.g., 
(Johnston et al. 2015; Posey et al. 2013; Posey et al. 2014; Vance et al. 2014)). 
Protection motivation theory also allows researchers to predict individuals’ 
behaviours regarding risky actions by studying their perceptions regarding one or 
more of the factors involved in the theory. 
Factors Enabling the Creation of Misleading Perceptions through Social 
Engineering  
Based on the stories, examples or possibility of occurrence of social 
engineering attacks, researchers have considered the other factors that might help 
social engineers to trick people or that might affect people’s ability to detect 
deception. These factors include strong affect and overloading.  
Social engineers can use strong affect as a “trigger” to deceive their victims 
(Gragg 2003). The strong sense of surprise, anticipation or anger leads victims to 
make inaccurate judgments, and, therefore, victims will be less likely to think about 
the actions that they take (Gragg 2003).  
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In overloading, the victims have to deal with a lot of information in a limited 
time (Gragg 2003). Hammond (2000) explained how time pressure can effect human 
decision-making. The application of time pressure affects the logical functioning of 
human judgment, and, therefore, the victim is more willing to accept arguments that 
they should have challenged (Petty et al. 2002). 
Finally, it is worth noting that West, Mayhorn, Hardee and Mendel (2009) 
divide the psychological perspective of why users make poor security decisions into 
three categories: (1) User factors, such as problem-solving limitations and decision-
making heuristics and experience; (2) Technology factors, such as the credible 
appearance and personal relevance of the email or website that tricks the users; and 
(3) Environmental factors, such as time pressure and inattention blindness, whereby 
users may not perceive details of the threat.  
2.6 Social Engineering as Deception 
People, in general, think that they are good at detecting deception and lies. 
However, research indicates that people have weaknesses and therefore perform 
poorly in detecting deception (Grazioli 2004; Qi 2007). The strong relationship 
between deception and social engineering illustrates the complexity of detecting and 
controlling social engineering attacks. On the organisational level, the findings by 
Kvedar et al. (2010) suggest that social engineers could succeed even among those 
organisations that identify themselves as being aware of social engineering 
techniques.  
Marett et al. (2004) explained that the reason why people are weak and perform 
poorly in detecting deception is because of the “lie detector bias”, namely, the 
assumption that most people are telling the truth. Most of the literature on social 
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engineering indicates that the main causes of the human weaknesses that lead people 
to fall victim to social engineering are human socio-psychological characteristics 
(Bezuidenhout et al. 2010; Mohebzada et al. 2010; Pattinson et al. 2012; Twitchell 
2006).  
Although the extant literature identifies the principles of persuasion and 
influence in the exploitation of human vulnerabilities in marketing, thus far, there is 
no theoretical framework specifically grounding the study of the factors that affect 
social engineering threats in information security. Sun et al. (2012) stated that those 
factors are complicated and challenging to identify, even if they seem to be simple. 
Generally, the concept of deception is addressed through interpersonal deception 
theory, which is explained next. 
Interpersonal Deception Theory 
Interpersonal deception theory describes deception that is used in the context of 
the interaction between two people. This theory posits that the following three 
strategies can be used for deception: falsification, concealment, and equivocation 
(Buller and Burgoon 1996). Falsification is another way of saying “lying”; for 
example, an attacker says that a downloadable file contains a free e-book when it 
actually contains malicious software. Concealment involves hiding either the whole 
truth or part of the truth; for example, an attacker says that a downloadable file 
contains a free e-book when it actually contains malicious software as well as a free 
e-book. Equivocation involves avoiding the truth by changing the subject or offering 
indirect responses. Interpersonal deception theory explains the different types of 
deception by exploring the interrelation between the communicative meaning of the 
deceiver and the victim’s cognition and behaviours in the context of deceptive 
exchanges. 
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2.7 Social Engineering as Dishonest Help-Seeking 
In general, people tend to help others. Helping others gives some people a 
sense of satisfaction, while for others the feeling they gain from helping is a sense of 
belonging (Batson et al. 1989; Toi and Batson 1982). Generally, people feel happier 
when they help others, and this phenomenon can be abused by social engineers who 
seek to accomplish their own goals by asking for help from others. That is, social 
engineers can use dishonest emotions or reasons to encourage the victim to help 
them. The theories that explain why people are willing to help others include the 
empathy–altruism hypothesis, equity theory and politeness theory, each of which is 
discussed next.  
Empathy–Altruism Hypothesis 
The empathy–altruism theory states that people are willing to help others in the 
following two main ways:  
 If they feel empathy, they are likely to help others without any selfish 
thoughts. 
 If they do not feel empathy, they will help others but only if the rewards 
(benefit) of helping outweigh the costs (loss) (Batson et al. 1989; Toi 
and Batson 1982). 
The benefit can come in many forms, such as winning a prize, relief from 
distress, or gaining appreciation from others. The loss can include diminished health 
or lost time, among other things. 
Equity Theory 
Equity theory states that people tend to be happiest in relationships where the 
giving and taking are about equal. The theory posits that getting too little from a 
relationship leads to unhappiness, and getting too much from a relationship leads to 
feelings of guilt about the imbalance (Adams et al. 1976). 
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Politeness Theory 
Politeness theory states that, in response to any request, people maintain one of 
the two following faces: a positive-based face, or a negative-based face (Brown 
1987). A positive-based face is one which reflects liking, appreciating, loving or 
respecting. A negative-based face expresses that there is no constraint in any way. 
Politeness theory indicates that people act politely or rudely depending on 
whether or not they care about the requester. If they care about the person who 
requests a favour (such as a parent, husband or boss), they will show a positive face; 
however, if someone that they do not care about makes such a request, they will 
show a negative face. 
2.8 Social Engineering as the Exploitation of Motivations and Drives 
People are affected by their motivations and drives, and as described earlier, 
social engineers abuse human characteristics in order to trick victims. Human 
motivations are among those characteristics that need to be understood in order to 
predict human behaviours and therefore to help control social engineering threats. 
The literature on human behaviours from a social engineering point of view can be 
categorised into two categories: needs-based behaviours and emotion-based 
behaviours. The attacker can use either human needs or emotions to encourage the 
user to accept the trick and fall victim to the attack. For example, the attacker can 
exploit the sexual desires of the victim and send them malicious software embed in a 
sexual video. The attacker could also exploit the greed of a victim and send them 
malicious software embedded in a free e-book. Additionally, an attacker can use 
emotions, such as a strong sense of surprise, anticipation or anger, to make victims 
fall for the trick. The literature on needs-based behaviours and emotion-based 
behaviours is reviewed in more detail in the following sections. 
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2.8.1 Needs-Based Behaviours 
Many studies have investigated how human needs motivate and shape human 
behaviours. Depending on the need, a specific motivation will arise and drive the 
person to behave in a certain manner. Several theories have been developed to 
illustrate this relationship. The major theories of motivation are the incentive theory, 
drive reduction theory, psychoanalytic theory and humanistic theory, each of which 
is discussed next.  
Incentive Theory of Motivation 
According to the incentive theory, people behave in a certain way in order to 
gain an external reward (Kerr 1975). For example, people may travel from place to 
place to find enough water or food, or work twelve hours per day to increase their 
income. 
Drive Reduction Theory of Motivation 
The drive reduction theory suggests that the reduction of drives is the primary 
force behind motivation (Hull 1935). That is, people are motivated to behave in a 
certain way in order to reduce the internal tension that is caused by biological needs. 
The theory posits that these needs represent the drives of the internal states of tension 
which must be reduced, such as thirst, hunger or the need for warmth. 
Psychoanalytic Theory of Motivation 
The psychoanalytic theory of motivation suggests that all human behaviours, 
thought and emotion have one of two basic drives: “life” or “death” drives (Freud et 
al. 1958). According to the theory, people will always behave in the manner that they 
think will enable them to live longer or avoid death. 
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Humanistic Theory of Motivation 
The humanistic theory is the most important theory for illustrating human 
motivations. Humanistic theory suggests that people have strong cognitive reasons 
for performing various actions (Maslow 1943). The theory classifies different 
motivations at different levels in a hierarchy of needs. All motivations are driven by 
human needs, and each level in this hierarchy has more motivational priority than the 
next level (Maslow 1943). The levels of needs in what is now commonly-known as 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (in ascending order of priority) are physiological needs, 
safety and security needs, social needs, self-esteem needs and self-actualisation 
needs, as follows: 
a. Physiological needs – Physiological needs are the starting point for motivational 
theory, and they represent the bottom of the hierarchy. While Maslow (1943) 
indicated that it was impossible or useless to list all physiological needs, he gave 
some examples such as the need for food, water, sleep and sex. 
b. Safety and security needs – If the physiological needs are relatively well 
satisfied, people will behave in a certain way that makes them feel safe and secure. 
Security needs are important for survival, but they are not as demanding as 
physiological needs. Safety and security needs include a desire for employment, 
health care, safe neighbourhoods and stability. 
c. Social needs – According to Maslow’s hierarchy, social needs, or the need for 
love and belonging, are less basic than physiological and security needs. 
Relationships, such as friendships, romantic attachments and families, help fulfil the 
need for companionship and acceptance. Maslow (1943) pointed out that love is 
different from sex, in that sex is a purely physiological need. 
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d. Self-esteem needs – Self-esteem needs come after the social needs in the level of 
priority. Maslow (1943) argued that there are two categories of self-esteem needs. 
The first category includes the needs for strength, achievement, adequacy, 
independence and freedom. The second category includes the needs for reputation, 
prestige, recognition, attention, importance and appreciation. 
e. Self-actualisation needs – At the highest level of Maslow’s hierarchy, self-
actualisation needs include the need for an understanding of the self, a sense of 
completeness and a sense of being the best. Self-actualisation also includes having a 
concern for personal growth, having less concern about the opinions of others, and 
having an interest in fulfilling one’s potential. According to Maslow (1943), no 
individual ever reaches the peak of the hierarchy. 
2.8.2 Emotion-Based Behaviours 
Emotion has been investigated since the early 1900s as a vital drive of human 
behaviours. In the social engineering context, a strong affect is one example of the 
use of emotion to trigger behaviours. As discussed above, social engineers can use 
emotions as a tactic to deceive their victims (Gragg 2003). A strong sense of an 
emotion such as surprise, anticipation or anger leads victims to make inaccurate 
judgments (Gragg 2003).  
Watson (1919, p. 165) defined emotion as “an heredity pattern-reaction 
involving profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of 
the visceral and glandular systems” (Watson 1919, p. 165). Tolman (1923) defined 
emotion as the readiness or drive for any behaviour. Emotion was defined by Arnold 
(1960) as “the felt tendency toward anything intuitively appraised as good 
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(beneficial), or away from anything intuitively appraised as bad (harmful)” (Arnold 
1960, p. 182). 
One important aspect of studying emotion is the discovery of the different 
types of emotions. Several studies have addressed this subject, of which the two most 
important—Ekman’s and Plutchik’s studies of basic emotions—are presented next. 
This is followed by an overview of the major theories that have been developed to 
illustrate the relationships between emotions and behaviours, namely, the James–
Lange theory, Cannon–Bard theory, Schachter–Singer theory and instinct theory.  
Ekman’s Basic Emotions 
Ekman (1999) conducted research with the aim to discover the basic emotions 
of humans and proposed the existence of six basic and universal emotions: anger, 
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise. 
Plutchik’s Basic Emotions 
Plutchik (2001) also studied emotion, and proposed the existence of eight 
primary emotions: anger, fear, sadness, disgust, surprise, anticipation, trust and joy. 
These emotions and the relationships between them are explained through a model 
called the wheel of emotions in which the emotions are juxtaposed as: joy vs sadness, 
trust vs disgust, fear vs anger, and surprise vs anticipation. 
James–Lange Theory 
The James–Lange theory suggests that an event causes a bodily response, and 
that the bodily response causes the emotion (James 1884). For example, if a man sees 
a snake nearby, his heart will begin to race. The brain will then notice the heart 
racing and determine that the man is experiencing fear. 
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Cannon–Bard Theory 
The Cannon–Bard theory contradicts the James–Lange theory and suggests that 
the experience of the emotion and the bodily response occur at the same time, 
independently of each other (Cannon 1927). For example, a racing heart can mean 
fear, but it can also mean excitation in a positive way. Therefore, this theory posits 
that the emotions occur independently of the body’s response. 
Schachter–Singer Theory 
The Schachter–Singer theory suggests that emotion requires a bodily response, 
and at the same time, needs an explanation of the cause of that bodily response 
(Schachter and Singer 1962). That is, when an event occurs the bodily reaction will 
follow, and at the same time the brain (depending on that situation) will determine 
why this specific bodily reaction has occurred. For example, when the heart races, 
the brain notices this and at the same time observes the event, therefore explaining 
why the heart is racing and determining an emotion. 
Instinct Theory 
Instinct theory is a motivational theory, but also provides insights into the 
relationship between emotion and behaviour. The theory suggests that people are 
evolutionarily programmed to behave in certain ways (Harlow 1969; James 2010). 
James (2010) argued that all humans, and even other animals, are born with specific 
innate knowledge about how to survive, including sucking, swallowing and 
coughing. He created a list of human instincts that are manifest in behaviours and 
emotions including attachment, play, shame, anger, fear, shyness, modesty and love.  
2.9 Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter has addressed the concept of social engineering from a range of 
possible angles based on the theories of related disciplines, such as psychology, 
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sociology, information technology, marketing and behaviourism. It has investigated 
social engineering as dishonest persuasion, manipulation, the exploitation of trust, 
the creation of misleading perceptions, deception, dishonest help-seeking and the 
exploitation of human motivations and drives. As such, this chapter has identified the 
overall sensitising concepts and thus provided a solid theoretical sensitivity for the 
researcher before conducting the research.  
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 Literature Review with Emphasis on Social Engineering 
in the SNS Environment 
3.1 Overview 
This chapter presents a review of the literature on social engineering in SNSs. 
While the previous chapter discussed the literature on social engineering in a range 
of disciplines such as psychology, sociology and human communication, the 
literature review in this chapter focuses on social engineering in SNSs. Section 3.2 
discusses the common attacks associated with social engineering in SNSs. Section 
3.3 discusses how the SNS environment affects social engineering success. Section 
3.4 reviews the solutions proposed for predicting, preventing and detecting social 
engineering-based attacks in SNSs. Section 3.5 discusses the relationship between 
demographics and susceptibility to social engineering. Section 3.6 discusses the 
theoretical premise, followed by research gaps and questions in Section 3.7. Section 
3.8 discusses the selection of the methodology and concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Common Attacks Associated with Social Engineering in SNSs 
As explained in Chapter 1 and 2, the literature includes a tremendous numbers 
of studies that highlight the attacks and threats in SNSs. A thorough review of the 
different security and privacy risks that threaten the wellbeing of SNS users shows 
that most of these threats are associated with social engineering in one way or 
another (Fire et al. 2014). While it is impossible to list, or predict, all the types of 
attacks associated with social engineering in SNSs, this section explains the practices 
that have been recognised as “common” social engineering-related attacks in the 
literature. At the time of writing, the common social engineering-related attacks are: 
 60 Chapter 3: Literature Review with Emphasis on Social Engineering in the SNS Environment 
 Phishing – The phishing technique is used to gather private information by 
manipulating users to provide critical information, such as their usernames and 
passwords (Polakis et al. 2010). Phishing attacks accounted for more than 25 
percent of the total reported security crimes in 2007 (Richardson 2007). 
According to the Microsoft Security Intelligence Report in 2010, 84.5% of all 
phishing attacks targeted SNS users (Cavit 2010). Phishing in SNSs is used also 
to gather information such as email addresses or any information that helps the 
attackers to trick the user (Jagatic et al. 2007). Moreover, posts and messages in 
SNSs can be used easily and effectively to attract victims to respond to phishing 
links (Vishwanath 2014). 
 Clickjacking – The clickjacking technique tricks users into clicking on an object, 
such as a video or photo, that they did not intend to click. This includes enticing a 
victim to download an harmful attachment or clicking on an embedded hyperlink 
(Coronges et al. 2012). Clickjacking is also used to install malicious backdoor 
programs that give the attacker full access to the system (Applegate 2009). An 
example of this type of attack is the “Don’t Click” trick, where the attacker 
tweets a link with the message “Don’t Click” which contains a masked URL. 
When victims click on the message, it spreads virally and is automatically posted 
on their profiles or accounts (McMillan 2009). 
 Farcing – Farcing is a type of phishing attack where attackers use a phony SNS 
profile to “friend” victims and then spy on them or solicit personal information 
directly from them (Vishwanath 2014). 
 Identity theft – Identify theft involves stealing personal information such as credit 
card data, social security number, address or date of birth, for financial or other 
purposes such as ordering products from the Internet. Many studies have shown 
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that SNS users are willing to share critical information about themselves and 
other people, such as information related to health (e.g., (Mao et al. 2011; Torabi 
and Beznosov 2013)) and location (e.g., (Cheng et al. 2010; Humphreys et al. 
2010)). 
 Identity cloning – In identity cloning, the attacker steals and copies the victims’ 
profiles and sends friendship requests to the friends of the cloned victims 
(Bhumiratana 2011; Jin et al. 2011). 
 Information harvesting – Information harvesting involves spying on an 
unsuspecting user in order to gain valuable information. This can be done in 
SNSs easily by spying on the activities, posts, tags or comments made by users. It 
can also be done by looking at users’ profiles, groups, events and pages to find 
valuable information that can directly or indirectly help the attacker to take 
advantage of the victim (Jagatic et al. 2007). 
 Spamming – Spamming involves sending messages to various people to ask for 
certain personal information, to influence them to buy or sell products and 
services, or to ask them to participate in or donate to charitable works 
(Mohebzada et al. 2010). Spammers use the SNS platform to send unwanted 
messages to other users or add comments on popular pages or accounts which are 
viewed by many users (Abu-Nimeh et al. 2011; Fire et al. 2012; Heymann et al. 
2007; Thomas et al. 2013). SNS spam is usually in the form of a wall post that 
spreads to friends’ wall posts and contains links or advertisements that attract 
users to click. This can harm the traffic bandwidth of the network, and sometimes 
these links may also lead to phishing sites or malware (Stringhini et al. 2010a). 
 62 Chapter 3: Literature Review with Emphasis on Social Engineering in the SNS Environment 
 Reverse attack – In the reverse attack technique, the attacker does not establish 
contact with the victim. Rather, the social engineer tricks victims into making 
contact. In this case, the victim will be extremely trusting of the attacker, and the 
attacker will take the opportunity to ask the victim to give information or perform 
an action (Irani et al. 2011).  
These techniques have been recognised as the common threats in the 
contemporary SNS environment. As social engineering is just a technique, it is 
impossible to anticipate all types of threats. Many different types of attacks can be 
launched through social engineering techniques such as sexual abuse, financial 
abuse, or any interpersonal deception. 
3.3 How the SNS Environment Affects Social Engineering Success 
SNSs affect the success of social engineering attacks in two main ways (as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1). The first way involves information gathering about the 
victims in order to steal their identity (identity theft), use their identity (cloning 
attack), or understand their vulnerabilities (information harvesting). The information 
gathered can be any available personal or organisational information such as name, 
age, work, position, interests, hobbies, address, banks the victim deals with, friends 
the victim trusts, or even the car a victim would like to buy. Some of the information 
available might not be useful on its own; however, it can be used by a social engineer 
to gain more information that is valuable (Orgill et al. 2004). An example of an 
information gathering attack was the creation of a cloned (impersonated) Facebook 
account for NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral James Stavridis in 2012; 
in that case, it was believed the aim was to deceive the commander’s colleagues and 
other military officials into befriending the cloned Facebook profile in order to 
harvest useful information (Lewis 2012). The story of NATO’s Supreme Allied 
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Commander shows how easy it is for an attacker in SNSs to impersonate an identity, 
create a fake profile for that identity, befriends potential victims, who trust the 
impersonated identity, and then use that fake profile for spying purposes. The fake 
profile in this story represents the cloned profile, which looks credible to the victim. 
The second way in which SNSs affect the success of social engineering attacks 
involves the ability to reach the victim. SNSs are not only useful for information 
gathering; they also offer a cheap and effective method of reaching victims and 
applying effective tricks (Luo et al. 2009). Whether SNSs are used in information 
gathering or in reaching victims (launching the attack), the three main sources that 
can be used are unsecure privacy settings, friendships and connections with strangers 
and unsecure dealings with content. Those sources and their roles are described in 
the following sections. 
 
Figure 3.1 How the SNS Environment Affects Social Engineering Success 
 
Unsecure Privacy Settings 
Most SNSs classify users in relation to others as a “friend,” “friend of friend”, 
or “unfriend” (public users). Some also allow users to divide their friends into 
 64 Chapter 3: Literature Review with Emphasis on Social Engineering in the SNS Environment 
different groups, and each group has a different privacy setting. A large percentage 
of SNS user profiles are set to be shown publicly to any users in the SNS. These 
profiles can be found from outside the site through any web search engine, such as 
Google or Yahoo!. In 2005, it was estimated that the profile details of more than 100 
million Facebook users were publicly accessible through search engines (Gross and 
Acquisti 2005). It could be expected that this number has increased since the number 
of active users has increased dramatically. Other profiles are set to be shown to 
friend-of-friend users or to all friends. The risk associated with making those profiles 
accessible or shown to others is high, and it is more dangerous for those who make 
their profiles shown publicly than those who are open to friend-of-friend users or to 
all friends. 
 Users who own public profiles either intentionally set their profiles to be 
publicly accessible or are not aware of the need to change the default privacy setting 
of their profiles (Gross and Acquisti 2005). Several studies have shown that SNS 
users are highly willing to reveal private or personal information on their profiles 
(e.g., (Cheng et al. 2010; Gross and Acquisti 2005; Humphreys et al. 2010; Mao et 
al. 2011; Torabi and Beznosov 2013)). This information includes their names, 
birthdays, work, locations, telephone numbers, addresses, email addresses, photos 
and many other pieces of critical information. With the information they reveal 
online, users expose themselves to social engineers who can use this information to 
launch various cyber-attacks. Their home addresses and email addresses, for 
example, can be used in phishing (Jagatic et al. 2007). Photos, names, birthdays and 
addresses can be valuable information for pretexting, identity theft, impersonation 
and other kinds of threats (Alim et al. 2011). 
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Friendships and Connections with Strangers 
Psychological motives, such as the desire for entertainment or making new 
friends, encourage people to talk with strangers over the Internet (Peter et al. 2006; 
Vandoninck et al. 2011). Social engineers can use the psychological trick of starting 
a “friendship” with the victim in order to build trust between the attacker and the 
victim and then abuse this trust to launch an attack (Vishwanath 2014). This type of 
attack could be used to gain critical information from the victim or to get the victim 
to perform an action that benefits the attacker and hurts the victim or their 
organisation (Scheelen et al. 2012).  
Most SNSs allow any user to specify their name, photo, age, school and other 
personal information freely and without any authentication. This makes it easy for 
the social engineer to impersonate any identity in order to gain trust from the victim. 
When the victim accepts the friendship invitation, the social engineer can establish a 
direct connection, engage in small talk or act as they have the same interests, 
problems or experiences as the victim (Rosenblum 2007). Facebook users have high 
confidence in the ability of the SNS to protect their personal information, and this 
confidence increases their trust in other users they consider as friends (Dwyer et al. 
2007). Moreover, being in a “friend list” of a victim allows the social engineer to spy 
on the victims’ posts or activities. Some SNSs automatically recommend new friends 
for users based on common elements such as friends, schools or groups. This feature 
can facilitate a reverse attack whereby the social engineer connects to the victim’s 
friends first, so the victim gets tricked into making contact with the social engineer 
(Irani et al. 2011). 
Social engineers can also use specialised spamming software, such as 
FriendBot, to automate the sending of friendship invitations (Hogben 2007). Another 
 66 Chapter 3: Literature Review with Emphasis on Social Engineering in the SNS Environment 
example of such software is “FaceBook Blaster,” which can be used to collect a large 
number of users’ IDs and send large numbers of friend requests and messages to 
users (Michalopoulos and Mavridis 2010). This is a dangerous tool because it can 
select specific groups of users based on specific criteria to launch a specific attack. It 
is possible for the attacker to target a specific organisation’s employees with specific 
attacks, such as phishing, viruses or malware, making the probability of a successful 
attack high. 
Unsecure Dealings with Content 
Content is all the available information in users’ profiles, pages or groups, such 
as news stories, blogs, tags, posts, notes, videos, photos and hyperlinks. According to 
Facebook, Facebook users shared 4.75 billion pieces of content daily in May 2013, 
which represented a 94% increase from August 2012. Unsecure practices when 
dealing with the content available on SNSs lead people to fall victim to many social 
engineering attacks. The content may have malicious software such as viruses, 
worms or malware. This content can be embedded in posts or messages through a 
hyperlink that leads to an executable file, for example, or to a hyperlink on a page 
that includes another hyperlink to an executable file with instructions that trick the 
victim into downloading that file (Hogben 2007). 
Phishing is also a potential threat that arises from the unsecure handling of 
content. Phishing can be posted in SNSs as stories, offers or alert messages that 
attract victims to click on an embedded hyperlink (Mohebzada et al. 2010). Spam is 
another example of such threats, and it is a critical issue since research suggests that 
SNSs may replace email as a means of communication (Hogben 2007). For those 
SNSs that allow users to post HTML in their profiles, users are vulnerable to cross-
site scripting attacks, which enable attackers to install client-side scripts into a profile 
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that is viewed by other users (Hogben 2007). In addition, “defamation” and “ballot 
stuffing” can be used, which are attacks that aim to destroy the reputation of a person 
or system (Cutillo et al. 2009).  
3.4 Solutions for Predicting, Preventing and Detecting Social 
Engineering Attacks in SNSs 
In recent years, the topic of social engineering in SNSs has begun to attracted 
many researchers. Several studies have investigated and highlighted the risks 
associated with social engineering in SNSs (e.g., (Boorman et al. 2014; Chitrey et al. 
2012; Dimensional-Research 2011; Fire et al. 2014; Hogben 2007; Jagatic et al. 
2007; Krombholz et al. 2014; Nagy and Pecho 2009; Shariff and Zhang 2014)). 
Those studies have suggested that SNSs are the most common sources of social 
engineering attacks. Many researchers have tried to come up with solutions to 
overcome the problems associated with social engineering in SNSs. As presented in 
Figure 3.2, these solutions can be grouped into five categories: spam detection, the 
detection of bot-operated accounts, cloned profile detection, the classification of 
profile owners’ identities, and the detection of users’ susceptibility to social 
engineering victimisation. Each of these categories is discussed next.  
 
Figure 3.2 Current/Proposed Solutions in the Literature 
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3.4.1 Spam Detection 
Spam detection solutions attempt to identify if the message (tweet, comment, 
or post) is legitimate or spam. These solutions rely mainly on measuring the 
similarity between messages. Spamming messages are usually similar in their 
specifications. The relationship between spamming and social engineering is that 
spam messages can contain social engineering tricks. Gao et al. (2010) studied 
spamming messages and found that 70% of all malicious wall posts advertised 
phishing sites. Social engineering can be used also to trick users to give the 
spammers “hidden” permission to post on their walls or send spamming messages to 
their friends. The major proposed solutions in the literature are based on similarity 
features. For example, Stringhini et al. (2010b) studied the characteristics of 
spamming messages in order to be able to detect them automatically. They found that 
spamming messages were usually in the form of advertisements and contained URL 
links to particular websites. They proposed a technique to detect spammers in social 
networks. While their proposed technique can work on greedy bots that send spam 
with each message, a low traffic spamming campaign would not be easy to detect. 
Rahman et al. (2012) also used the similarity features in order to detect 
spamming messages. They calculated the similarity score that sums the value for all 
the similar messages, with the same URL links, and computed the standard deviation 
for all the posts. This seems to be a better solution than Stringhini et al. (2010b) 
technique, as it carefully checks that the message is spam. Huber et al. (2009), Yardi 
et al. (2009), Benevenuto et al. (2010), Stringhini et al. (2010a), Wang (2010), 
McCord and Chuah (2011) and Castillo et al. (2011) investigated spam detection in 
Twitter using a content-based approach, and they achieved different accuracy results. 
Those approaches were mainly based on similarity and the characteristics of the URL 
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links. The major limitation of these automatic methods is that they don’t work 
effectively in detecting low traffic spamming campaigns. 
3.4.2 Detection of Bot-Operated Accounts 
Some solutions aim to detect if the profile is operated by a human or by a 
computer (bots). Bots are “automatic or semi-automatic computer programs that 
mimic humans and/or human behaviour in online social networks” (Wagner et al. 
2012, p. 41). Detecting this type of account or profile is done mainly based on the 
types of posts and messages that are created by that account. If the account posts or 
sends messages that can be classified as spam, the algorithm suggests that the 
operator is a computer. However, if the profile has a normal communication with 
their friends and various social transactions, the algorithm suggests that the operator 
is human. Several researchers (e.g., (Castillo et al. 2011; Chu et al. 2012; Huber et al. 
2009; McCord and Chuah 2011; Stringhini et al. 2010a; Wang 2010)) used content-
based techniques similar to those described above in relation to spam detection 
(Section 3.4.1) to detect if the account operation is automated or human. 
One of the important studies in this regard was conducted by Yardi et al. 
(2009) who examined the differences between fake and legitimate Twitter users, 
mainly based on content-based techniques. Chu et al. (2012) proposed an improved 
classification model that classifies legitimate users, automated users (bots), and a 
combination of both in Twitter. While their proposed classification model showed 
high accuracy when using all methods that operate the algorithm, it seems to be 
costly with high computational complexity. This is because it includes many factors 
such as the URL ratio, mention ratio, registration date, link safety, hashtag ratio, 
followers to friend ratio and account verification. Moreover, their classification 
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model can work only for automated programs (i.e., bots) and cannot be generalised 
to any fake profile.  
Fire et al. (2012) proposed a novel algorithm for detecting malicious profiles in 
SNSs. Their algorithm uses a combination of graph theory algorithms and machine 
learning in order to detect malicious profiles that can be classified as spammers. The 
advantage of their algorithm is that it has been evaluated on several SNSs and found 
to be effective in detecting spammers’ profiles. Thomas et al. (2013) investigated the 
market for fraudulent Twitter accounts (profiles) in order to monitor the fraud 
perpetrated by 27 merchants during a 10 month period. They were able to monitor 
around 120,000 fraudulent accounts. Based on their exploration, they developed a 
classifier to retroactively detect the fraudulent accounts sold via these merchants. 
Their work is unique in the area of SNS spamming. However, their proposed 
classifier technique is still of most assistance only in relation to automatically 
generated accounts. Their classifier was developed and tested on Twitter, and 
whether or not their classifier algorithm works for any SNS or only for Twitter still 
requires investigation.  
Abbasi and Liu (2013) designed an algorithm called “CredRank” to measure 
information source credibility in social media. This algorithm relies on examining 
the similarities in the behaviours (not the messages) of SNS users. They built their 
algorithm based on two assumptions: 1) a non-credible user creates a large number of 
accounts and uses these accounts to spread messages or words; and 2) a non-credible 
user votes, regardless of content, for other users in their group. The first assumption 
has been supported by several studies that investigated spamming messages 
behaviours. However, there seems to be a lack of theories that support the second 
assumption. Nevertheless, the goal of their algorithm is to identify the similarities 
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between users and cluster them together. The clusters are then weighted to show the 
credibility value of the members in that cluster, which helps detect any coordinated 
behaviour such as a fake profile used for spamming, or a Sybil profile used to 
manipulate the voting or rating system. While the idea behind this proposed 
algorithm is novel, it is limited to predicting the credibility of the information in 
terms of spamming, based on classifying the profile (i.e., whether the profile is a bot 
or human), but it cannot be generalised to the credibility of the source. The source 
credibility is a complex and multi-dimensional concept (Eisend 2006), and limiting it 
to classifying the profile as a computer or human is an approach that lacks evidence. 
3.4.3 Cloned Profile Detection 
In identity cloning attacks, attackers duplicate the SNS user profile, either in 
the same SNS or across different sites, to trick the cloned victim’s friends into 
forming a trusting relationship with the attacker (cloned profile) (Fire et al. 2014). 
While the general idea for detecting spamming messages is based on measuring the 
similarity between the messages or the posts, the general idea for detecting cloned 
profiles is based on measuring the similarity between the profiles. If two profiles 
reach the predetermined threshold, then one of them is more likely to be cloned. A 
few studies (e.g.,(Jin et al. 2011; Khayyambashi and Rizi 2013; Rizi et al. 2014) have 
proposed solutions based on the similarity principle. Those studies started by 
analysing and characterising the behaviours of the identity clone attacks, and then 
propose a detection framework based on their analysis. Their frameworks use two 
approaches: one is based on the attribute similarity of the profiles, and the second is 
based on the similarity of the friend networks. 
Kontaxis et al. (2011) proposed a prototype system that can help users to 
investigate or predict their susceptibility to a cloning attack. The main idea behind 
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this technique is to identify the information that is contained in the users’ profiles, 
which uniquely identifies them. The concept in this approach is simple, and the 
experimental results show an acceptable level of efficiency. 
Conti et al. (2012) introduced a new model that attempts to mitigate fake 
account (fake profile) attacks. Their model depends on the temporal evolution that 
characterises real SNS user accounts, whereby the data can be collected and utilised 
to identify set of features in the dynamic mode of SNSs. These features can be 
utilised to evaluate a particular profile under test, and detect if there is any major 
deviation from expected behaviour. The new idea in this model is that it doesn’t rely 
on the similarity measurement between the profiles. Therefore, this model is very 
useful where the attacker is impersonating the victim on a particular SNS where the 
victim has no prior account in place. 
Kiruthiga et al. (2014) proposed a new approach in which the clone attack is 
detected based on the user action time period and the users’ click pattern to find the 
similarity between the cloned profile and the real one in Facebook. Meligy et al. 
(2015) proposed a theoretical framework which mainly relies on a novel topology 
named the “trusted social graph”. Their approach aims to visually show the trusted 
instances of social interactions between users, and detect the strange instances of 
communications which are more likely to be performed by cloned profiles. 
The main challenge and limitation of the previous approaches is that they rely 
on similarity. It is quite common for several people to have similar attributes, friends 
or behaviours in the real world; hence, their identities in SNSs may be similar. 
Therefore, it is not reliable to infer that all similar profiles are cloned profiles. 
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3.4.4 Classification of Profile Owners’ Identities  
Some studies have proposed solutions that classify the identity (usually the 
gender) of SNS profile owners. If they succeed, these solutions help to detect false 
information provided in users’ profiles. One of the first studies in this area was 
conducted by Rao et al. (2010) who introduced a classification-based algorithm 
called the stacked-SVM-based algorithm. This classification algorithm uses statistics 
on the user’s account as well as some features such as the n-grams and stylistic 
features.  
Pennacchiotti and Popescu (2011) proposed an algorithm based on Twitter 
using other groups of features extracted from users’ profile content such as explicit 
links pointing to outside sources, content structure features, lexical features and text 
content sentiment features. Al Zamal et al. (2012); Liu and Ruths (2013); Mislove et 
al. (2011); Rao et al. (2011); and Burger et al. (2011) also investigated gender 
classification mainly using text-based characteristics. However, while these works 
achieved acceptable accuracy results, their solutions are unwieldy due to the 
resulting total number of features. 
The approach proposed by Alowibdi et al. (2014) compares gender indicators 
obtained from different profile characteristics including the user name and layout 
colours, as well as applying a Bayesian classifier to the weighted average of 
characteristics for each user. The advantage of their approach is that it uses only a 
few hundred features, while the previous approaches use millions of features.  
Identity classification techniques are valuable in terms of dealing with social 
engineering. However, despite the importance and creativity of these works, 
detecting deception involving the identity, such as the gender of SNSs, is still 
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challenging. To date, there is no reliable solution for detecting social engineering of 
this kind. 
3.4.5 Detection of User Susceptibility to Social Engineering 
Victimisation  
All the solutions discussed above attempt to detect the common social 
engineering-based attacks such as spam and clone attacks through technical methods. 
Although these studies are valuable, social engineering still succeeds despite all the 
available technical methods. This is because the proposed methods focus on the 
weakness of the technology not the weakness of the users. For this reason, 
researchers have begun to focus on the user as the weakest link. No social 
engineering-based attack can succeed unless the users themselves accept, succumb 
and perform the requested action which harms them and benefits the attackers. This 
section discusses the solutions that focus (directly or indirectly) on users’ 
susceptibility to social engineering victimisation.  
Rashtian et al. (2014) and Rashtian (2014) investigated the behaviours of 
friendship in online social networks. They found that four factors significantly 
impacted the receiver’s decision, namely, knowing the requester in the real world, 
having common hobbies or interests, having mutual friends, and the closeness of 
mutual friends. Understanding friendship-related behaviours in SNSs is crucial in 
terms of social engineering. For example, understanding these behaviours can 
explain the acceptance of friend requests from strangers, which is known to be risky 
behaviour. However, the limitation of the approach proposed by Rashtian et al. 
(2014) and Rashtian (2014) is that friendship-related behaviour is only one part of 
social engineering. The findings of their study (e.g., knowing the requester in the real 
world) indicate that they didn’t focus on strangers. Another limitation in their 
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approach is that it does not have a clear over-arching theoretical framework. The data 
analysis is also fairly brief and preliminary, and the second phase of their study (the 
confirmatory phase) suffers from validity and reliability problems.  
One of the strengths of the work by Rashtian et al. (2014) and Rashtian (2014) 
is that it included exploratory qualitative research. The qualitative method is not 
commonly adopted in this domain but is useful since SNSs are virtual-oriented and 
relatively new and there is a significant difference between human behaviours in real 
life and in virtual environments (Zinoviev and Duong 2009).  
Wagner et al. (2012) investigated the susceptibility of SNS users to bots. They 
collected data by intentionally placing bots in Twitter in order to influence the user 
behaviours and then study those behaviours. The analysis of the collected data 
suggested that susceptible users usually used their Twitter accounts for 
conversational purposes. They also found that susceptible users usually used more 
social phrases or words. In addition, they found that susceptible users usually 
communicated with many different users and usually showed more affection. Their 
study is valuable in terms of predicting users’ susceptibility based on their usage 
behaviours. On the other hand, they did not investigate the level of susceptibility. 
More importantly, their experiment studied one trick (i.e., bots), and was limited to 
one specific interest (cats). Social engineering tricks are varied, and many other 
factors (such as the user’s age, gender, education, awareness level, or interest) can 
impact participants’ reactions. As these factors were not controlled during the 
experiment, the findings of Wagner et al. (2012) study suffer from validation 
problems. 
Veerasamy and Labuschagne (2013) investigated how users distinguish real 
“human” and fake “computer” profiles. However, their investigation in terms of 
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susceptibility was limited to a single question regarding the first element in a 
Facebook profile that users would look for in order to determine whether or not the 
profile is real. 
In a study similar to that conducted by Wagner et al. (2012), Huang et al. 
(2014) investigated the susceptibility of SNS users to malicious links in malware 
attacks. They investigated how SNS users were lured to click on the malicious links 
in Facebook, by monitoring 3.5 million Facebook accounts. They found that the 
majority of the malware campaigns used pure social incentives (such as sexual 
incentives) rather than monetary incentives (such as free items). They also observed 
that the malware campaigns that used both social and monetary incentives lasted 
longer and infected more accounts than those that used pure social or pure monetary 
incentives. This is a valuable study since it relied on an actual dataset obtained from 
real Facebook users. However, their investigation focused only on the incentives of 
the malware campaigns and from the attackers’ perspectives.  
Several studies have investigated users’ behaviours in regard to information or 
self disclosure in SNSs. The most thorough and comprehensive work in this regard is 
that of Almakrami (2015), whose research provides a broad understanding of the 
types of information that people self-disclose on Facebook, identifies factors that 
have a significant influence on such disclosure, and explains how it is affected by 
one's national culture. In addition, there is a topic under information disclosure that is 
directly related to susceptibility to social engineering, namely, the sharing of 
personally identifiable information (PII) with strangers. For example, Venkatanathan 
et al. (2013) found that individuals are influenced to reciprocate PII when the 
disclosure of PII is directed by strangers towards them, and also when it is not 
directed towards anyone in particular such as through public pages or channels. 
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The study most closely related to susceptibility to social engineering 
victimisation in SNSs is the work done by Vishwanath (2014) on farcing. As 
discussed above, farcing is a type of phishing attack whereby the attacker uses a 
phony profile to “friend” victims (called a Level 1 attack in Vishwanath’s work) and 
then solicit personal information directly from them (called a Level 2 attack). 
Vishwanath (2014) conducted an experiment on undergraduate students. In the first 
part of the experiment, the students were asked to participate in an online survey 
which included questions that helped the researcher locate them on Facebook. Then, 
four fake profiles were created on Facebook using full factorial design, and 
friendship invitations were sent from those profiles to the subjects. The findings of 
the study suggested that individuals fell victim to a Level 1 attack because they relied 
primarily on the number of friends or the picture of the requester in the fake profile. 
On the other hand, those who received a Level 2 information request used the 
sender’s picture in the message as a credibility cue.  
Vishwanath (2014) study is among the first studies dedicated to susceptibility 
to deception in SNSs. The strength of that study is that experiments were performed 
in the actual Facebook environment. However, one limitation of that study is that the 
researcher used only one trick (“offering internship”). The use of only one trick 
could impact the validity of the results, since it is possible that those who did not 
respond to the request were not interested in the incentive, due to external reasons, 
and not because of the experimental treatment. In addition, the study only examined 
whether or not a profile picture and the number of friends had an impact on 
susceptibility to victimisation through a farcing attack, and did not attempt to explore 
any other factors that could affect the subjects’ susceptibility. The sample was 
limited to undergraduate students and thus did not represent a diverse range of 
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demographics. In addition, the study did not utilise a control group to enhance the 
validity and make sure that the subjects were susceptible to the attack due to the 
impact of the picture and the number of friends and not due to another factor that 
wasn’t considered. 
In another study, Vishwanath (2015) examined the habitual usage of Facebook 
and its impact on susceptibility to deception on Facebook. This was done by 
conducting a quantitative survey among 150 undergraduate communication students 
to measure some potential predictors of susceptibility to phishing victimisation, such 
as habitual Facebook use. Six weeks later, an experimental study was conducted on 
the same group of students, in which they were subjected to a friendship invitation on 
Facebook from a fake profile. Two weeks later, the subjects who accepted the 
friendship invitation were subjected to a phishing request from the fake profile. The 
results showed that the habitual usage of Facebook (measured by the frequency of 
usage, inability to regulate behaviours, and large social network) was a significant 
predictor of victimisation. One of the strengths of that study is that it was based on a 
solid theoretical framework. Another strength is that the study used a real phishing 
request on Facebook. However, the study did not utilise a control group to enhance 
the validity and make sure that the subjects were susceptible to the attack due to their 
habitual use and not due to another factor that wasn’t considered. In addition, the 
sample was limited to undergraduate students. More importantly, the study was 
limited to one trick (“offering internships”), which could impact the validity of the 
results since it is possible that those who did not respond to the request were not 
interested in the incentive due to external reasons, and not because they were not 
susceptible. 
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3.5 Relationship between Demographics and Susceptibility to Social 
Engineering 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, there has been no study dedicated to 
understanding the demographic factors correlated with the influence of source 
characteristics on susceptibility to social engineering in SNSs. However, some 
studies have measured users’ susceptibility to specific types of email phishing attacks 
or studied the effectiveness of one or more email phishing countermeasures in 
relation to some demographic factors. This section presents a review of those studies 
and their findings. 
Workman (2008a, 2008b) conducted a field study with phishing emails to 
investigate whether or not the factors found to be significant regarding successful 
marketing campaigns might be also significant regarding successful social 
engineering deception. Workman developed a theoretical model of social 
engineering factors and then performed confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for the 
proposed model followed by an experiment to investigate possible treatments and 
measure their efficacies. These studies are among the first and strongest empirical 
studies on the topic of email phishing. However, Workman investigated the factors 
that account for successful marketing campaigns only, and did not explore other new 
possible factors that may affect the success of social engineering attacks. In addition, 
the studies did not investigate the effectiveness of each factor in relation to users’ 
demographics. 
 Jagatic et al. (2007) collected data from SNSs and performed an email 
phishing experiment targeting students aged from 18 to 24. The aim of that study was 
to determine how social context increases email phishing success. They found that 
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female students fell for 77 percent of the email phishing attacks, whereas male 
students fell for 65 percent of the attacks. 
Kumaraguru et al. (2009) conducted an actual email phishing study using 515 
participants, with the aim to study the long-term retention of anti-phishing training 
called “PhishGuru”. They found that the training decreased the susceptibility of 
participants to phishing emails or websites, with no significant differences in relation 
to gender. However, they found that the participants in the 18–25 age group were 
consistently more vulnerable to email phishing tricks, as compared to the older 
participants (Kumaraguru et al. 2009). 
Parrish Jr et al. (2009) examined the reasons why some people are more 
susceptible than others to email phishing attacks and proposed a conceptual 
framework utilising the Big-Five personality traits as a possible explanation. 
However, their approach did not produce clear results and thus further research is 
required into that particular line of investigation. 
Kvedar et al. (2010) conducted a study to measure the effectiveness of an 
interactive game “Anti-Phishing Phil” which teaches people not to fall for email 
phishing scams. They found that 75.5% of men and 64% of women in the study 
could correctly distinguish phishing and legitimate websites. In addition, they found 
that people above the age of 18 performed better than those under 18 (Kvedar et al. 
2010). 
In a role-playing survey conducted by Sheng et al. (2010), 1001 respondents 
answered an online questionnaire designed to study the relationship between 
demographics and email phishing susceptibility. That study also aimed to assess the 
effectiveness of some anti-phishing educational or training materials. They found 
that women were more susceptible than men to email phishing and that participants 
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aged 18 to 25 were more susceptible than participants in other age groups. In 
addition, they found that the educational and training materials decreased the 
likelihood that users would give information to phishing websites by 40% for both 
genders and all age groups. 
Pattinson et al. (2012) conducted a study on informed and not-informed 
participants and found that participants’ familiarity with computers, personality traits 
and cognitive impulsivity impacted on the behavioural responses to email phishing. 
They found that, overall, legitimate emails were managed better than phishing 
emails, and that informed participants managed phishing emails better than not-
informed participants. In addition, they found that for those participants who were 
informed, the more familiar they were with computers, the better they managed 
phishing emails. For the not-informed participants, the survey results indicated that 
the less impulsive, more extraverted or more open people were, the better they 
managed phishing emails (Pattinson et al. 2012). 
Darwish, Zarka and Aloul (2012) conducted a review of the literature to 
summarise the relationship between email phishing victims’ backgrounds and email 
phishing. They found that users’ demographics were valuable factors for social 
engineering studies. The summary of the demographic variables of potential phishing 
victims is presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Summary of Demographic Variables of Potential Email Phishing Victims (Darwish et 
al. 2012) 
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The difference between the present study and the studies described above is 
that the focus of this study is social engineering in Facebook, and not on the use of 
email. As explained earlier, social engineering in SNSs can use several techniques, 
such as posts, tags, impersonation using fake profiles, applications, games, or even 
interactive persuasion using chatting or messaging. Moreover, the interest of this 
study is investigating how people make judgments about attackers, who they trust on 
Facebook, and the factors upon which they base their judgments. Another interest of 
this study is investigating if there is any relationship between the effectiveness of 
source characteristics and user demographics.  
3.6 Theoretical Premise 
3.6.1 Source Credibility Theory 
According to source credibility theory, people are more likely to obey and 
accept a message when the source presents itself as credible (Hovland et al. 1953). 
The theory is broken down into the following three models: the factor, the functional, 
and the constructivist model. The aim of these models is to narrow the wide scope of 
the theory. The factor model helps determine to what extent the receiver judges the 
source as credible. The functional model views credibility as the degree to which a 
source meets a receiver’s needs. The constructivist model shows what the receiver 
does with the persuader’s proposal or message (Lane 2001). 
Source credibility research has its roots in persuasion. Aristotle divided the 
aspects involved in persuasion into three groups: ethos (which refers to credibility), 
pathos (which refers to emotion), and logos (which refers to logic) (Larson 2012; 
Nussbaum 1996). Emotion and logic describe the person’s emotional connection and 
the means of reasoning that are used to convince the receiver to accept a particular 
argument. Credibility influences people’s beliefs regarding who they should trust 
 Chapter 3: Literature Review with Emphasis on Social Engineering in the SNS Environment 83 
(Rapp 2002). Because of the several operationalisations that appear in the literature, 
many definitions have been presented for source credibility. For the purpose of 
exploring the source characteristics that influence Facebook users to judge an 
attacker as credible, the present study adapts Ohanian’s (1990) definition of source 
credibility as “a term commonly used to imply a communicator’s positive 
characteristics that affect the receiver’s acceptance of a message” (p. 41). 
3.6.2 Relationship between Source Characteristics and Susceptibility to 
Social Engineering Victimisation 
Understanding the attitudes, cognition and behavioural intentions of 
individuals in response to threat is a key element in information security. An 
application of PMT in the information security context (Posey et al. 2014) found that 
coping appraisal factors such as response efficacy, risk perception, self efficacy and 
response costs, play a vital role in individuals’ behaviours regarding security threats, 
for both ordinary organisational employees and information security professionals. 
People’s response efficacy, risk perception, self-efficacy and response costs are 
associated with making accurate judgments regarding social engineering attempt.  
A social engineering attempt always comes as a message containing a request. 
This request can be direct, or it can be a trick that requires the victim to accept or 
respond to a request. For decades, marketers, advertisers, politicians and researchers 
in human communication have investigated the effects of source characteristics on 
the beliefs, behaviours and perceptions of an audience in regard to the contents of a 
message. A highly credible source is commonly found to be more persuasive than a 
source with low credibility (Hovland and Weiss 1951; Johnson and Izzett 1969; 
Kelman and Hovland 1953; Klebba and Unger 1983; Koslin et al. 1967; 
Pornpitakpan 2004). Source credibility, that is, the credibility of the speaker or seller, 
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is a significant element in persuading an audience (Burgoon et al. 1990; Tormala and 
Petty 2004). According to source credibility theory, people are more likely to believe 
and obey a message when the source is perceived as credible (Hovland et al. 1953). 
In SNSs, obeying and accepting a message involves complying with a request, such 
as a request to click a link or accept an offer. 
Credibility research has its roots in persuasion theory, especially in human 
communication research. Source credibility theory views credibility as the degree to 
which a source meets a receiver’s needs (Hovland et al. 1953). Persuasion comprises 
three main elements: the sender or the source, the meaning or the message, and the 
recipient (O'Keefe 2002). According to O’Keefe (2002), persuasion must involve a 
goal and the intent to achieve that goal on the part of the sender, while the recipient 
must have free will and must not be persuaded by force. In the case of social 
engineering in SNSs, the sender (source) is the social engineer or the attacker, the 
message is the trick or the technique, and the recipient is the user.  
Source credibility has been widely investigated in marketing research that 
focuses on the factors upon which people base their judgments regarding the 
credibility of a salesperson or spokesperson. As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2) 
the goals of social engineers and online marketers are different with respect to the 
use of persuasion. Marketers want to persuade potential buyers to make purchases, 
while social engineers want to obtain valuable information or influence users to 
perform actions that benefit the attackers (Orgill et al. 2004). Workman (2007) used 
experimental threat assessment and the ELM model as a framework to determine the 
probability of success of a social engineering attack. The results of that experiment 
can help explain how marketing techniques can be used in social engineering. 
Moreover, the assumption that source credibility influences the persuasiveness of a 
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message even on the Internet has been commonly accepted (e.g., (Ayeh et al. 2013; 
Chu and Kamal 2008; Johnson et al. 2007)). Although the extent to which this 
assumption applies to social engineering on the Facebook platform is unclear, there 
is a reason to believe that Facebook users’ credibility perceptions will have a positive 
effect on their susceptibility to social engineering victimisation. 
3.6.3 Credibility Perception and Behavioural Compliance 
Persuasion is generally defined as “human communication that is designed to 
influence others by modifying their beliefs, values, or attitudes” (Simons 1976, p. 
21). Attitude is defined as the tendency to rate an entity (such as an object, person, 
institution or event) with “some degree of favor or disfavor, ordinarily expressed in 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses” (Eagly and Chaiken 1993, p. 155). On 
the other hand, behavioural compliance refers to a particular kind of response, which 
is an acquiescence, to a particular kind of communication, which is a request 
(Cialdini and Goldstein 2004).  
Most of the studies that have attempted to study source credibility are guided 
generally by empirical findings or different theories related to behaviourism in social 
psychology. These studies have found that perception is strongly associated with 
changing attitudes and behavioural compliance (Pornpitakpan 2004). Depending on 
the purpose of a particular study, perception, attitude, behavioural compliance and 
behavioural intention, sometimes along with other factors, have been studied in 
different ways. For example, Ohanian (1990) studied perceptions of celebrity 
endorsers’ expertise and found that these perceptions significantly explained the 
participants’ intention to buy the advertised products. Similar factors were studied by 
Braunsberger (1996) who found that perceived expertise led to a positive attitude 
toward the advertisement and the endorser. Source credibility has also been studied 
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in regard to behavioural compliance, with these studies finding that the use of a 
highly credible source leads to more behavioural compliance than a source with low 
credibility (e.g.,(Crano 1970; Crisci and Kassinove 1973; Levine et al. 1978; Ross 
1973; Tybout 1978)). The role of source credibility perceptions has also been 
examined in the online context, where it has been found to be influential in consumer 
behaviour (e.g., (Ayeh et al. 2013; Casaló et al. 2010)).  
In summary, social engineering always comes as a message containing a 
request, and users’ perception and behavioural compliance are the key elements in 
controlling social engineering attacks. In relation to source credibility theory, these 
concepts form the theoretical foundation for this study. 
3.6.4 Source Credibility Dimensions 
Credibility is a perception (Tseng and Fogg 1999). It is a complex concept that 
is composed of other concepts called dimensions. Many factors can impact the 
perceived credibility of a source, depending on the type of source, the type of 
persuasion and the characteristics of the medium (Metzger et al. 2003). Since source 
credibility is a multi-dimensional concept, several studies (Table 3.2) have 
investigated its dimensions using different methods, such as explorative factor 
analysis. 
Most of those studies provided their participants with a number of semantic 
differential items with which to rate the credibility of the sources. The resulting data 
were then combined into factors through factor analysis. The factors were interpreted 
as dimensions of credibility. Table 3.2 presents a summary of the major studies that 
have been conducted on source credibility. Researchers in these studies have used 
measurement scales ranging from 5 to 15 scale points. The collected data were then 
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analysed and categorised in dimensions using exploratory factor analysis such as 
principal component factor analysis. Table 3.2, shows that several dimensions of 
source credibility have been proposed (e.g., intimacy, character, esteem, sociability, 
and clarity) depending on the type of the source and the type of the contexts. 
Table 3.2 Previous Studies on Source Credibility 
No. Study Concept specification 
       Dimensions 
# Labels/Names 
1 (McCroskey 1966) ethos 2 Authoritativeness; Character 
2 (Bowers and Phillips 1967) source credibility 2 Competence; Trustworthiness 
3 (Markham 1968) 
television newscasters 
credibility 
3 Reliable/logical factor; Dynamism Trustworthiness 
4 (Whitehead Jr 1968) source credibility 4 Competence; Dynamism; Objectivity; Trustworthiness 
5 (Berlo et al. 1969) source credibility 3 Dynamism; Qualification; Safety 
6 (Baudhuin and Davis 1972) ethos  4 
Authoritativeness; Esteem; Interpersonal Attractiveness; 
Personal integrity 
7 (Baudhuin and Davis 1972) ethos  2 Authoritativeness; Interpersonal Attractiveness  
8 (Falcione 1974) source credibility 4 Competence; Emotional stability; Extroversion; Safety 
9 (Tuppen 1974) communicator credibility 5 
Charisma; Co-orientation; Dynamism; Expertise; 
Trustworthiness 
10 (McCroskey et al. 1974) teacher credibility 5 
Character; Competence; Composure; Extroversion; 
Sociability 
11 
(McCroskey and Jenson 
1975) 
mass media news source image 5 
Character; Competence; Composure; Extroversion; 
Sociability 
12 (Singletary 1976) news source credibility 6 
Articulation; Attraction; Hostility; Knowledge ability; 
Stability; Trustworthiness 
13 (McCain et al. 1977) televised source credibility 4 Character; Competence; Composure; Sociability 
14 (Lee 1978) 
international newspaper news 
credibility 
4 Expertness; Intimacy; Availability Trustworthiness 
15 (Lee 1978) 
international TV news 
credibility 
3 Believability/honesty; Dynamism; Intimacy 
16 (Lee 1978) 
local newspaper news 
credibility 
4 Bias; Dynamism; Intimacy; Trustworthiness/authenticity 
17 (Lee 1978) local TV news credibility 3 
Dynamism/expertness; Immediacy-intimacy; 
Trustworthiness/ authenticity 
18 (Simpson and Kahler 1981) 
source credibility in the selling 
context 
4 Believability; Dynamism; Expertness; Sociability 
19 (Bergh et al. 1981) advertiser credibility 7 
Competence; Competitiveness; Familiarity; 
Likeability/attractiveness; Prestige; 
Taste/progressive/fulfilling; Trustworthiness 
20 (Mosier and Ahlgren 1981) 
information presentation 
credibility 
4 Accuracy; Believability; Clarity; Trustworthiness 
21 (Gaziano and McGrath 1986) media credibility 1 Credibility 
22 (Salwen 1987) 
credibility of newspaper 
opinion polls 
4 Clarity; Expertise; Objectivity; Trustworthiness 
23 (Meyer 1988)  credibility of newspapers 2 Affiliation w. t. community; Believability 
24 (Ohanian 1990) celebrity endorsers' credibility 3 Attractiveness; Expertise; Trustworthiness 
25 (White 1990) newscaster credibility 6 
Attraction; Dynamism; Objectivity; Presentation; 
Stability; Trustworthiness 
26 
(Newell and Goldsmith 
2001) 
corporate credibility 2 Believability/honesty; Expertise 
27 (Raman and Haley 1997) 
organizational source 
credibility 
3 
Good dimension; Role model dimension; Smart 
dimension;  
28 (Eisend 2006) salesperson credibility 3 Trustworthiness; Competence; Attraction 
29 (Eisend 2006) company credibility 3 Trustworthiness; Competence; Dynamism 
30 (Eisend 2006) spokesperson credibility 3 Sincerity; Professionalism; Attraction 
31 (Corina 2006) 
credibility in online social 
programs 
3 Trustworthiness; Expertise; Attractiveness 
32 (Ayeh et al. 2013)  
credibility in trip-advisor 
content 
2 Trustworthiness; Expertise 
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3.7 Research Gap and Research Questions 
From the previous review it can be seen that source characteristics play a vital 
role in influencing SNS users to fall victim to social engineering. Deception research 
has revealed that the outcome of an attempted deception depends more on the liar’s 
credibility than on any other factors (Bond Jr and DePaulo 2008). Email phishing 
research also shows that the effectiveness of (false) source credibility has been 
repeatedly demonstrated in phishing victimisation (Dhamija et al. 2006; Luo et al. 
2012; Sussman and Siegal 2003). Likewise, it was observed that almost all social 
engineering threats, such as spamming, identity cloning and bots, rely on fake 
identities (Fire et al. 2014). This gives an explanation of why around 83 million 
Facebook accounts (8.7% of all accounts) are estimated to be fake (Couper 2013).  
The ability of attackers to convince users to comply with their requests 
involves wearing a suitable “hat” and playing a suitable character. This character can 
be a poor person, a sexy girl or a wonderful friend. A social engineer can also 
impersonate a real person who is known to the victim, such as a friend, boss, relative 
or a celebrity. This task is much easier in SNSs where users can create multiple fake 
profiles and choose their names, photos, locations and other details freely and easily. 
At the same time, it is more difficult for the victim to uncover the identity deception 
through a SNS than in a face-to-face, real-life situation. The social engineer, 
depending on the victim’s vulnerabilities, can use distance, anonymity and the 
absence of authentication mechanisms to abuse the victim. A suitable “hat” shapes 
the character that the social engineer plays in order to make the victim feel trusting 
and safe, and therefore, encourage the victim to accept the trick. 
On the other hand, users’ perceptions of risks have important implications for 
information security, and recent research indicates the critical need to understand 
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how users perceive and respond to information security risks (e.g., (Furnell and 
Clarke 2012; Vance et al. 2014; Willison and Warkentin 2013)). From the discussion 
in the previous sections, it can be seen that most of the work that has been done to 
date has focused on technological techniques that are used by social engineering 
attackers such as spam and cloning, while there is a lack of research regarding the 
main entity in this dilemma, namely, the user. Attackers keep relying on people to 
launch social engineering attacks, while security defenders keep focusing and relying 
on technology. 
Some studies have investigated user susceptibility to social engineering in 
SNSs (Section 3.4.5), but little attention has been paid to the source credibility in 
terms of social engineering in SNSs. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there has 
been no study dedicated to exploring the source characteristics upon which users 
base their judgments regarding the source credibility of social engineering attackers 
in Facebook, and therefore a clear gap is observed. This research gap can be 
described in three-folds: 1) Identifying the source credibility dimensions in terms of 
social engineering on Facebook; 2) Identifying Facebook-specific source 
characteristics that influence Facebook users to judge an attacker as per these 
dimensions; and 3) Understanding the demographic factors correlated with the 
influence of source characteristics on susceptibility to social engineering in 
Facebook. 
With several studies showing that social engineering attacks succeed even 
among those users and organisations that identify themselves as being aware of 
social engineering, and considering the fact that all of these attacks succeed by 
relying on the vulnerability of people, it is vital to understand the vulnerability of 
people. Furthermore, by recognising the vital role played by source characteristics in 
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social engineering victimisation, and the fact that the present study is believed to be 
the first to theoretically model source credibility in terms of social engineering in 
SNSs, the study makes an original contribution. Finally, by recognising the 
technological possibility of profiling Facebook users based on their characteristics 
(e.g., (Balduzzi et al. 2010; van Dam and van de Velden 2015)), which allows 
researchers to predict users’ vulnerabilities based on their demographics, a 
substantial practical contribution is expected from this study’s findings. 
To this end, this research aims to study the impact of source characteristics on 
users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation in SNSs, particularly 
Facebook. This aim is achieved through answering the following research questions: 
1. What source characteristics influence Facebook users to judge an attacker as 
credible? 
2. How do source characteristics influence Facebook users to judge an attacker 
as credible? 
3. To what extent do each of these source characteristics influence Facebook 
users to judge an attacker as credible? 
4. Is there any relationship between the influence of a source characteristic on 
users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation in Facebook and users’ 
demographics such as age, gender, education, relationship status and level of 
awareness? 
5. Is there any relationship between users’ demographics and susceptibility to 
social engineering victimisation on Facebook in general? 
The theoretical premise and the details of how this study was conducted are 
explained in the following sections. 
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3.8 Chapter Conclusion and Towards the Selection of the 
Methodology 
As presented in Table 3.2, several empirical studies, in varied contexts, 
including human, media, technology and information contexts, have been conducted 
on source credibility. Depending on the type of source, the type of persuasion and the 
context, different dimensions have been found. Therefore, in order to study the 
credibility of a social engineering attacker on Facebook, a specific investigation 
should be conducted specifically for that purpose. The dimensions that have been 
found for other types of sources in the literature could be different and therefore the 
dimensions need to be tested in the context of Facebook. 
While identifying the relevant source credibility dimensions in terms of social 
engineering on Facebook is a substantial contribution of this study, the aim of the 
study is not limited to this end. In addition to identifying the source credibility 
dimensions, this study aims to extend the investigation to the source characteristics at 
the Facebook-specific level. Users’ perceptions of source credibility on Facebook are 
arguably different from the perceptions they would form in real-life situations, and 
social engineering is arguably different from the types of persuasion that have been 
examined in previous studies (Table 3.2); therefore, a deep investigation is required 
that links the existing knowledge based on real-life settings with new and emerging 
phenomena in the virtual environment of SNSs such as Facebook.  
Achieving this aim is associated with some challenges, as explained in the next 
chapter. Dealing with these challenges in this study required the adoption of multiple 
methods, through two main phases. The multiple methods used in the first phase 
included: 1) observations of participants’ profiles and timelines; 2) in-depth 
interviews; and 3) a qualitative (or open-ended) questionnaire. For the second phase, 
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and based on the findings of the qualitative phase, a quantitative experiment was 
used to test the extent to which the findings of the qualitative phase are accurate. The 
qualitative phase methodology is discussed in detail in the next chapter, while the 
quantitative phase methodology is explained in detail in Chapter 6. 
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 Research Methodology with Emphasis on Qualitative 
Phase 
4.1 Overview 
 
This chapter discusses the choice of methodology and the research design 
process for this study. Specifically, it explains what kind of methodology was used 
and why it was considered appropriate for this study, as well as the advantages and 
limitations of the selected approach. The study used a sequential exploratory mixed 
method, which involved a qualitative method in the first phase and a quantitative 
method in the second phase, and the focus of this chapter is on the research design 
and methodology of the qualitative phase. The quantitative phase depends on the 
findings of the qualitative phase, and therefore its methodology is presented in 
Chapter 6, after presenting the findings of the qualitative phase. 
4.2 Methodological Choices 
The methodology is the overall approach to the research process. Researchers 
with different philosophical assumptions adopt different approaches in their research. 
Broadly speaking, there are three approaches or methods for conducting research on 
information systems or human behaviours in general. Those approaches or methods 
are: qualitative methods, quantitative methods, and mixed methods (Creswell 2002; 
Hanson et al. 2005; Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003).  
The goal of qualitative methods is to gain insights into particular social and 
behavioural processes and practices that exist within a particular location, and to 
extract meaning from the data. The data are collected from people in their natural 
settings and are interpreted based on the meanings people bring to them (Denzin and 
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Lincoln 2000). The qualitative method usually engages in investigations with regard 
to the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of decision making rather than just focusing on the ‘when’, 
‘where’ and ‘what’, and thus qualitative studies usually make use of a small sample. 
The qualitative methods usually produce information with regard to particular cases 
that are being explored, and seek different ways through which the answers to the 
questions posed in the research can be developed. This is achieved through the use of 
a predetermined procedure (Denzin and Lincoln 2005). Qualitative methods also 
explore the different ways through which appropriate and necessary evidence can be 
collected. Qualitative methods are capable of producing findings that have not 
previously been determined. Moreover, they play an important role in the production 
of findings and results that can be effectively applied beyond the immediate 
boundaries of the given research (Creswell et al. 2007).  
The data collection methods that are commonly applied in qualitative research 
include the focus group, in-depth interviews and participant observation. Focus 
groups are used to elicit information concerning the different norms of different 
groups, as well as the generation of broad viewpoints about different issues among 
the groups that are being explored in the study (Creswell 2002). In-depth interviews 
are important for the collection of data with regard to the personal histories, 
experiences and perspectives of different individuals, especially with regard to 
sensitive issues. In participant observation, the naturally occurring behaviours of the 
different individuals are considered in their natural contexts. 
In contrast, quantitative methods are used to explain phenomena and answer 
research questions through the collection of numerical and quantitative data which 
are usually analysed using various mathematically and statistically-based methods. 
Quantitative methods play an important role in testing different hypotheses and 
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relationships between variables or factors (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). The two main 
types of quantitative methods are the quantitative questionnaire (or survey) and 
experiment (Recker 2012). The mixed methods approach uses both qualitative and 
quantitative methods in a single study (Creswell et al. 2007). There are different 
types of mixed methods depending on the purpose of the study and the order of the 
methods involved. The most common types of mixed methods are the sequential 
explanatory mixed method (using a quantitative method followed by a qualitative 
method) and the sequential exploratory mixed method (using a qualitative method 
followed by a quantitative method). Using qualitative, quantitative, or any type of 
mixed methods should be guided by the research question and type of investigation 
(Creswell et al. 2007). The methodology chosen for this research, and the rationale 
and justification for this choice, are explained in the following sections. 
4.3 Choosing the Sequential Exploratory Mixed Method 
The main purpose of the present study is to explore the source characteristics 
that influence Facebook users to fall for social engineering attacks, and to find the 
relationship between those characteristics and users’ demographics. To achieve this 
aim, the research methods were combined in a sequential order, beginning with 
qualitative methods in the first phase followed by a quantitative method in the second 
phase. As mentioned above, this specific type of mixed methods design is known as 
the sequential exploratory mixed method (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003). Qualitative 
methods are often found to be appropriate for exploratory research (such as in the 
case of the first phase of this study), where the aim is to discover a theoretical model 
or generate hypotheses. On the other hand, quantitative methods are often used to test 
hypotheses. By utilising both types, all the goals of this research can be achieved. 
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Figure 4.1 illustrates the research design. The research commenced with a 
review of the literature in order to define the strategy and the context. The next stage 
involved identifying the research questions and objectives, followed by choosing the 
appropriate methodology. The subsequent steps involved conducting the first phase 
of the research, conducting the second phase of the research (based on the findings of 
the first phase), and finally identifying the implications of the study for practice and 
research. This process involved several tasks and stages, which are explained 
throughout the thesis.  
 
Figure 4.1 Research Design 
 
 
The sequential exploratory mixed method was selected for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, it was not possible to start with a quantitative method in this study to 
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explore new factors or create hypotheses that can answer the first and the second 
proposed research questions, and therefore there was a need to start with a qualitative 
method to explore and identify such factors. Secondly, the mixed method approach 
makes use of deductive and inductive scientific methods in which both hypotheses 
and theory generation is undertaken as well as the provision of the tests and proofs of 
the theories and the hypotheses.  
Thirdly, the sample of the first phase was relatively small. Therefore, there was 
a need to use a large sample to test and link the findings of the first phase to 
demographics variables, and thereby to address the third, fourth and fifth research 
questions. Fourthly, using the mixed method design ensures the validity of results, by 
eliminating bias and subjectivity in the interpretation, which can occur through the 
use of the qualitative method. 
Thus, a qualitative phase was adopted in order to develop the a priori model, 
and to develop the hypotheses for the quantitative phase. The quantitative phase 
involved testing the hypotheses developed in the qualitative phase and examining the 
relationship between the source characteristics (found during the qualitative phase) 
and users’ demographics. The results of the quantitative phase are presented as an a 
posteriori model, in which the final model is developed and tested based on both 
qualitative and quantitative empirical evidence (Burnham and Anderson 2002). 
Therefore, the qualitative phase of this research was mainly focused on answering 
the first and second research questions: 
1. What source characteristics influence Facebook users to judge an attacker as 
credible, and therefore make them susceptible to social engineering 
victimisation by that attacker? 
2. How do source characteristics influence Facebook users to judge an attacker 
as credible? 
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The quantitative phase mainly focused on answering the third, fourth and fifth 
research questions: 
3. To what extent do each of these source characteristics influence Facebook 
users to judge an attacker as credible? 
4. Is there any relationship between the influence of the source characteristics 
on users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation in Facebook and 
users’ demographics such as age, gender, education, relationship status, and 
level of awareness? 
5. Is there any relationship between users’ demographics and susceptibility to 
social engineering victimisation on Facebook in general? 
4.4 Objective of the First (Qualitative) Phase 
As mentioned above, the aim of the first (qualitative) phase was to answer the 
first two research questions. Although the literature lacks a definitive answer 
regarding the source characteristics that impact on users’ susceptibility to social 
engineering victimisation on Facebook, there is agreement across related disciplines 
that source credibility encourages the recipient to accept a request or message 
received from that source (e.g., (Ayeh et al. 2013; Bergh et al. 1981; Berlo et al. 
1969; Corina 2006; Eisend 2006; Falcione 1974; Markham 1968; McCain et al. 
1977; McCroskey and Jenson 1975; Ohanian 1990; Salwen 1987; Simpson and 
Kahler 1981; Singletary 1976; Tuppen 1974; White 1990)). Social engineering 
always comes in the form of a message that contains a request. This request can be 
direct or it can be a trick that requires the victim to accept or respond to a request 
within the trick. As discussed in Chapter 3, several empirical studies from varied 
contexts have been conducted in regard to source credibility, including politics, 
journalism, marketing, and other contexts.  
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The important factor in the present study is the credibility that “influences” the 
receiver to obey, comply or accept a message. This is represented by Ohanian’s 
(1990) definition of source credibility as “a term commonly used to imply a 
communicator’s positive characteristics that affect the receiver’s acceptance of a 
message” (p. 41). Depending on the type of source, the type of persuasion and the 
context, different dimensions of source credibility have been found. Since the 
dimensions are strongly associated with the operationalised definition, and because 
this study adapted the operationalised definition proposed by Ohanian (1990), there 
was good reason to base the initial expectations (sensitising concepts) on the 
dimensions used by Ohanian. In the context of marketing, Ohanian (1990) 
propounded three dimensions that contribute to the perception of celebrity endorsers’ 
credibility:  
1) Trustworthiness (which can also be labelled as trustworthiness, believability or 
sincerity) 
2) Expertise (which can also be labelled as expertise, professionalism or 
competence) 
3) Attractiveness (which can also be labelled as attractiveness, appeal and 
likability). 
Additionally, although several dimensions of source credibility have been 
proposed in the literature (e.g., intimacy, character, esteem) in different contexts, 
there seems to be general agreement regarding these three dimensions of source 
credibility (e.g., (Bergh et al. 1981; Berlo et al. 1969; Corina 2006; Markham 1968; 
Mosier and Ahlgren 1981)). Furthermore, Eisend (2006) summarised 28 studies in 
marketing communication in order to identify the existence of a generalised 
conceptualisation of credibility. While different labels were used, the results 
suggested the same three dimensions of source credibility as those suggested by 
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Ohanian (1990). Moreover, these three dimensions also appear to be the most 
relevant to the particular context of SNSs (Ayeh et al. 2013; Corina 2006). Although 
the extent to which these findings would apply on the Facebook platform was unclear 
before conducting the research, there was reason to believe that Facebook users’ 
perceptions as measured by these three dimensions would have a positive effect on 
their susceptibility to social engineering victimisation.  
On the other hand, while there was strong reason to expect that these 
dimensions (trustworthiness, expertise, and attractiveness) would be relevant, there 
were also concerns regarding their validity at the initial stage. These concerns were 
associated with the difference between persuasion in the context of making purchases 
and persuasion in the context of taking risky actions in response to social 
engineering. Moreover, the Facebook context is very different from real-life 
situations. Therefore, the adoption of grounded theory approach in the qualitative 
phase is essential to eliminate such concerns. The grounded theory approach is 
particularly suitable for addressing this challenge, and has been utilised in many 
similar studies.  
The grounded theory approach is viewed as a type of reverse engineering, in 
which a new theory is constructed based on the collected data. This differs from a 
research approach that begins with hypotheses, and thus the dimensions of source 
credibility were able to be explored during the qualitative phase. The expected 
dimensions thus served as sensitising concepts only, which, as discussed previously, 
play a role in increasing a researcher’s theoretical sensitivity (Dunne 2011). 
Furthermore, even though identifying the dimensions of source credibility is an 
important aim, the final goal of this research does not stop at the perception level. 
That is, this research also aims to explore the Facebook-specific source 
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characteristics that influence the perception of these dimensions in the context of 
Facebook. Therefore, the aim of the qualitative phase can be achieved through 
addressing the following questions (as shown in Figure 4.2): 
1) What are the source credibility dimensions in terms of social engineering on 
Facebook? 
2) What are the Facebook-specific source characteristics that influence 
Facebook users to judge an attacker as per these dimensions? 
 
Figure 4.2 Questions Regarding Potentially Important Dimensions 
  
4.5 Selection of Grounded Theory 
The first step in this study was reviewing the literature in relevant disciplines, 
such as psychology, sociology, behaviourism, human communication, politics and 
marketing, in order to discover any potentially important variables related to the 
topic under study. Compared to the scope of the present study, the variables found in 
the literature were developed and tested for other purposes, on samples or 
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populations other than those of present interest, and in different disciplines (mostly in 
marketing). Although the source credibility studies in the literature are valuable and 
potentially important, the following major differences between this study and those 
studies are noted: 
1. The purpose of the persuasive marketer is different than that of the social 
engineer, in that the social engineer makes the victim unable to 
understand their real intentions or to see the full consequences of the 
beliefs or actions. 
2. The previous studies were based on real-life, face-to-face situations, and 
the factors upon which people were found to base their judgments are 
feasible in those situations. However, in this study, the factors that 
influence people to make judgments are different because the users are 
interacting in a virtual environment. 
3. The requests of the marketer usually involve convincing customers to pay 
for a product or service, but the social engineer’s request can involve 
many other purposes, such as revealing information, downloading 
software or clicking on a link. Therefore, the factors that customers look 
at in order to make a judgment about the credibility of a marketer are 
perhaps different to the factors that SNS users look at in order to make a 
judgment about the credibility of a social engineer. 
 
In this situation, when no existing theory or model can be applied to address 
the research questions, Creswell (2012) suggests using the “grounded theory” 
method to inductively build the targeted theory or model. As Creswell (2012) 
explains: 
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Grounded theory is a good design to use when a theory is not available to 
explain the process. The literature may have models available, but they 
were developed and tested on samples and populations other than those 
of interest to the qualitative researcher. Also, theory may be presented, 
but they are incomplete because they do not address potentially valuable 
variables of interest to the researcher. (p. 66) 
According to Martin and Turner (1986), the grounded theory approach is an 
inductive methodology, which “allows the researcher to develop a theoretical 
account of the general features of a topic while simultaneously grounding the 
account in empirical observations or data” (p. 141). Grounded theory is a research 
method that aims to develop a theory inductively and ground the theory in data that 
are systematically gathered and analysed (Myers 1997). There has been increasing 
interest in the use of grounded theory in information systems research, due to its 
usefulness in developing theories in different and new contexts (Urquhart et al. 
2010). Matavire and Brown (2008) classified the usage of grounded theory in 
information systems research into four types, namely, “Glaserian”, “Straussian”, 
“simple application of grounded theory techniques” and “as part of a mixed 
methodology”. Because there is an overlap between these four usage types, the usage 
of grounded theory in the present study can be classified in “Straussian” and “as part 
of a mixed methodology”. 
Grounded theory has three key principles that make it different from other 
approaches, namely, the principle of emergence, the principle of constant 
comparative analysis, and the principle of theoretical sampling (Matavire and Brown 
2008). The emergence principle of grounded theory methodology suggests that both 
the outcome theory and the research design process should be allowed to emerge 
from the data. Constant comparative analysis is the major strategy used in 
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discovering grounded theory, which includes determining the accuracy of the data, 
establishing the limits of empirical generalisation, specifying a concept, verifying the 
theory, and finally generating the theory. The theoretical sampling suggests that the 
size of the sample should continue until each category, as identified in the theory, is 
saturated, and that the type of participants should be determined by the emerging 
theory. While many researchers agree on all of these three principles, other 
researchers (e.g., (Creswell 2012)) suggest that emergence is the main criterion in the 
grounded theory approach. Matavire and Brown (2008) and Creswell (2012) suggest 
that grounded theory is a good design to use even for extending an existing theory. 
The benefits of using grounded theory, even when there is an existing a priori model, 
were explained by Matavire and Brown (2008) as follows:  
Researchers may start with pre-conceived a priori theory, then go on to 
collect empirical data, and analyse it using grounded theory coding 
techniques. The intent may be to extend the initial theory inductively. 
Alternatively, the intent may be to use the initial theoretical framework 
solely as a guide or sensitizing device, before applying grounded theory 
techniques to analyse data and build theory. The final theory developed 
may or may not resemble the initial framework. (p. 142) 
This procedures suggested by Creswell (2012) and Matavire and Brown (2008) 
above were followed in this research. The aim of this study, as well as the 
methodology used, help to address an important gap in the information systems 
literature. As highlighted in the introductory discussion about the suitability of this 
study’s methodology (Chapter 1, Section 1.9), Cao et al. (2014) recommended that 
future research on online social networks should focus on the validation of constructs 
and development of theories that are specific to SNSs, investigate the individual 
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characteristics or factors that play a role in SNS research, and employ multiple 
research methods (especially qualitative methods and data analytics).   
4.6 Epistemological Considerations 
Epistemology represents the research assumptions about knowledge and how it 
can be obtained (Myers 1997). It refers to the philosophical types and underlying 
paradigm for qualitative research. In information systems, researchers (e.g., (Guba 
and Lincoln 1994; Myers 1997; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991)) have suggested four 
categories for qualitative studies based on the underlying epistemology: positivist, 
interpretive, critical, and constructivist. Positivist studies assume that reality is 
objectively given in the data and can be described by measurable properties that are 
independent of the researcher. In other words, positivist studies attempt to test 
hypotheses and theories in order to enhance the existing understanding of the 
phenomena under investigation. 
 Interpretive studies attempt to understand a particular phenomenon relying on 
the meanings that people assign to them, but without predefining dependent and 
independent (cause and effect) variables. A critical study attempts to explain 
“oppositions, conflicts and contradictions in contemporary society, and seeks to be 
emancipatory” (Myers 1997, p. 5). Constructivist studies assume that meaning or 
knowledge is constructed by the researcher and not discovered (Guba and Lincoln 
1994). Considering the aim and the methodology of the present study, it can be 
classified mainly as positivist research, in which it assumes that reality is objectively 
given. However, it is noted that there is an overlap between the different types of 
qualitative studies, and that there is general agreement that the distinctions between 
these epistemological and philosophical types are not always clear cut (Myers 
(1997).  
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Grounded theory research is classified into two main schools: the objectivist 
grounded theory (or systematic procedures) of Corbin and Strauss (1990); Strauss 
and Corbin (1998), and the constructivist approach of Charmaz (2006). Charmaz (in 
(Morse et al. 2009)) summarised the differences and similarities between the 
objectivist grounded theory of Strauss and Corbin and constructivist grounded theory 
of Charmaz, as presented in Table 4.1. Although both schools of grounded theory are 
similar in general, there are some differences in the underlying epistemology as 
explained in the table. 
The most (and, arguably, the important) difference between the objectivist 
grounded theory and the constructivist approach is the coding procedures. Debate has 
arisen between the two co-founders of grounded theory, Glaser and Strauss, about 
the epistemology of grounded theory and the metaphor of emergence during coding 
(Seidel and Urquhart 2013). 
Coding is the process of naming, grouping and labelling the objects, categories 
and properties found in the collected data or text (Suresh 2015). Strauss and Corbin 
(1990) proposed three coding stages: “open coding” to find the core categories, then 
“axial coding” to find the categories around each core category, and then “selective 
coding” to develop the hypotheses that are interrelated with the categories in the 
model. While there is general agreement on open and selective coding, a difference 
arose between Glaser and Strauss about axial coding. Strauss and Corbin (1990) 
introduced some recommendations and guidelines to help researchers define the 
relationships between concepts during axial coding. Glaser (1992) believed that this 
axial coding can lead to the conceptualisation being forced, rather than being allowed 
to emerge. Due to this debate, there are two disparate opinions regarding coding in 
grounded theory. 
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Table 4.1 The Differences and Similarities between the Objectivist Grounded Theory and 
Constructivist Grounded Theory as have been Summarised by Charmaz (in Morse et al. (2009)) 
 Objectivist Grounded Theory Constructivist Grounded Theory 
F
o
u
n
d
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a
ss
u
m
p
ti
o
n
s Assume an external reality Assumes multiple realities 
Assumes discovery of data 
Assumes mutual construction of data through 
interaction 
Assumes conceptualizations  
emerge from data 
Assumes researcher constructs categories 
Views representation of data as  
unproblematic 
Views representation of data as problematic, 
relativistic, situational, and partial 
Assumes the neutrality, passivity,  
and authority of the observer 
Assumes the observer’s values, priorities, 
positions, and actions affect views 
O
b
je
ct
iv
es
 
Aims to achieve context-free 
generalizations  
Views generalizations as partial, 
conditional, and situated in time, space, 
position, action, and interactions  
Aims for abstract conceptualizations 
that transcend historical and 
situational locations  
Aims for interpretive understanding of 
historically situated data  
Specifies variables Specifies range of variation 
Aims to create theory that fits, works, 
has relevance, and is modifiable 
(Glaser) 
Aims to create theory that has credibility, 
originality, resonance, 
 
The present study used the objectivist grounded theory (systematic procedures 
of Strauss and Corbin), due to its compatibility with the research aim and questions. 
The research sought to systematically develop a model that contains and explains the 
source characteristics that influence Facebook users to perceive a source as credible. 
Therefore, the aim is producing a theoretical model, which contains the causality 
relationship between dependent and independent variables. As noted by Seidel and 
Urquhart (2013), the systematic procedures of Strauss and Corbin are effective in 
research that aims to develop a causal theory: 
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We also noted that applying the S & C [Strauss and Corbin] coding 
paradigm leads to the identification of causal relationships. Therefore, 
one clear advantage of applying the S & C paradigm is that it does lead to 
theory development because it encourages the consideration of 
relationships between categories. (p. 248) 
In addition, objectivist grounded theory (the systematic procedures of Strauss 
and Corbin) is “the most influential strand of grounded theory method, and is seen by 
scholars to have more reach and influence” (Seidel and Urquhart 2013, p. 238). More 
details about how the objectivist grounded theory was applied in this research are 
provided in the following sections. 
4.7 Triangulation 
The challenge of exploring factors related to deceptive practices such as social 
engineering attacks is that when people are asked how they are tricked or deceived, 
they usually say “we are aware of deception and we don’t get deceived!” In the best 
situation, they may say “we don’t know how we get deceived”. However, research 
shows that individuals and organisations are extremely weak in detecting deception 
and social engineering tricks (Grazioli 2004; Qi 2007). It is also possible that the 
participants who have experienced social engineering-based attacks would feel 
hesitant to report their stories. These challenges arising from these tendencies can be 
summarised as follows: 
 People think that they are good at detecting deception and therefore they will 
either not report how or won’t know how they get deceived. 
 It may be difficult to find participants who have experienced social engineering 
attacks and convince them to participate. 
 It may be challenging to encourage participants to report their sensitive 
experiences without feeling hesitant or shy. 
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 It may be difficult to make sure that participants report the truth and not 
fabricated stories. 
 Some participants might have experienced a social engineering attack but they 
don’t know it occurred. 
To deal with this kind of challenge, Flick (2004, p. 178) suggests using 
triangulation by combining data “drawn from different sources and at different times, 
in different places or from different people”. There are different types of 
triangulations mentioned in the literature such as methods triangulation, triangulation 
of sources, analyst triangulation, and theory-perspective triangulation (Denzin 1970; 
Patton 1999). In this research, the methods triangulation was used, which ensures 
that an account is robust, rich, and comprehensive. The following data collection 
methods were used in the qualitative phase of this research: 
1- Observations of participants’ profiles and timelines on Facebook  
2- In-depth interviews 
3- Qualitative open-ended questionnaire. 
The following sections explain each of the three methods, including their 
purpose, limitations, and how they were conducted. 
4.8 Observations of Participants’ Profiles and Timelines 
Observation was utilised as a method to support the interviews. Interviews are 
a highly efficient way to gather rich and empirical data. However, interviews can 
present challenging biases; for example, participants may present themselves in a 
manner that is different from their real life, due to the knowledge that they are under 
study. Interviews are conducted in a social context that is not anonymous. Therefore, 
participants may present themselves in a certain way to the interviewer rather than 
reporting their actual experience. For this reason, Corbin and Strauss (1990) and 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggest collecting and analysing observations or 
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documents as a way to support the interview method. According to (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007): 
Key approach to mitigating bias is to combine retrospective and real-time 
cases…real-time cases employ longitudinal data collection of interviews 
and, often, observations, both of which help to mitigate retrospective 
sensemaking and impression management. (p. 28)  
In this study, the goal is to understand Facebook users’ perceptions, attitudes 
and behaviours in regard to dealing with social engineers’ tricks or traps. Therefore, 
the best way to observe their actual behaviours was to observe their profiles and 
timelines. Facebook profiles and timelines save and keep a record of individuals’ 
activities on their accounts and their interactions when dealing with others, such as 
sharing, posting, liking and commenting. The profiles and timelines also show the 
groups, events, friends and commercial pages that the users are members of.  
The observation method has been used in many areas of behavioural research, 
such as psychology, sociology, nursing and information systems. The observation 
method can be structured, unstructured or a mix of both structured and unstructured 
(e.g.,(Emerson et al. 2001; Gold 1958; Mulhall 2003)). According to Mulhall (2003, 
p. 307), “observers using unstructured methods usually enter ‘the field’ with no 
predetermined notions as to the discrete behaviours that they might observe”. As the 
observations in the present study commenced without predetermined notions, the 
observations were mostly unstructured. 
Before the interviews were conducted in this study, permission from the 
participants was obtained, allowing online observations to be made of the 
participants’ behaviours through browsing their Facebook accounts (profiles and 
timelines). This provided several benefits such as gaining a better idea of what 
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questions to ask in the interview, getting a picture of the users’ previous and actual 
behaviours, and making better sense of what the participants later said during the 
interviews. Moreover, the observations revealed that some participants had fallen 
victim to social engineering tricks but they did not recognise that this had occurred. 
For example, some participants’ accounts were connected to fake (impersonated) 
accounts for celebrities while believing that those accounts belonged to the real 
celebrities. Other participants had shared posts that can be classified as spam or 
malware but they believed those posts were safe.  
Notes of the observations were taken on a pre-designed form. The notes 
included the name that identified the user’s Facebook account, the number and types 
of friends, groups or fan pages that the user’s account was connected to, any 
interesting or unusual behaviours, the types of comments and posts that the user 
received or sent, any questions to be asked during the interviews, and any other 
additional notes. 
4.9 In-Depth Interviews 
As a research method, the interview is used to gain a deep understanding of 
human behaviour and the different reasons governing that behaviour. Interviews are 
conducted to understand a research topic or problem from the perspective of the 
population that is involved. The interview method is important because it provides 
complex textual descriptions of people’s experiences regarding a certain issue. In 
addition, the interactivity with interviewees provides important information about the 
human aspects of the issue under consideration, such as the different individuals’ 
often contradictory behaviours, opinions, relationships, beliefs and emotions 
(Burnard 1991). This method can effectively identify intangible factors such as the 
religious beliefs, norms, gender roles and ethnicity of the individuals, the relevance 
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of which to the research topic may not be apparent from the onset (Creswell 2012). 
The interview method also plays an important role in interpreting and understanding 
the complex realities that characterise the given situations as well as identifying the 
implications of the collected data. 
4.9.1 Interview Approach 
As mentioned earlier, the systematic procedures approach of Corbin and 
Strauss (1990) and Strauss and Corbin (1998) was chosen due its compatibility with 
the research purpose; that is, the research sought to systematically develop a model 
that contains and explains the source characteristics that influence Facebook users to 
perceive a source as credible and therefore influence them to accept messages from 
that source. In the systematic procedures approach, Corbin and Strauss (1990) 
suggest that researchers conduct 20 to 30 interviews to collect data that saturate the 
categories.  
The category is the unit of information, which includes the factors that the 
research aims to explore. Corbin and Strauss (1990) also suggest that the researcher 
in this approach keeps trying to find information that continues to add to themes until 
no more can be found. Corbin and Strauss (1990) also suggest collecting and 
analysing observations along with conducting interviews. These suggestions were 
followed in this research and were found to be useful, as explained in the following 
sections. 
4.9.2 Pilot Interviews 
A pilot study is a rehearsal study that is conducted before the main study is 
undertaken (Glesne and Peshkin 1992; Myers 1997; Sonderegger and Sauer 2010). In 
the present study, four pilot interviews were conducted to test the proposed interview 
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protocol for its clarity and effectiveness in exploring participants’ experience 
regarding social engineering on Facebook. The interview protocol was adapted, first, 
based on the general definition of social engineering. Some modifications to the 
interviews’ questions and protocol were made in light of the pilot interview results. 
The major change was the addition of the observation method to the research 
strategy. The observation method was not part of the initial research plan. During the 
first two pilot interviews, it became clear that observing the participants’ profiles and 
timelines would provide a fuller picture of the participants’ actual behaviours, guide 
the development of the questions to ask in the interviews, and help to make better 
sense of what the participants said during the interviews. Therefore, the observation 
method was adopted before conducting the last two pilot interviews. Some 
adjustments were also made to the interview questions based on the results of the 
pilot interviews; these adjustments enabled the project to proceed in conformity with 
both the research aim and the methodology. 
4.9.3 Interview Sampling 
Based on the systematic procedures of Corbin and Strauss, theoretical sampling 
was used, in which the participants were chosen selectively and theoretically. This 
helps in exploring all possible factors and forming the theory based on these factors. 
The selection of the theoretical sample (Figure 4.3) was based on the following 
factors that have been found to affect people in relation to social engineering in 
SNSs: 
1) Risk beliefs –Rosenstock (1974) introduced the relationship between 
behaviour and perceived threat through the health belief model. This theory suggests 
that the probability of performing a risky action is determined by the perceived threat 
of taking that action, the perceived susceptibility to the threat, the perceived severity 
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of the threat if it has already happened, and the perceived benefits of taking that 
action. Aldoory and Van Dyke (2006) further stated that the problems of performing 
a risky action have been associated with the health belief model and the situational 
theory of publics (Grunig et al. 1997). The latter suggests that a population can be 
classified depending on the way it behaves, that is, based on whether it is active or 
passive. The psychological issues concerned with this theory include: 1) the extent of 
activity in the behaviour, 2) familiarity with problems, and 3) knowledge of 
constraints (Brafman and Brafman 2011). The protection motivation theory proposes 
that individuals protect themselves based on four factors: the perceived severity of a 
threatening event, the perceived vulnerability (the probability of the occurrence of 
that threat), the efficacy of the recommended preventive action or behaviour, and the 
perceived self-efficacy (Posey et al. 2014). 
2) Socio-psychological factors – Previous research has indicated that human 
socio-psychological factors are the main causes of the human weaknesses that lead 
people to fall victim to social engineering (Bezuidenhout et al. 2010; Mohebzada et 
al. 2010; Pattinson et al. 2012; Twitchell 2006). Studies have also found a 
relationship between socio-psychological factors, personality type and demographic 
variables such as age, gender and educational level. Darwish et al. (2012) conducted 
a review of studies on email phishing attacks to understand the relationship between 
the victims’ backgrounds and their susceptibility to phishing victimisation. They 
found that user demographics and personality traits were important factors that 
impacted social engineering victimisation and other security-related behaviours. 
3) Awareness level – The commonly suggested countermeasures for defending 
against social engineering attacks are education and training (Brody 2012), policy 
and management (Gragg 2003; Kvedar et al. 2010), and auditing and testing (Mitnick 
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and Simon 2001). These countermeasures can enhance the awareness of potential 
victims and provide some controls for their behaviour. 
 
Figure 4.3 Factors Influencing the Theoretical Sample 
 
Therefore, participants with different personality types and demographic 
variables were selected to ensure that the sample represented a potentially high 
degree of variation and to increase the likelihood of identifying all possible factors 
under investigation. As shown in Table 4.2, 20 interviews and four pilot interviews 
were conducted. The employees in the sample were purposively chosen from two 
different international organisations, and their participation was voluntary. One of 
these organisations experienced a serious cyber attack in 2012, and had since started 
to train its employees on the various types of cyber threats, including social 
engineering threats.  
In contrast, the second organisation had not yet experienced a serious cyber 
attack, and its employees had not been involved in professional training about social 
engineering. Thus, it was expected that the participants may have different risk 
beliefs and different levels of awareness regarding social engineering. The size of the 
sample was determined by reaching the point of saturation at which no new data 
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emerged. That is, the participants continued to be interviewed and the collected data 
continued to be analysed until each category identified in the theory was saturated. 
While two groups of participants (from two organisations) were determined before 
the interviews commenced, the individual participants in each group were selected 
during the interviews based on emerging knowledge from the previous interviews. 
That is, an ongoing interplay between the data collection coding and iterations of the 
sampling occurred during data coding and analysis. 
 
Table 4.2 Characteristics of the Interview Sample 
Interviewee  
Number 
Age Gender 
Personality Type 
(based on big five  
personality traits) 
Cultural 
Heritage 
Employment Educational Level 
Interviewee 1 31 Female Extraverted Saudi Organization 1 Master’s Degree 
Interviewee 2 24 Female Neurotic Jordanian Organization 1 Bachelor’s Degree 
Interviewee 3 37 Male Open Saudi Organization 1 Master’s Degree 
Interviewee 4 35 Male Agreeable Indian Organization 1 Bachelor’s Degree 
Interviewee 5 24 Female Neurotic American Organization 1 Bachelor’s Degree 
Interviewee 6 27 Male Extraverted American Organization 1 Bachelor’s Degree 
Interviewee 7 32 Male Open Egyptian Organization 1 Master’s Degree 
Interviewee 8 48 Female Conscientious American Organization 1 Doctoral Degree 
Interviewee 9 23 Female Agreeable Saudi Organization 1 Bachelor’s Degree 
Interviewee 10 43 Male Agreeable Indian Organization 1 Bachelor’s Degree 
Interviewee 11 27 Female Open Saudi Organization 2 Bachelor’s Degree 
Interviewee 12 41 Male Open Indian Organization 2 Doctoral Degree 
Interviewee 13 33 Female Conscientious American Organization 2 Bachelor’s Degree 
Interviewee 14 34 Male Open Saudi Organization 2 Master’s Degree 
Interviewee 15 19 Female Neurotic Indian Organization 2 Undergraduate or lower 
Interviewee 16 27 Male Conscientious Egyptian Organization 2 Master’s Degree 
Interviewee 17 37 Male Agreeable Egyptian Organization 2 Bachelor’s Degree 
Interviewee 18 29 Male Open American Organization 2 Bachelor’s Degree 
Interviewee 19 51 Male Open American Organization 2 Doctoral Degree 
Interviewee 20 31 Male Extraverted Jordanian Organization 2 Bachelor’s Degree 
Interviewee 21 33 Male Agreeable Egyptian Pilot Master’s Degree 
Interviewee 22 18 Male Conscientious Saudi Pilot Undergraduate or lower 
Interviewee 23 18 Male Extraverted Jordanian Pilot Undergraduate or lower 
Interviewee 24 39 Female Agreeable Saudi Pilot Doctoral Degree 
4.9.4 Interview Protocol 
Semi-structured questions were prepared in order to address all the possible 
topics under investigation. As mentioned above, the interview protocol was adapted 
first based on the definition of social engineering. The environment characteristics of 
Facebook and how they impact social engineering victimisation were taken into 
consideration. For example, the interview included some questions regarding 
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accepting friendship invitations from strangers, distinguishing fake and legitimate 
users/accounts, and the privacy settings used by the participants. As discussed above, 
some modifications to the interviews questions and protocol were made in light of 
the results of the pilot interviews. For some participants, extra questions were added 
to the interviews based on the previous observations of their Facebook profiles and 
timelines. In addition, interactivity with the participants during the interviews 
allowed the conversation to cover some important questions and topics that were not 
included in the semi-structured questions, but arose during the interviews. This 
followed the approach suggested by Wengraf (2001). The interviews were conducted 
face-to-face, were audio recorded with the permission of the interviewee, and then 
transcribed. Each interview took from 30 to 60 minutes. The researcher conducted, 
recorded and transcribed all the interviews that were conducted in Arabic. For the 
interviews that were conducted in English, the task of transcription was assigned to a 
commercial office. To manage and minimise any ethical risks, the following 
guidelines were applied before, after and during the interviews: 
1- Ensure that the interview sessions are conducted in a friendly environment and 
manner. 
2- Explain the purpose, type of questions, expected time and privacy of the 
information that the participants provide before starting the interview, and 
explain that the participants have the right to accept or reject the invitation to 
participate. 
3- Inform the participants that they have the right to stop the interview at any time 
without any penalty. 
4- Inform the participants that their participation is entirely voluntary and that they 
are not obliged to answer any questions they find objectionable, and assure them 
that no information collected will be reported to anyone who is in a position of 
authority over them. 
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4.10 Qualitative Open-Ended Questionnaire 
Although interviews and observations are highly efficient ways to gather rich 
empirical data, they can present challenges and limitations. As discussed above, 
interviews and observations are conducted in a social context that is not anonymous; 
therefore, participants may present themselves to researchers in a certain light rather 
than reporting their actual experience. This study therefore used a third method, 
namely, a qualitative open-ended questionnaire which aimed to eliminate the 
limitations of the interviews and observations by allowing subjects to anonymously 
report their real experiences of social engineering attacks. Another reason for using 
this method was to reach a large number of participants and therefore to gain as 
much knowledge as possible about the phenomenon. The rationale for using this 
method was to confirm the findings of the observations and interviews based on real 
users’ experiences and, most importantly, to explore any factors that were not 
identified during the observations and interviews. 
4.10.1 Objectives and Procedures of the Open-Ended Questionnaire 
The qualitative open-ended questionnaire was conducted to collect users’ 
experiences of social engineering attacks on Facebook. Through the qualitative open-
ended questionnaire, a researcher can gain a deep understanding of human 
behaviours as well as the reasoning that governs those behaviours (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2005). The investigative focus of the qualitative open-ended questionnaire in 
the present study was similar to the focus of the interviews. It considered the ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ of the decision-making process, rather than just focusing on ‘when’, 
‘where’ and ‘what’ questions. A small sample size can be sufficient if saturation is 
achieved, in which case it would not be necessary to establish statistical confidence 
(Creswell et al. 2007). Saturation was also applied in this method. As explained 
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above, saturation is the point at which a researcher no longer finds new information. 
In the present study, this occurred within the first 40 responses to the questionnaire. 
Because of the sensitivity surrounding the subject, and in order to encourage 
more participants, the questionnaire was concise and participation was anonymous. 
Moreover, to avoid fabrication or bias, participation was voluntary. A pilot study was 
conducted to test the clarity and usefulness of the questionnaire items and to examine 
any items that needed revision. To fulfil the research objectives, the questionnaire 
was distributed and insightful opinions from participants were collected. A short 
paragraph was provided at the beginning of the questionnaire to explain the meaning 
of social engineering attacks. Although the setting of this research was the Facebook 
platform in particular, the questions were worded to cover SNSs in general for 
comparison purposes. However, only those answers related to Facebook were 
considered in the analysis of the data in this research. The questionnaire gathered the 
participants’ demographic variables through a drop-down list. The following specific 
questions were asked: 
1) Have you experienced, faced or run across any social engineering attacks in 
SNSs, such as deception, abuse, damage, loss, fraud, or any other type of social 
engineering attack? 
2) What type of social engineering attacks have you run across? Please tell us your 
experience. 
3) In which social networking site did this happen? 
4) How did you respond to it? 
5) Why did you respond to it in this way? 
4.10.2 Approach and Sampling for the Open-Ended Questionnaire 
A letter of invitation for participation was sent to various organisations with a 
request made to the directors to disseminate the letter to their personnel. Two 
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organisations accepted the request and distributed the invitation to their personnel. 
More than 4,000 people were approached and a total of 72 responses were collected. 
The sample that was approached included both genders, a variety of ages (from 18 to 
60 years), and a variety of education levels (secondary school, bachelor, masters and 
PhD). Figure 4.4 presents the demographics of the participants who admitted that 
they had fallen for or participated in distributing one or more social engineering 
tricks or who had encountered at least one social engineering trick but did not fall for 
it 1.  
 
Figure 4.4 Demographics of the Participants of the Open-Ended Questionnaire 
 
4.10.3 Analysis of Open-Ended Questionnaire 
After all the responses were collected, critical screening was done on the data. 
Out of 72 responses, six were found to be irrelevant to social engineering attacks and 
were therefore discarded. The data were added (triangulated) to the data from the 
                                                 
 
1 In this thesis, only the findings that are related to source characteristics have been presented. Other 
unrelated findings from open-ended questionnaire can be found in the paper (Algarni et al. 2014b). 
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interviews and observation, and then coded using the same procedures. The same 
analysis and coding approach proposed by Corbin and Strauss that had been applied 
on the interview data was applied on the questionnaire data. As Corbin and Strauss 
suggested, the analysis began with open coding to find the core categories, then axial 
coding was conducted to find the categories around each core category, followed by 
selective coding to develop the hypotheses that are interrelated with the categories in 
the model. The questionnaire responses showed several types of social engineering 
attacks that had been experienced on Facebook. This information was then analysed 
to extract the source characteristics that led the participants to fall for social 
engineering tricks. 
4.10.4 Limitations of the Open-Ended Questionnaire 
One of the limitations of an open-ended questionnaire is the risk of subjective 
interpretation bias. In order to encourage participants to respond, the open-ended 
questionnaire used in the present study was concise and included only a few, focused 
questions. Therefore, it did not provide the in-depth interactivity with participants 
and richness of information that would give a fuller picture of any potential hidden 
factors. The interpretation of the questionnaire responses was based only on what had 
been written and described by the participants themselves, unlike the interviews 
which provided the opportunity to interact, ask further questions and discuss the 
participants’ opinions. Overall, however, it was expected that the limitation of the 
questionnaire would be eliminated by using the observations and interviews as 
explained earlier.  
The questionnaire method was used to support the rich data collected during 
the interviews. The aim of this method was to focus on the experiences of social 
engineering attacks which might have been difficult to discover during the interviews 
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due to the challenges discussed above (Section 4.7). In addition, the main advantage 
of using this method was to discover any missing factors that were not discovered 
using the interviews. Therefore, combining both methods was helpful to eliminate 
the limitations in each one. Moreover, all of these issues were eliminated by using 
the second phase of research, which tested the hypotheses and findings that emerged 
in the qualitative phase.  
4.11 Validation of Qualitative Data 
Some strategies are available to enhance the validity of qualitative data, and it 
is recommended that qualitative researchers use one or more of them. These 
strategies include member checking, peer debriefing, triangulation, external auditing 
and negative case analysis (e.g., (Barusch et al. 2011; Lietz et al. 2006; Padgett 
2008)). In the present study, rigor was established through the use of multiple 
strategies. 
First, the study used triangulation, including observations, interviews and an 
open-ended questionnaire. This approach ensures that an account is robust, rich and 
comprehensive (e.g., (Denzin 1970; Patton 1999)). Second, the study used the 
strategy of member checking by emailing transcripts of the interviews to the 
participants and asking the participants to review and modify any information that 
they believed to be incorrect. Third, the strategy of peer debriefing was implemented 
through the input of the supervisory team with expertise in the field. Comprehensive 
discussions and reviews were conducted in regular meetings in relation to the data 
collection, analysis and reporting. Valuable feedback and ideas were received during 
the supervisory meetings regarding every stage of the research, therefore enhancing 
the validity of the research. 
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4.12 Analysis and Coding 
4.12.1 Analysis Process and Triangulation of Observation, Interview 
and Open-Ended Questionnaire Data 
For the data analysis, the systematic procedures approach of Corbin and 
Strauss suggests that the researcher begins the analysis while still collecting data. 
Creswell (2012) explains this approach as follows: 
My image for data collection in a grounded theory study is a ‘zigzag’ 
process: out to the field to gather information, into office to analyze the 
data, back to the field to gather more information, into the office, and so 
forth. (Creswell 2012, p. 64) 
As explained earlier, the type of triangulation used in this research was 
methods triangulation. The multiple methods used in this study were: 1) observations 
of participants’ Facebook profiles and timelines; 2) in-depth interviews; and 3) a 
qualitative open-ended questionnaire. The process of data collection, analysis and 
theorising using grounded theory involves stages that overlap. At some point, the 
activities of data collection such as note-taking, coding and memo-writing take place 
simultaneously. Dick (2006) description of the major data collection activities and 
how they overlap is presented in Figure 4.5.   
In the present study, data collection commenced from the research context 
itself (i.e., users’ Facebook profiles) in order to “to understand what is happening 
there” (Dick 2006, p. 3). For every participant, observations and note-taking were 
conducted simultaneously, followed by the interview. The analysis and coding 
followed every interview. The data from the open-ended questionnaire were added to 
the data collected from the observations and interviews, and analysed using the same 
coding procedures. As Corbin and Strauss suggested, the analysis began with open 
coding, followed by axial coding and then selective coding. All of these steps took 
 124 Chapter 4: Research Methodology with Emphasis on Qualitative Phase 
place as iterations of looking at the data, finding a meaning, comparing it with other 
findings, re-forming the relationships and going back again to the data. 
 
Figure 4.5 Major Data Collection Activities As Discribed by Dick 2006 
 
 
Constant comparisons were made after analysing each interview or adding data 
from the open-ended questionnaire in order to compare the most recent structure with 
the new findings. Such constant comparisons enable the categories, properties, 
relationships and themes to emerge. Memoing was used during this process, whereby 
drawing and writing about a finding occurred as soon as it was detected in the data. 
Wolcott (1994) described the importance of this step by pointing out that “writing is 
thinking”. In addition, Myers (1997, p. 13) made the point that “the motto of every 
qualitative researcher should be to start writing as soon as possible”. In this study, 
memoing was helpful for drawing the connections and relationships between the 
emerging categories and concepts. Several memos were drawn and altered during the 
data collection and analysis. 
 It was challenging to find the accurate relationships from the early stages. 
However, this challenge is expected and acceptable in the grounded theory approach. 
As Holton, Byrant and Charmaz (2007) explained, “grounded theory is not about the 
accuracy of descriptive units, nor is it an act of interpreting meaning as ascribed by 
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the participants in a study; rather, it is an act of conceptual abstraction” (p. 272). 
With more iterations and with more data being collected, the relationships began to 
be constructed, leading to the development of the theoretical model. 
 The main purpose the iterative approach is to help the researcher during the 
extraction of the meaning from the collected data, and develop the target theory 
(model or relationships) based on that meaning (Suresh 2015). Discovering the 
categories or themes was less challenging after the sixth or seventh interview; 
however, critical judgment was required to find agreement on “abstraction”, which in 
this research included perceptions, influences or behaviours. This target “abstraction” 
emerged quickly in some cases and slowly in some other cases. It represented one of 
the concepts under investigation, such as a source characteristic or a type of 
influence, as explained further, with more examples, in the tables from 4.5 to 4.10.  
Most of the abstractions and relationships that emerged were based on the 
interview data. The interviews resulted in approximately 270 pages of transcript, and 
the open-ended questionnaire resulted in approximately 60 pages. The role of the 
observation method was to support the interviews by gaining a better idea of what to 
ask in the interviews and to make better sense of the participants’ responses. The 
purpose of the open-ended questionnaire was to confirm the findings of the 
observations and interviews based on users’ experiences and to explore any missing 
factors that were not identified during the observations and interviews.  
4.12.2 Theoretical Sensitivity 
In grounded theory, theoretical sensitivity refers to a researcher’s analytic 
capability to work with the collected data in both sensitive and theoretical ways 
(Glaser 1978; Glaser 1992). This can be affected positively by conducting a literature 
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review before data collection and analysis. However, it might have a negative effect, 
in some cases, on the emergence during coding. Nevertheless, both Glaser (1978); 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) agree on the importance of theoretical sensitivity during 
coding. However, they take slightly different positions in terms of how to discover 
new knowledge in the data during coding. 
Strauss and Corbin argued that theoretical sensitivity is enhanced through the 
use of specific analytic strategies during coding, which include questioning (asking 
exploratory questions during observation of the data), detailed analysis of a word 
(analysing word by word and line by line), the flip-flop technique (“turning concepts 
inside out or upside down to obtain a different perspective” (p. 97)), and making 
close-in and far-out comparisons (a comparison to find similarities and then a 
comparison to find differences) (Corbin and Strauss 2014). On the other hand, Glaser 
(1992) argued that these techniques were unnecessary and that they may lead to 
forcing the conceptualisation instead of allowing it to emerge. Glaser believed that 
theoretical sensitivity is obtained simply by letting “the data speak” (Walker and 
Myrick 2006). Heath and Cowley (2004) summarised the points of agreement and 
differences in the relative positions as follows: 
Glaser and Strauss both acknowledge that the researcher will not enter 
the field free from ideas, but differ considerably in the role they see for 
the literature. Discovery is at the heart of both researchers’ ideas; one 
enters the field open to realising new meaning and, via cycles of data 
gathering and analysis, progressively focuses on a core problem around 
which other factors will be integrated. (p. 143) 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) also suggested the use of a coding paradigm in axial 
coding to assist in the forming or grouping of the categories. Seidel and Urquhart 
(2013) summarised the paradigm elements suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1990) 
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as presented in Table 4.3. The paradigm elements are just guidelines that might be 
used; they are not rules that must be followed. As Seidel and Urquhart (2013) stated, 
axial coding is the process of linking categories to sub-categories “often without 
reference to the paradigm” (p. 243), and they have explained that “researchers use 
axial coding flexibly, for instance, by using their own coding paradigm” (p. 243).  
Table 4.3 The Paradigm Elements 
Item Description Reference 
Causal 
conditions 
“Events, incidents, happenings that lead to the occurrence or 
development of a phenomenon” 
(Strauss and Corbin 
1990, p. 96)  
Intervening 
conditions 
“The structural conditions bearing on action/interactional strategies 
that pertain to a phenomenon. They facilitate or constrain the 
strategies taken within a specific context” 
(Strauss and Corbin 
1990, p. 96)  
Context “The specific set of properties that pertain to a phenomenon; that is, 
the locations of events or incidents pertaining to a phenomenon 
along a dimensional range. Context represents the particular set of 
conditions within which the action/interactional strategies are taken” 
(Strauss and Corbin 
1990, p. 96)  
Action/ 
interactional 
strategies 
“Strategies devised to manage, handle, carry out, respond to a 
phenomenon under a specific set of perceived conditions” 
(Strauss and Corbin 
1990, p. 97) 
Consequences “Outcomes or results of action and interaction” (Strauss and Corbin 
1990, p. 97) 
 
To make the most of both the Strauss and Corbin approach and the Glaser 
approach, this study relied on the systematic procedures approach of Strauss and 
Corbin, due to its compatibility with the research aim and questions. However, to 
avoid Glaser (1992) concerns about forcing the conceptualisation instead of allowing 
it to emerge, this study followed the guidelines suggested by Seidel and Urquhart 
(2013):  
1. Be “flexible” in using the axial coding 
2. Consider “the rationale for adaptations” 
3. Avoid ‘forcing’ by using the coding paradigm as a “jumping-off” point 
rather than as a “rigid device” 
4. Use the coding paradigm as a “sensitizing device” to find the causal 
relationships 
5. Use the coding paradigm to “uncover the context in which certain 
phenomena occur” (p. 248). 
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4.12.3 Open Coding 
The aim of analysis and coding is to categorise the data into themes, categories 
or factors. According to Suresh (2015) coding is the process of naming, grouping and 
labelling the objects, categories and properties found in the collected data or text. 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) suggest that researchers begin with open coding to find 
the core categories. Those core categories are the major factors the researcher seeks. 
Some researchers (e.g.,(Charmaz 2008)) refer to open coding as initial coding since 
is represents the first stage of the analysis. 
Grounded theory takes a reverse engineering approach that starts from the data 
to form the factors, which are the code categories at this stage. Creswell (2007) 
described the process of open coding as “forming categories of information about the 
phenomenon being studied by segmenting information” (p. 67). The purpose of 
segmentation of the information during open coding is to look for “the extreme 
possibilities on a continuum of the property” (Creswell 2007, p. 67). According to 
Suresh (2015), “coding can be done very formally and systematically or quite 
informally. In this [open coding], it is done informally” (p. 191). The aim of open 
coding is to identify, describe and categorise the phenomena found in the manuscript 
“informally” and “initially”. 
In the present study, coding commenced in parallel with the conduct of the 
observations and interviews, and while the data from the open-ended questionnaires 
were collected. The data from the open-ended questionnaire were added to the data 
collected from the observations and interviews, and analysed using the same coding 
procedures. As explained above, these steps happened as iterations of looking at the 
data, finding a meaning, comparing it with other findings, re-shaping the 
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relationships and going back to the data. Dick (2006) described this iterative process 
as follows: 
Constant comparison is the heart of the process. At first you compare 
interview (or other data) to interview (or other data). Theory emerges 
quickly. When it has begun to emerge you compare data to theory. (p. 3)  
In the present study, the open coding was performed by looking closely at the 
manuscript, line by line and sentence by sentence, in order to identify the concepts 
that were represented. The aim at the open coding stage was to discover the initial 
participants’ meanings and then group or categorise the meanings as one node or 
concept. The text was read several times and then tentative labels (core categories) 
were created for chunks of data that summarised and described such data. As 
suggested by Corbin and Strauss (1990), all of the labelling and grouping were based 
on the meanings that emerged from the data itself, avoiding any existing theory. In 
addition, different colours and labels were used to highlight the participants’ phrases 
and words that can be grouped together, or that can represent a common meaning. 
Computer-aided methods (NVivo) were also used to organise the manuscript. Sense 
was made of the collected text through the following steps:  
1. Search for the meanings. 
2. Organise the meanings into categories which represent the essential aspects 
of the meaning. 
3. Perform an iterative cycle of careful reading of the text in order to assess the 
categories against the new emerging data. 
The open coding revealed multiple core categories, and each core category was 
linked to groups of properties. Table 4.4 presents examples of the open coding 
including examples of the links and connections that were established between the 
interpretive core categories and the phrases or words of the participants.  
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Table 4.4 Examples of the Open Coding 
Categories of Influence Examples of participants’ words 
Properties 
(At the perception level) 
A source that successfully 
deceived me. 
- Unfortunately, my friend trusted him 
and gave him the money.  
- He made many promises and I felt I 
had no choice but to believe him 
- from logos and certificates that are 
presented -on his profile you can tell 
that he is professional 
1) Being trustworthy 
2) Being believable 
3) Being professional 
 
A source that impress me 
- What impress me a lot in Facebook 
is 
- I found it interesting to have such a 
relationship with these people… this is 
perhaps what attracted me the most to 
this group 
- I like the way he writes, this is 
perhaps what attracted me the most  
- I’m connected to a group of cheerful 
friends who made Facebook a great 
place to chat and laugh with the friends 
of your choice. 
1) Being impressing 
2) Being interesting 
3) Being likable 
4) Being attractive 
5) Being cheerful 
A source that I’m eager to 
communicate with 
- first thing I would say is if there is 
any profitable outcome of being 
friend with them or no.  
- If there is a benefit, I’m eager to 
communicate with them. It is as simple 
as that. 
- I would also prefer to like them 
- If there is a benefit I will accept, if 
there is a cost I will not accept 
1) Being profitable. 
2) Being likable. 
3) Being beneficial. 
4) [not] being costly. 
 
A source that I don’t mind 
to communicate with 
- mostly because I thought that I have 
nothing to lose 
- I would probably choose what would 
do me the least harm 
- because they have found that parson 
to be sincere. 
- I would make sure that it is not a 
fake profile 
- as long as they are nice to me 
1) Being safe/harmless 
2) Being sincere 
3) [not] being fake profile 
4) Being nice 
A source that I care about 
- This is depends on the worthwhile of 
the person. If I care about him so 
much, I’m willing to do anything for 
him 
1) Being worthwhile 
A source that I can take 
information from 
- I seek information only from those 
who are capable to provide me with 
the information I need. 
- I only purchase products that are 
advertised by authentic people. This is 
1) Being capable 
2) Being authentic 
3) Being qualified 
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because I assume they have used the 
product or tested it and found out that 
it works.   
- If you do not know a lot about a 
product, you cannot try to get 
information from someone who does 
not much about it too.. a blind man 
cannot lead another blind man. You 
must get information from qualified 
people. 
- if I do not have competence in that 
field, I do not have much choice rather 
than going with what the experts say, 
and hope its true. 
- I consider it reasonable to find myself 
trusting them 
4) Being expert 
5) Being trustworthy 
 
A source that I would help 
- not unless he deserves it. 
- The first thing I would think about is 
honesty 
1) Being deserving 
2) Being honest 
A source that I try to make 
happy 
- I think this is reasonable, since they 
are important to me. 
- I would accept so that I don’t lose my 
valuable relationship with her 
1) Being important 
2) Being valuable 
 
4.12.4 Axial Coding 
After identifying the core categories, Strauss and Corbin (1990) suggest that 
researchers start axial coding in order to find the categories around each core 
category. According to Creswell (2007), axial coding involves finding the causal 
conditions (i.e., the conditions that determine what factor causes what effect), the 
strategies (i.e., the actions taken in response to the core problem) and the 
consequences (i.e., the findings on the use of the strategies). 
In the present study, axial coding was used to find important relationships. 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) explained that axial coding “puts the data back together by 
making connections between the categories and sub-categories” (p. 278). The use of 
axial coding for the purpose of finding relationships has been encouraged in this type 
of research, where the aim is to develop theoretical and causality relationships (e.g., 
(Conboy 2010; Kendall 1999; Seidel and Urquhart 2013)). That is, during the axial 
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coding in this research, the properties were grouped as they emerged from the open 
coding. Grouping them was based on their meaning during the dimensionalising of 
the source credibility at the perception level, and based on their relation to the 
dimensions that resulted at the Facebook-specific level. The same procedures of 
constant comparison were also used in regard to the sub-categories during the axial 
coding, where the aim was to find some smaller themes or variables that are related 
to the core categories. At a certain point, no new core category or sub-category could 
be found; this was the saturation point.  
The axial coding was performed in two stages. The first stage was at the 
perception level, and the second stage was at the Facebook-specific source 
characteristic level. Table 4.5 presents examples of axial coding at the perception 
level, and Tables 4.6 to 4.9 present examples of axial coding at the Facebook-
specific source characteristic level. Both stages revealed multiple categories, and 
each category was linked to a group of properties. The tables also present examples 
of the links and connections that were established between the interpretive categories 
and the phrases or words of the participants. 
1) Axial Coding at the Perception Level 
As presented in Table 4.5, the first stage of axial coding revealed that the 
source characteristics influenced Facebook users to judge the attacker according to 
the following four source credibility dimensions:  
1. The degree to which the message receiver perceived the source as honest and 
free from duplicity. For simplicity, this was labelled “perceived sincerity”. 
2. The quality of adequacy and possession of a required skill or capacity. For 
simplicity, this was labelled “perceived competence”. 
3. The presence of a feature or quality that evoked interest and liking. For 
simplicity, this was labelled “perceived attraction”. The meaning of attraction here 
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is not limited to sexual or physical attractiveness. As described in the definition, it 
is any feature in the source that evokes interest and liking, which could be toward 
a user, page, group of people, profile, brand or any source. 
4. The degree to which the source was perceived to be advantageous for the user, 
which in turn inspired the user’s effort, respect or care. For simplicity, this was 
labelled “perceived worthiness”. 
Table 4.5 Examples of Axial Coding at the Perception Level 
Categories of Influence 
Properties 
(As they have emerged 
from open coding ) 
Categories of Perception 
(After grouping them based on the 
meaning during axial coding) 
A source that 
successfully deceived 
me. 
1) Being trustworthy 
2) Being believable 
3) Being professional 
 
Dimension 1 
(perceived 
sincerity) 
 
 
1) Being trustworthy 
2) Being believable 
3) Being safe/ harmless 
4) Being sincere 
5) [not] being fake profile 
6) Being authentic 
7) Being honest 
A source that impress 
me 
1) Being impressing 
2) Being interesting 
3) Being likable 
4) Being attractive 
5) Being cheerful 
Dimension 2 
(perceived 
competence) 
1) Being professional 
2) Being qualified 
3) Being expert 
4) Being capable 
 
A source that I’m eager 
to communicate with 
1) Being profitable. 
2) Being likable. 
3) Being beneficial. 
4) [not] being costly. 
Dimension 3 
(perceived 
attraction) 
1) Being impressing 
2) Being interesting 
3) Being likable 
4) Being attractive 
5) Being cheerful 
6) Being nice 
A source that I don’t 
mind to communicate 
with 
1) Being safe 
2) Being sincere 
3) [not] being fake 
profile 
4) Being nice 
A source that I care 
about 
1) Being worthwhile 
Dimension 4 
(perceived 
worthiness) 
1) Being profitable 
2) Being beneficial 
3) Being worthwhile 
4) Being deserving 
5) Being important 
6) Being valuable 
A source that I can take 
information from 
1) Being authentic 
2) Being qualified 
3) Being expert 
4) Being trustworthy 
A source that I would 
help 
1) Being deserving 
2) Being honest 
A source that I try to 
make happy 
1) Being important 
2) Being valuable 
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2) Axial Coding at the Facebook-Specific Characteristic Level  
 
As presented in Table 4.6, the second stage of axial coding revealed the 
following five Facebook-specific source characteristics that influenced Facebook 
users to judge an attacker according to the first dimension of credibility, namely, 
perceived sincerity. The five source characteristics were: 
1. The number of members the source was connected to in Facebook. For 
simplicity, this was referred to as “number of friends”. 
2. The number of members that the source and the user were connected to in 
common. For simplicity, this was referred to as “common friends”. 
3. The number of posts made by the source. For simplicity, this was referred to as 
“number of posts”. 
4. Sharing a common religion with the user. For simplicity, this was referred to as 
“common belief”. 
5. The source’s use of a real name (i.e., not using a nickname). For simplicity, this 
was referred to as “real name”. 
Similarly, as presented in Table 4.7, the second stage of axial coding revealed 
three Facebook-specific source characteristics that influenced Facebook users to 
judge an attacker according to the second dimension of credibility, namely, perceived 
competence. These three source characteristics were: 
1. The educational level of the source. For simplicity, this was referred to as 
“qualification”. 
2. The celebrity (or fame) status of the source. For simplicity, this was referred to 
as “celebrity”. 
3. The apparent wealth of the source. For simplicity, this was referred to as 
“wealth”. 
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As presented in Table 4.8, the second stage of axial coding revealed two 
Facebook-specific source characteristics that influenced Facebook users to judge an 
attacker according to the third dimension of credibility, namely, perceived attraction. 
These two source characteristics were: 
1. The good looks of the source. For simplicity, this was referred to as “good 
looks”. 
2. The writing skills of the source. For simplicity, this was referred to as “good 
writing skills”. 
Finally, as presented in Table 4.9, the second stage of axial coding revealed 
three Facebook-specific source characteristics that influenced Facebook users to 
judge an attacker according to the fourth dimension of credibility, namely, perceived 
worthiness. These three source characteristics were: 
1. The power of the source over the user. For simplicity, this was referred to as 
“authority”. 
2. The sexual compatibility with the user. For simplicity, this was referred to as 
“sexual compatibility”. 
3. The compliments, likes and positive comments received from the source. For 
simplicity, this was referred to as “reciprocity”. 
It is important to mention that these relationships, between the 13 Facebook-
specific source characteristics and the 4 source credibility dimensions, have been 
emerged from the data collected in this study, as presented in the following tables 
and further discussed in Chapter 5, and not based on common sense or any other 
existing knowledge. Therefore, other relationships can be arguably possible, e.g., 
between sexual compatibility and perceived attraction. However, based on the main 
principle of grounded theory method, the relationships are emerged and hypothesized 
based on the collected data only. 
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Table 4.6 Examples of Axial Coding at the Facebook-Specific Level for Dimension 1 
Categories of Perception 
(After grouping them based on the 
meaning during axial coding) 
Examples of participants’ words 
 
Properties 
At Facebook-specific 
Source Characteristics 
Level 
 
Dimension 1 
 (perceived 
sincerity) 
 
 
 
1) Being trustworthy 
2) Being believable 
3) Being safe/ 
harmless 
4) Being sincere 
5) [not] being fake 
profile 
6) Being authentic 
7) Being honest 
If it is not clear who the person is, the 
request can wait, maybe until I 
remember who the person is. If I’m 
certain that it is a scammer, I would 
make sure that it is not a fake profile 
by checking the user’s number of 
friends and the amount of content in 
the user’s account. 
Number of Friends 
 
Having a huge fan base on Facebook 
sends a positive signal about the 
profile or the page.  
There must be a reason one user has 
thousands friends whereas other 
users only has a few friends. This says 
a lot about the honesty of the parson… 
..while making a decision I will be 
biased towards the one with more 
friends because I assume, many 
people befriend that parson because 
they have found that parson to be 
sincere. 
This is mainly based on the 
trustworthiness of the person. If I 
know the parson I accept the request. 
If I know nothing about the person I 
reject. But in some cases, when I see 
that we have common friends, I say 
to myself, “Maybe the system 
suggested that he add me to his friend 
list,” so I accept the invitation. 
Common Friends 
I don’t always get a completely 
random request; usually I will always 
have a few friends in common with 
most of the random people who send 
me a friend request. If I have no 
friends in common with them, I will 
deny it every time. 
Again these people are my friends, or 
people that we have common friends, 
and they are unlikely to misguide me. 
He said that he is an American 
businessman. If that was the case, he 
wouldn't have only a few friends and 
made only a couple of posts. The 
account was absolutely fake. I had no 
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doubt that he is a scammer based on 
this alone. 
If I’m certain that it is a scammer, I 
would make sure that it is not a fake 
profile by checking the user’s number 
of friends and the amount of content 
in the user’s account. 
Number of Posts 
The high number of posts is 
definitely an indication that the profile 
is not fake. 
he wouldn't have only a few friends 
and made only a couple of posts. The 
account was absolutely fake. I had no 
doubt that he is a scammer based on 
this alone. 
You are just sort of blind on 
Facebook. You don’t know if what 
someone is saying in his profile is true 
… I would discover his attitude by 
observing his profile and checking if 
he really believes in what I believe. Common Beliefs 
As you know, there are many political 
and religious persecutions and issues 
now, so having the same religion can 
make you sympathize with someone. I 
think it encourages you to help. 
I would suspect that, in the vast 
majority of cases, users who use 
nicknames are trying to be cute. I 
think they are trying to hide their 
reality from others and there must be 
a reason for that. If a person is quite 
confident about his attitude, he would 
not hide his real identity 
Real Name I would look at what the nickname 
was and make a decision to look into 
it more. If it is something like “Miller 
Time” or “Jaeger Bomb” I would not 
trust that person at all, but if it is 
something like “Buzz” or “Chazz” or 
“Red,” I would assume that it is a 
family name and just treat them like 
anyone else 
 
 
 138 Chapter 4: Research Methodology with Emphasis on Qualitative Phase 
Table 4.7 Examples of Axial Coding at the Facebook-Specific Level for Dimension 2 
Categories of Perception 
(After grouping them based on 
the meaning during axial coding) 
Examples of participants’ words 
 
Properties 
At Facebook-specific 
Source Characteristics 
Level 
 
Dimension 2 
(perceived 
competence) 
 
 
 
1) Being professional 
2) Being qualified 
3) Being expert 
4) Being capable 
I don’t know if you agree with me or 
not, but I think that the primary benefit 
of social networks, including 
Facebook, is that they allow you to 
build a network of qualified and expert 
people in your field. Most of users 
write their disciplines and educational 
levels on their profiles. The only thing 
you need to do is send them a friend 
request. You lose nothing if they reject 
it! 
Educational Level 
I have never thought that this guy is a 
scammer. From his photos you can tell 
that he is well educated, drives luxury 
cars, and lives in a beautiful home. 
I seek information only from those 
who are capable to provide me with 
the information I need, such as highly 
educated people. 
Perhaps not all celebrities are highly 
educated, but they certainly have high 
level of competence since they have 
lots of money and fame. 
Celebrity Celebrities who are chosen as a brand 
ambassador must value their followers 
and fans, and I don’t think they will 
give them false information because of 
fear of their fans turning against them. 
Perhaps not all celebrities are highly 
educated, but they certainly have high 
level of competence since they have 
lots of money and fame. 
Wealth 
One of my friends used to know a man 
on Facebook who pretended to be a 
rich person. After a couple of months 
of chatting with each other on 
Facebook, he said that his business 
was in trouble and that he needed to 
borrow a couple of thousand dollars 
from her. Unfortunately, my friend 
trusted him and gave him the money. 
Immediately after receiving the 
money, the man removed her from his 
friend list and disappeared. 
It is very simple to know if a person is 
successful or no. The more money he 
has, the more successful he is. 
I have never thought that this guy is a 
scammer. From his photos you can tell 
that he is well educated, drives luxury 
cars, and lives in a beautiful home. 
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Table 4.8 Examples of Axial Coding at the Facebook-Specific Level for Dimension 3 
Categories of Perception 
(After grouping them based on the 
meaning during axial coding) 
Examples of participants’ words 
 
Properties 
At Facebook-specific 
Source Characteristics 
Level 
 
Dimension 3 
(perceived 
attraction) 
 
 
 
1) Being impressing 
2) Being interesting 
3) Being likable 
4) Being attractive 
5) Being cheerful 
6) Being nice 
I have been using Facebook for 
marketing for over a year now, and 
I can tell you, people who are 
more attractive tend to have a lot 
of conviction. Good looks mean 
more likability and more money. 
Good Looks 
In a real life situation, it’s about 
attitude and personality and 
probably not about how bad-
looking one is. But on Facebook, I 
would look at the photos initially 
to get a first impression. 
I spend most of my time on 
Facebook reading others’ posts or 
comments, so the first thing that 
attracts me is good writing. When 
I see an impressive post or 
comment, I immediately look at 
the profile of the person who 
wrote it, and sometimes I send the 
person a friend request 
Good Writing Skills I found it interesting to have such 
a relationship with these people… 
I like the way they write, this is 
perhaps what attracted me the 
most to this group 
I read everything he writes and 
love his posts, especially when he 
argues with others. It's just 
interesting to have users like him 
around. 
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Table 4.9 Examples of Axial Coding at the Facebook-Specific Level for Dimension 4 
Categories of Perception 
(After grouping them based on 
the meaning during axial coding) 
Examples of participants’ words 
 
Properties 
At Facebook-specific 
Source Characteristics 
Level 
 
Dimension 4 
(perceived 
worthiness) 
 
 
 
1) Being profitable 
2) Being beneficial 
3) Being worthwhile 
4) Being deserving 
5) Being important 
6) Being valuable  
Documents, no, not unless from people 
who are authority figures like an 
employer or a professor or teacher. I 
am friends with my academic advisor 
right now, which I am perfectly ok 
with… The worthiness of the 
relationship with him is different than 
other relationships I would say. 
Authority 
When I see a post from my boss, I feel 
hesitant to leave it without commenting, 
sharing, or at least clicking the ‘like’ 
button. Such post requires extra care I 
guess. 
If I have a chance to have a sexual 
relationship with someone I want, and I 
know that accepting the request will 
make it happen, I would accept it. I 
think anybody who says differently is 
lying. As I said before, If there is a 
benefit I will accept, if there is a cost I 
will not accept. Sexual Compatibility 
Facebook somehow is just like any other 
online dating site, whereby I can find 
and develop personal romantic or sexual 
relationship. Thus, the most valuable 
person for me is the most sexual 
compatible one. 
Some of the users in my friend list 
always like and write good comments 
on my photos or posts, and I usually do 
the same for them to keep them around. 
…. I think this is reasonable, since they 
are important to me. Complimenting, likes, 
and positive comments 
received from the source 
I look at Facebook as a place of gaining 
mutual benefits from exchanging 
opinions, news, good times, or any 
others things with other people. So, I 
think the advantageous people in my 
friends list are those who keep 
exchanging these things with me. 
 
4.12.5 Selective Coding and Emergence of Relationships between All 
Interrelated Categories 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) suggest that researchers carry out “selective coding” 
as the final stage of coding. Selective coding seeks to develop hypotheses that are 
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interrelated with the categories in the model. The selective coding in the present 
study revealed the overall relationships, as shown in the examples presented in Table 
4.10. As Suresh (2015) explained, the essential idea of selective coding is to “find 
out a single storyline around which all everything else is draped” (p. 192). Therefore, 
the result of the selective coding in this research hypothesised the relationship 
between social engineering (the main research problem, which is the dependent 
effect), source credibility dimensions, and Facebook-specific source characteristics. 
Table 4.10 Examples of Selective Coding 
Impact on 
Social 
Engineering  
Categories of Influence 
Properties 
(As they have 
emerged from open 
coding ) 
Categories of Perception 
(After grouping them based on 
the meaning during axial coding) 
Properties 
At Facebook-specific 
Source 
Characteristics Level 
 
Accepting SE. 
A source that 
successfully deceived 
me. 
1) Being trustworthy 
2) Being believable 
3) Being professional  
Dimension 
1 
(perceived 
sincerity) 
1) Being trustworthy 
2) Being believable 
3) Being safe/ harmless 
4) Being sincere 
5) [not] being fake 
profile 
6) Being authentic 
7) Being honest 
 
 
1) Number of Friends 
2) Common Friends 
3) Number of Posts 
4) Common Beliefs 
5) Using Real Name 
 
A source that impress me 
1) Being impressing 
2) Being interesting 
3) Being likable 
4) Being attractive 
5) Being cheerful 
 1) Being professional 
2) Being qualified 
3) Being expert 
4) Being capable 
1) Educational Level 
2) Celebrity 
3) Wealth A source that I’m eager 
to communicate with 
1) Being profitable. 
2) Being likable. 
3) Being beneficial. 
4) [not] being costly. 
Dimension 
2 
(perceived 
competence) 
Dimension 
3 
(perceived 
attraction) 
1) Being impressing 
2) Being interesting 
3) Being likable 
4) Being attractive 
5) Being cheerful 
6) Being nice 
1) Good Looks 
2) Good Writing Skills  
 
A source that I don’t 
mind to communicate 
with 
1) Being safe 
2) Being sincere 
3) [not] being fake 
profile 
4) Being nice 
A source that I care about 1) Being worthwhile 
Dimension 
4 
(perceived 
worthiness) 
1) Being profitable 
2) Being beneficial 
3) Being worthwhile 
4) Being deserving 
5) Being important 
6) Being valuable 
 
1) Authority 
2) Sexual 
Compatibility 
3) Complimenting, 
likes, and  positive 
comments received 
from the source 
A source that I can take 
information from 
1) Being authentic 
2) Being qualified 
3) Being expert 
4) Being trustworthy 
A source that I would 
help 
1) Being deserving 
2) Being honest 
A source that I try to 
make happy 
1) Being important 
2) Being valuable 
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4.13 Research Ethics Statement 
This study involved the active participation of human subjects. The study’s 
activities were categorised as “low risk” in accordance with the National Statement 
on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans. An application for approval of 
low risk research involving human participants was approved by the Human 
Research Ethics Committee at Queensland University of Technology (with approval 
number 1300000371). 
Appendix A presents the ethics approval certificate issued by Queensland 
University of Technology. The ethical approval was issued firstly for the interviews 
and observations only. The participation information sheet for participants in the 
interviews and observation is presented in Appendix B. The consent form for the 
interviews and observations is presented in Appendix C. Appendix D presents an 
example of the observation notes. Appendix E presents the main semi-structured 
interview questions. Additional ethical approval was obtained to conduct the open-
ended questionnaire, as shown in Appendix F. The participation information sheet 
for the open-ended questionnaire is presented in Appendix G. 
4.14 Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter has discussed the selection of the methodology and the 
development of the research design in this study. Specifically, it has explained the 
rationale for using the sequential exploratory mixed method in this research, and why 
it was considered appropriate for this thesis. The sequential exploratory mixed 
method in this research involved two main phases, namely, a qualitative method in 
the first phase and then a quantitative method in the second phase. The focus of this 
chapter was on the research design and the methodology for the qualitative phase. 
Therefore, this chapter has explained the three methods used in the first phase of the 
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research, namely, observations, interviews and an open-ended questionnaire. In 
addition, this chapter provided a detailed explanation about the rationale for using 
these three methods as well as the procedures of triangulation. This chapter also 
presented a detailed explanation about the coding stages and the emergence of the 
theory. The next chapter presents the findings of the first phase of the research in 
more detail. The quantitative phase methodology depends on the findings of the 
qualitative phase, and these are presented in Chapter 6. 
  
 144 Chapter 5: Qualitative Phase Results 
 Qualitative Phase Results 
5.1 Overview 
Building on the initial and overall presentation of the results in relation to the 
coding stages in the previous chapter, this chapter presents the findings in detail. The 
chapter starts by explaining the findings on the influence of source credibility in 
Section 5.2. The findings on the dimensions of source credibility are presented in 
Section 5.3, followed by the findings on the Facebook-specific source characteristics 
in Section 5.4. The a priori model is then presented in Section 5.5, followed by the 
supportive literature in Section 5.6. The chapter is concluded in Section 5.7.  
5.2 Influence of Source Credibility 
The open coding of the data revealed multiple core categories, and each core 
category was linked to a group of properties, as explained in section 4.12.3 in the 
previous chapter. Links and connections were established between the interpretive 
influence categories and the phrases or words of the participants. Recapping the 
discussion in the initial chapters, the focus of this research is credibility which refers 
to the positive characteristics of a communicator that affect the receiver’s acceptance 
of a message (Ohanian 1990); based on this focus, the qualitative phase protocols 
and questions were designed. Therefore, it was not surprising to find that the first 
categories that emerged during coding were related to influence. The open coding 
revealed multiple core categories of influence, and each core category was linked to 
a group of perceived properties that affected those categories of influence. The 
categories, as explained by the participants, were: 
1. A source that successfully deceived me. This category represents the 
properties, reported by the participants, of sources that had successfully deceived 
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them somehow. This category included the following perceived properties: 1) being 
trustworthy, 2) being believable, and 3) being professional. 
2. A source that impressed me. This category represents the properties, 
reported by the participants, of the sources that impressed them. This category 
included the following perceived properties: 1) being impressive, 2) being 
interesting, 3) being likable, 4) being attractive, and 5) being cheerful. 
3. A source that I was eager to communicate with. This category represents the 
properties, reported by the participants, of the sources that they were eager to 
communicate with on Facebook. This category included the following perceived 
properties: 1) being profitable, 2) being likable, and 3) being beneficial. 
4. A source that I didn’t mind communicating with. This category represents 
the properties, reported by the participants, of the sources that they didn’t mind 
communicating with. This category included the following perceived properties: 1) 
being safe, 2) being sincere, 3) [not] being fake, 4) being nice. 
5. A source that I cared about. This category represents the properties, reported 
by the participants, of the sources that they cared about in some way. This category 
included the following perceived property: being worthwhile. 
6. A source from which I could take information. This category represents the 
properties, reported by the participants, of the sources that they could consult or take 
information from in some way. This category included the following perceived 
properties: 1) being authentic, 2) being qualified, 3) being expert, and 4) being 
trustworthy. 
7. A source that I would help. This category represents the properties, reported 
by the participants, of the sources that they would help if they were able to. This 
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category included the following perceived properties: 1) being deserving, and 2) 
being honest. 
8. A source that I tried to make happy. This category represents the properties, 
reported by the participants, of the sources that they tried to make or keep happy in 
some way. This category included the following perceived properties: 1) being 
important, and 2) being valuable. 
Some overlaps existed between these emerged categories. This was expected 
and justifiable since the goal of the open coding was to segment the data based on the 
participants’ words and phrases. As Holton et al. (2007) explained, the coding at this 
stage “is not about the accuracy of descriptive units… rather, it is an act of 
conceptual abstraction” (Holton et al. 2007, p. 272). The data analysis showed that 
source credibility affects users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation in 
multiple ways, including approaching the social engineering message, 
communicating with a potential attacker, and deciding whether or not to accept a 
message.  
When users log in to their Facebook accounts, they encounter many messages, 
such as posts, news, links, photos, videos, applications and stories that are written, 
suggested, liked or shared by others. The sources of these messages are not 
necessarily well known to the user in real life; they may be friends that the user 
knows only on Facebook, friends of friends, members of a group or event in which 
the user is a member, or strangers who post on a fan page or commercial page of 
which the user is a member. Therefore, the user does not pay the same attention to all 
of the content or messages encountered. The analysis of the interview data showed 
that source credibility is one criterion by which the user approaches the content or 
message. For instance, Interviewee 5 stated, “Yes, there are some friends whose posts 
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I like to read even if I don’t have enough time and regardless of the topic that they 
are talking about”. 
The source characteristics also have an impact on the user’s decision about 
whether or not to believe or accept the request in a message. Source credibility was 
reported as one criterion that participants used to decide whether or not to accept a 
message: 
Interviewer (I): If someone asks you for a favor, such as a donation, 
document, software, or participation, would you accept? 
Participant (P): Well, that depends on the person who asked me the 
favor, and the request itself. 
I: Can you explain the criteria that you use to decide whether to help or 
not? 
P: What I mean is that, with some people, I would think carefully before I 
reject their requests … Also, there are some requests that I cannot grant 
or that could cost me a lot … In a situation like that, I think I would 
probably choose what would do me the least harm—granting the request 
or losing the person. (Interviewee 8) 
The results of the qualitative questionnaire also highlighted the important role 
played by source credibility in influencing victims to accept their requests. Among 
the questionnaire participants, those who had fallen for social engineering tricks on 
Facebook stated that they had been influenced or tricked by attackers who 
impersonated a sexy person, a celebrity, a wealthy person, a highly educated person, 
a charity representative, a company page, or a combination of two or more of these.  
The important finding is that source credibility has a significant influence on 
Facebook users’ judgment toward social engineering and consent behaviours. The 
following sections explain how the perceived properties that emerged during the 
open coding were “dimensionalised” into the source credibility dimensions. 
 148 Chapter 5: Qualitative Phase Results 
5.3 Dimensions of Source Credibility 
As established in the discussion in the introductory chapters, credibility is a 
perception (Tseng and Fogg 1999) and it is a complex concept composed of other 
concepts called dimensions. The axial coding to identify the dimensions of source 
credibility was performed in two stages. The first stage was at the high level of 
perception, and the second stage was at the Facebook-specific source characteristic 
level, as explained in section 4.12.4 in Chapter 4. At the first stage of axial coding, 
all the source properties that were found in the open coding were grouped or 
dimensionalised into categories based on their meaning. This task revealed four 
potential dimensions of source credibility pertinent to social engineering, namely, 
perceived sincerity, perceived competence, perceived attraction and perceived 
worthiness. Each of the dimensions is discussed in the following sub-sections.  
5.3.1 Perceived Sincerity 
The first dimension was labelled “perceived sincerity”. Perceived sincerity is 
the degree to which the message receiver perceives the source as honest and free 
from duplicity. A number of source characteristics related to perceived sincerity were 
repeatedly mentioned in the interviews. The properties reported by participants under 
this dimension included: being trustworthy, being a real account (not fake), being 
believable, being safe/harmless, being sincere, and being honest. For instance, 
Interviewee 2 explained that honesty was the primary criterion she applied in 
deciding whether or not to accept or reject a request: 
I: If someone asks you a favor, such as a donation, document, software, 
or participation, would you accept? What criteria would you use to 
decide to accept or reject the request? 
 Chapter 5: Qualitative Phase Results 149 
P: The first thing I would think about is honesty … you know, I have to 
make sure that he is not lying to me.  
Being harmless was reported by one of the questionnaire (open-ended 
questionnaire) participants as a relevant criterion when explaining why he was 
involved in a relationship with a stranger with whom he had had a bad experience: 
“Mostly because I thought that I have nothing to lose” (Questionnaire Participant 
49). Interviewee 18 also reported that he was willing to accept a request if there was 
nothing to lose from doing so:  
In principle it is not my way to turn down a request, for example, if it is 
possible and can be accommodated, why not you offer your support. 
Should you have nothing to lose, giving a helping hand is great.   
 Being harmless was also reported by Interviewee 8 as a criterion used to 
decide whether or not to accept a message: 
In a situation like that, I think I would probably choose what would do 
me the least harm—granting the request or losing the person.  
Shortly after joining the social groups, I did receive messages from 
strangers requesting me to add them as friends. I did respond to those 
messages even though they were from strangers because I felt like they 
were not harmful and I like to make friends, anyway. 
Believability was cited by Questionnaire Participant 8 when explaining how 
she was deceived by a scammer on Facebook: “He made many promises and I felt I 
had no choice but to believe him”. Interviewee 3 cited another example related to the 
dimension of sincerity, namely, the source having a real account (not a fake account): 
“If I’m certain that it is a scammer, I would make sure that it is not a fake profile”. 
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Therefore, (as shown in Table 5.1) the following relationship can be 
hypothesized between perceived sincerity of the source and susceptibility to social 
engineering victimization: 
Ha1: Users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimization is positively 
related to the perceived sincerity of the source. 
 
Table 5.1 Examples of the Participants’ Words Related to Hypothesis Ha1 
Hypothesis Participant Examples of participants’ words 
Ha1 
Interviewee 2 I: If someone asks you a favor, such as a donation, document, software, 
or participation, would you accept? What criteria would you use to 
decide to accept or reject the request? 
P: The first thing I would think about is honesty … you know, I have to 
make sure that he is not lying to me. 
Questionnaire 49 Mostly because I thought that I have nothing to lose 
Interviewee 18 On principle it is not my way to turn down a request, for example, if it 
is possible and can be accommodated, why not you offer your support. 
Should you have nothing to lose, giving a helping hand is great 
Interviewee 8 In a situation like that, I think I would probably choose what would do 
me the least harm—granting the request or losing the person.  
Interviewee 11 I only purchase products that are advertised by authentic people. This 
is because I assume they have used the product or tested it and found 
out that it works 
Interviewee 8 Shortly after joining the social groups, I did receive messages from 
strangers requesting me to add them as friends. I did respond to those 
messages even though they were from strangers because I felt like they 
were not harmful and I like to make friends, anyway 
Questionnaire 8 He made many promises and I felt I had no choice but to believe him 
Interviewee 3 If I’m certain that it is a scammer, I would make sure that it is not a 
fake profile 
Interviewee 5 The less I would trust them are the less likely I would be to interact 
with them. … I would not say that there is a specific criterion, just a 
feeling about whether or not I could actually trust the person. 
 
5.3.2 Perceived Competence 
The second dimension of credibility that emerged from the data analysis was 
labelled “perceived competence”. This concept represents the quality of being 
adequate and possessing a required skill or capacity. The properties reported by the 
participants under this dimension included: being professional, being qualified, being 
expert and being capable. For example, Interviewee 7 stated that being capable was 
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the main criterion that he relied on when seeking information about news, issues and 
events: 
I: I noticed while observing your Facebook account that you made and 
discussed many news issues and events, where you do take this 
information from, or let me say: how do you evaluate your information 
sources? 
P: Almost all of my sources are available on the social media itself. Most 
of us don’t probably see social media as an essential news source. But I 
seek information only from those who are capable to provide me with the 
information I need. 
Being expert and being qualified were reported by Interviewee 11 and 
Interviewee 19 as relevant factors when making judgments in regard to the quality of 
a product before purchase: 
I tend to use software or purchase products that are recommended by 
experts. I assume if those software or products work for them they will 
work for me as well. (Interviewee 11) 
If you do not know a lot about a product, you cannot try to get 
information from someone who does not know much about it too..a blind 
man cannot lead another blind man. You must get information from 
qualified people. (Interviewee 19) 
Some of the participants reported “being expert” as another property related to 
the dimension of perceived competence. For example, Interviewee 16 stated: 
If I do not have competence in that field, I do not have much choice 
rather than going with what the experts say, and hope it’s true. 
Therefore, (as shown in Table 5.2) the following relationship can be 
hypothesized between perceived competence of the source and susceptibility to 
social engineering victimization: 
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Ha2: Users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimization is positively 
related to the perceived competence of the source. 
 
Table 5.2 Examples of the Participants’ Words Related to Hypothesis Ha2 
Hypothesis Participant Examples of participants’ words 
Ha2 
Interviewee 7 I: I noticed while observing your Facebook account that you made and 
discussed many news issues and events, where you do take this 
information from, or let me say: how do you evaluate your information 
sources? 
P: Almost all of my sources are available on the social media itself. Most 
of us don’t probably see social media as an essential news source. But I 
seek information only from those who are capable to provide me with 
the information I need 
Interviewee 11 I tend to use software or purchase products that are recommended by 
experts. I assume if those software or products work for them they will 
work for me as well. 
Interviewee 19 If you do not know a lot about a product, you cannot try to get 
information from someone who does not much about it too..a blind man 
cannot lead another blind man. You must get information from qualified 
people 
Interviewee 16 If I do not have competence in that field, I do not have much choice 
rather than going with what the experts say, and hope it’s true. 
Interviewee 4 I like also to follow and connected to successful people. I think watching 
successful people gives you understanding of all the little things they 
build their success on. It is never late to learn about success, I think. 
Interviewee 5 Professionalism should be something that everyone worries about on 
Facebook, or any social media. I have done hiring before and we have 
made decisions based on someone’s profile. I know that colleges will do 
the same thing when students are applying for admissions.  
 
5.3.3 Perceived Attraction 
The third dimension of credibility that emerged from data was labelled 
“perceived attraction”. The dimension of attraction represents the feature or the 
quality that evokes interest and liking1. The properties reported by participants under 
this dimension included: being impressive, being interesting, being likable, being 
attractive, being cheerful, and being nice. For example, Interviewee 13 explained the 
influence of “being cheerful” on her Facebook experience: 
                                                 
 
1 It is important to note that the meaning of attraction here is not limited to sexual or 
physical attractiveness. As described in the definition, it is any feature that evokes interest 
and liking. For example, people can be are attracted to a user, page, group of people, profile, 
brand or any type of source, because they liked them or found them interesting, and not 
necessary because they want to have a sexual relationship with them.  
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I probably use Facebook too much, I always have it up on my computer 
and on my phone. I would probably say that I am addicted to it. I’m 
connected to a group of cheerful friends who made Facebook a great 
place to chat and laugh with the friends of your choice. 
“Being interesting” was reported by Interviewee 8 and Interviewee 19 as a 
factor that made it attractive to join a group, even though all of the group members 
were strangers: 
I found it interesting to have such a relationship with these people… this 
is perhaps what attracted me the most to this group. (Interviewee 8) 
I remember when I signed up for a gaming group long back, I did receive 
many messages from people unknown to me playing the same games as 
me to add them on my friends list. I responded to them because they 
didn’t sound creepy and majority of them were quite interesting.  
(Interviewee 19) 
“Being likable” was reported as a criterion for accepting a friendship on 
Facebook. As Interviewee 14 stated: “I would also prefer to like them”. The impact 
of likability was reported as an influential characteristic by Interviewee 12 when 
deciding whether or not to provide important information such as a phone number: 
Like if I had run into someone a few times but didn’t know them so well 
and they asked for my phone number on chat I would decide based on 
how well I like them… It all depends on who it is and how much I like 
them I guess. 
The analysis of the interview data revealed the application of “being 
interesting” as a relevant criterion when the user approaches the content or message. 
For instance, Interviewee 5 stated, “I like to read almost all of the things that they 
post, a lot of it is really interesting”. 
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Being nice is another property seen in the interview data. For example, 
Interviewee 15 referred to this property when asked her opinion about the strangers 
who made comments on her Facebook posts (which sometimes contained links and 
unsecure content):   
I do not find it so weird when I get a more random comment. Facebook is 
made for that stuff, so a lot of them do not bother me as long as they are 
nice to me. If a random person commented something that was a little bit 
creepy to me personally then I would have a problem with it, but I have 
no problem with someone making a nice comment. 
Therefore, (as shown in Table 5.3) the following relationship can be 
hypothesized between perceived attraction of the source and susceptibility to social 
engineering victimization: 
Ha3: Users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimization is positively 
related to the perceived attraction of the source. 
 
Table 5.3 Examples of the Participants’ Words Related to Hypothesis Ha3 
Hypothesis Participant Examples of participants’ words 
Ha3 
Interviewee 13 I probably use Facebook too much, I always have it up on my computer 
and on my phone. I would probably say that I am addicted to it. I’m 
connected to a group of cheerful friends who made Facebook a great 
place to chat and laugh with the friends of your choice 
Interviewee 8 I found it interesting to have such a relationship with these people… 
this is perhaps what attracted me the most to this group 
Interviewee 19 I remember when I signed up for a gaming group long back, I did receive 
many messages from people unknown to me playing the same games as 
me to add them on my friends list. I responded to them because they 
didn’t sound creepy and majority of them were quite interesting 
Interviewee 6 I would also prefer to like them 
Interviewee 12 Like if I had run into someone a few times but didn’t know them so well 
and they asked for my phone number on chat I would decide based on 
how well I like them… It all depends on who it is and how much I like 
them I guess 
Interviewee 5 I like to read almost all of the things that they post, a lot of it is really 
interesting 
Interviewee 15 I do not find it so weird when I get a more random comment. Facebook 
is made for that stuff, so a lot of them do not bother me as long as they 
are nice to me. If a random person commented something that was a 
little bit creepy to me personally then I would have a problem with it, 
but I have no problem with someone making a nice comment. 
Interviewee 11 Instead, I choose to follow people that are appealing to me, or like pages 
that have the content I find impressive to me. 
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5.3.4 Perceived Worthiness 
The fourth dimension of credibility that emerged from data was labelled 
“perceived worthiness”. Perceived worthiness is the degree to which the source is 
perceived to be advantageous for the user. In other words, it is the perceived benefit 
of the source, which inspires users’ efforts, care, and respect. The difference between 
perceived worthiness and the previous dimensions is that it represents the potential 
benefit that the particular user can get from a source. Some participants mentioned 
the worthiness of the source as an important dimension to consider when deciding 
whether or not to accept or reject a request. Some participants believed that the 
source must be worthy of their acceptance or response even if they believed the 
source was sincere, competent or attractive. The properties reported by participants 
under this dimension included: being profitable, being beneficial, being worthwhile, 
being deserving, being important, and being valuable. For instance, Interviewee 1 
said: 
This depends on the worthwhile of the person. If I care about him so 
much, I’m willing to do anything for him; I support him financially, and 
do everything I can for him. But if I don’t care about him, I don’t think 
that I’m willing to do that even if I believe that he is in need  
Being beneficial was repeatedly mentioned by the participants as the main 
reason for accepting or rejecting a request on Facebook. This was observed to be 
applicable in the case of general requests such as providing information about the 
participant’s organisation: “If there is a benefit I will answer, if there is a cost I will 
not answer” (Interviewee 11). The same factor was also observed to be applicable in 
the case of accepting a friendship from strangers:   
First thing I would say is, if there is any profitable outcome of being 
friend with them or no. (Interviewee 6) 
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If there is a benefit, I’m eager to communicate with them. It is as simple 
as that. (Interviewee 8) 
Another property related to the dimension of worthiness is “being important”. 
For example, Interviewee 1 justified his willingness to help those who regularly liked 
his posts and sent him good feedback by saying that they were important to him: “I 
think this is reasonable, since they are important to me”. Interviewee 5 also stated 
that being important was a good enough reason for accepting a request regarding a 
donation, document, software or participation: 
If the person is important to me why not to help? I love helping people if 
I have the time or money. I do not know the situation where I might have 
to share a document of a piece of software, but yes I would do that also if 
I needed to. 
The property of “being valuable” was also reported in a similar example given 
by Interviewee 3. In the example, he justified his willingness to help his new 
“potential” girlfriend who he knew through Facebook by saying that the relationship 
was valuable: “Honestly, I would accept so that I don’t lose my valuable relationship 
with her”. 
Therefore, (as shown in Table 5.4) the following relationship can be 
hypothesized between perceived worthiness of the source and susceptibility to social 
engineering victimization: 
 
Ha4: Users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimization is positively related 
to the perceived worthiness of the source. 
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Table 5.4 Examples of the Participants’ Words Related to Hypothesis Ha4 
Hypothesis Participant Examples of participants’ words 
Ha4 
Interviewee 1 This depends on the worthwhile of the person. If I care about him so 
much, I’m willing to do anything for him; I support him financially, and 
do everything I can for him. But if I don’t care about him, I don’t think 
that I’m willing to do that even if I believe that he is in need 
Interviewee 11 If there is a benefit I will answer, if there is a cost I will not answer 
Interviewee 6 First thing I would say is, if there is any profitable outcome of being 
friend with them or no 
Interviewee 8 If there is a benefit, I’m eager to communicate with them. It is as simple 
as that 
Interviewee 1 I think this is reasonable, since they are important to me 
Interviewee 5 If the person is important to me why not to help? I love helping people 
if I have the time or money. I do not know the situation where I might 
have to share a document of a piece of software, but yes I would do that 
also if I needed to 
Interviewee 3 Honestly, I would accept, so that I don’t lose my valuable relationship 
with her 
 
5.4 Facebook-Specific Source Characteristics 
The second stage of axial coding, as explained in section 4.12.4 in Chapter 4, 
revealed 13 Facebook-specific source characteristics that impacted the perception of 
source credibility in the four dimensions that emerged during the first stage of axial 
coding (five characteristics related to the dimension of sincerity, three characteristics 
related to the dimension of competence, two characteristics related to the dimension 
of attraction, and three characteristics related to the dimension of worthiness). Those 
Facebook-specific source characteristics led Facebook users to judge the attacker as 
sincere, competent, attractive or worthy, thus making them susceptible to social 
engineering victimisation. The following sections explain those 13 Facebook-specific 
source characteristics. 
5.4.1 Facebook-Specific Source Characteristics Related to the 
Dimension of Sincerity 
The second stage of axial coding revealed five Facebook-specific source 
characteristics that impacted the perception of sincerity. Those Facebook-specific 
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source characteristics were: 1) the number of friends (the number of members the 
source was connected to), 2) common friends (the number of members that the 
source and the user were connected to in common), 3) the number of posts made by 
the source, 4) common beliefs (sharing a common religion with the user), and 5) the 
source’s use of a real name (not using a nickname as an identifier). The participants 
cited some source characteristics that they considered when judging the perceived 
sincerity of a source. For example, when Interviewee 3 suspected that another user 
was a scammer, he usually looked at that user’s number of friends and the amount of 
content in the user’s account: 
I: What kind of friend request do you usually accept? What criteria 
would you use to decide whom to accept or reject?  
P: If it is not clear who the person is, the request can wait, maybe until I 
remember who the person is. If I’m certain that it is a scammer, I would 
make sure that it is not a fake profile by checking the user’s number of 
friends and the amount of content in the user’s account.  
More examples of the impact of “number of friends” on the perception of 
sincerity were reported by Interviewee 11 and Interviewee 6, in which they reported 
that they considered having many friends as a positive signal about the sincerity of 
the source: 
There must be a reason one user has thousands of friends whereas other 
users only has a few friends. This says a lot about the honesty of the 
person… while making a decision I will be biased towards the one with 
more friends because I assume, many people befriend that person 
because they have found that person to be sincere. (Interviewee 11) 
Having a huge fan base on Facebook sends a positive signal about the 
authentication of the profile or the page. (Interviewee 6) 
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In addition, the stories shared in the responses to the questionnaire showed that 
users’ beliefs regarding credibility were affected by the characteristics of the source’s 
profile. For example, Questionnaire Participant 34 stated that the evidence of having 
few friends and posts helped her to discover a scammer’s dishonesty: 
He suggests he is an American businessman. If that was the case, he 
wouldn't have only a few friends and made only a couple of posts. The 
account was absolutely fake. I had no doubt that he is a scammer based 
on this alone.  
Another example regarding the impact of the number of posts was cited by 
Interviewee 19 as a positive indication about the source: 
The high number of posts is definitely an indication that the profile is not 
fake. 
Having a friend in common with the requester was reported as a factor that 
reduces the level of suspicion. For example, Interviewee 1 mentioned that when she 
received a friend request from a stranger, she checked to see whether or not they had 
any common friends: 
I: What kind of friend request do you usually accept? What criteria 
would you use to decide whom to accept or reject?  
P: This is mainly based on the trustworthiness of the person. If I know the 
person I accept the request. If I know nothing about the person I reject. 
But in some cases, when I see that we have common friends, I say to 
myself, “Maybe the system suggested that he add me to his friend list,” 
so I accept the invitation.  
Another example regarding the impact of the source and the recipient having 
friends in common was cited by Interviewee 9 as a positive indication about the 
safety of the source: 
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Again, these people are my friends, or people that we have common 
friends, and they are unlikely to misguide me. 
Interviewee 13 also reported the consideration of this factor (friends in 
common) when she received a friend request from a stranger: 
I don’t always get a completely random request; usually I will always 
have a few friends in common with most of the random people who send 
me a friend request. If I have no friends in common with them, I will deny 
it every time. 
Interviewee 5 and Interviewee 2 reported another factor that was considered to 
reflect sincerity, namely, common beliefs: 
You are just sort of blind on Facebook. You don’t know if what someone 
is saying in his profile is true … I would discover his attitude by 
observing his profile and checking if he really believes in what I believe. 
(Interviewee 5) 
As you know, there are many political and religious persecutions and 
issues now, so having the same religion can make you sympathise with 
someone. I think it encourages you to help. (Interviewee 2) 
In addition, the use of a nickname was cited as suspicious. Therefore, the use 
of a person’s real name or a common name was considered to reflect sincerity. For 
instance, Interviewee 16 indicated that he did not trust people who used nicknames: 
I would suspect that, in the vast majority of cases, users who use 
nicknames are trying to be cute. I think they are trying to hide their 
reality from others and there must be a reason for that. If a person is 
quite confident about his intention, he would not hide his real identity. 
Using a name that seems real, even if it is not, can mislead users. For example, 
Interviewee 5 indicated that:  
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I would look at what the nickname was and make a decision to look into 
it more. If it is something like “Miller Time” or “Jaeger Bomb” I would 
not trust that person at all, but if it is something like “Buzz” or “Chazz” 
or “Red”, I would assume that it is a family name and just treat them like 
anyone else. 
Therefore, we can see from the previous examples just discussed, and other 
examples shown in Tables 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9, that participants repeatedly 
mentioned number of friends, common friends, number of posts, common beliefs, 
and using real name as reasons or cues to make judgment about the sincerity, 
honesty, not being fake, trustworthiness or other properties that are related to the 
dimension of the sincerity. Consequently, the following relationships can be 
hypothesized between the source number of friends and perceived sincerity of the 
source (as shown in Table 5.5), between the number common friends and perceived 
sincerity of the source (as shown in Table 5.6), between the number of posts the 
source made and perceived sincerity of the source (as shown in Table 5.7), between 
sharing the same beliefs with the source and perceived sincerity of the source (as 
shown in Table 5.8), and between the source’s use of a real name and perceived 
sincerity of the source (as shown in Table 5.9): 
Hb1: The perceived sincerity of a source increases as the source’s number of 
friends increases. 
Hb2: The perceived sincerity of a source increases as the number of friends they 
have in common increases. 
Hb3: The perceived sincerity of a source increases as the number of the source’s 
posts increases.  
Hb4: The perceived sincerity of a source is positively related to sharing the same 
beliefs or religion with the source.  
Hb5: The perceived sincerity of a source is positively related to the source’s use 
of a real name. 
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Table 5.5 Examples of the Participants’ Words Related to Hypothesis Hb1 
Hypothesis Participant Examples of participants’ words 
Hb1 
Interviewee 3 I: What kind of friend request do you usually accept? What criteria 
would you use to decide whom to accept or reject?  
P: If it is not clear who the person is, the request can wait, maybe until I 
remember who the person is. If I’m certain that it is a scammer, I would 
make sure that it is not a fake profile by checking the user’s number of 
friends and the amount of content in the user’s account 
Interviewee 11 There must be a reason one user has thousands of friends whereas other 
users only has a few friends. This says a lot about the honesty of the 
person… 
Interviewee 11 while making a decision I will be biased towards the one with more 
friends because I assume, many people befriend that person because 
they have found that person to be sincere 
Interviewee 6 Having a huge fan base on Facebook sends a positive signal about the 
authentication of the profile or the page 
Questionnaire 
34 
He suggests he is an American businessman. If that was the case, he 
wouldn't have only a few friends and made only a couple of posts. The 
account was absolutely fake. I had no doubt that he is a scammer based 
on this alone 
 
Table 5.6 Examples of the Participants’ Words Related to Hypothesis Hb2 
Hypothesis Participant Examples of participants’ words 
Hb2 
Interviewee 1 I: What kind of friend request do you usually accept? What criteria 
would you use to decide whom to accept or reject? 
P: This is mainly based on the trustworthiness of the person. If I know 
the person I accept the request. If I know nothing about the person I 
reject. But in some cases, when I see that we have common friends, I 
say to myself, “Maybe the system suggested that he add me to his friend 
list,” so I accept the invitation. 
Interviewee 9 Again, these people are my friends, or people that we have common 
friends, and they are unlikely to misguide me. 
Interviewee 13 I don’t always get a completely random request; usually I will always 
have a few friends in common with most of the random people who 
send me a friend request. If I have no friends in common with them, I 
will deny it every time 
Interviewee 5 The thing I have a problem with is people who friend you out of the 
blue. I will always turn those down. They really just have no reason to 
do it. If I have a few mutual friends with someone and they request me 
and I generally know who they are, I will probably accept that request. 
Interviewee 8 I would check whether they have any mutual friends, that is the 
common friends between the sender and myself.  If there were any, I’d 
ask the mutual friend about their trustworthiness and whether they are 
good or bad in nature. 
Interviewee 18 I may have gotten a friend request or two from a completely random 
profile that I have suspected to be fake, but I just ignored it because we 
do not know each other or even have any mutual friends, and it just did 
not seem safe to accept that person’s friend request, whoever they were. 
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Table 5.7 Examples of the Participants’ Words Related to Hypothesis Hb3 
Hypothesis Participant Examples of participants’ words 
Hb3 
Questionnaire 
34 
He suggests he is an American businessman. If that was the case, he 
wouldn't have only a few friends and made only a couple of posts. The 
account was absolutely fake. I had no doubt that he is a scammer based 
on this alone 
Interviewee 19 The high number of posts is definitely an indication that the profile is 
not fake. 
Interviewee 16 This is why before making any connection with strangers I usually go 
through their profiles and basic information to check whether they have 
a fake name or simply check if they made enough number of posts. 
These can tell you a lot about the trustworthiness of the account. 
Interviewee 7 In a nutshell, it is a matter of common sense. It is easy to detect the 
possibility of being scammed. For instance, there are some things which 
are out the ordinary and which a reasonable person would sense danger. 
For example, I would hesitate to answer someone who has not, or made 
only a few posts because he or she is more likely has bad intentions. 
Accounts without normal posting activities raise a red flag. 
Interviewee 3 If I’m certain that it is a scammer, I would make sure that it is not a fake 
profile by checking the user’s number of friends and the amount of 
content in the user’s account. 
 
Table 5.8 Examples of the Participants’ Words Related to Hypothesis Hb4 
Hypothesis Participant Examples of participants’ words 
Hb4 
Interviewee 5 You are just sort of blind on Facebook. You don’t know if what someone 
is saying in his profile is true … I would discover his attitude by 
observing his profile and checking if he really believes in what I 
believe. 
Interviewee 2 As you know, there are many political and religious persecutions and 
issues now, so having the same religion can make you sympathise with 
someone. I think it encourages you to help. 
Interviewee 5 I get that it sounds fun to post anything you want, but it is not worth it, 
not at all. I do not even cuss in my statuses, or anything that I post. I 
don’t even try to make posts that show my political or religious views 
too much, just because it is not at all worth it put something online if it 
may cost you something as big as a job. My boss is very conservative 
and I am very liberal, so when I was being hired and they looked at my 
Facebook, I was probably safe by the fact that I have never posted 
anything overtly liberal, because even if he didn’t take that into account 
it would have stuck in the back of his mind, and really could have 
effected whether or not I got hired. 
Interviewee 18 I: During observation I noticed that you made several posts related to 
religious views. Don’t you think that this may affect your relationship 
with others who may not agree with these views? 
It could affect the relationship with some of them. But sharing these 
views doesn't mean to be aggressive and offensive. I honestly believe 
there's no reason to hide. I think that many of the online interactions are 
virtue and rely on trust. It is generally agreed that sharing information 
such as my religious views is one way of strengthening trust and 
mutuality with those who share the same views. 
Interviewee 19 Recently, I have not provided any religious views although I’m 
interested in it and quite religious.  This is because I lost the trust of 
many of friends who don’t believe in my views.  Thus I don’t want to 
make my profile look quite serious and prefer it to be fun.   
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Table 5.9 Examples of the Participants’ Words Related to Hypothesis Hb5 
Hypothesis Participant Examples of participants’ words 
Hb5 
Interviewee 16 I would suspect that, in the vast majority of cases, users who use 
nicknames are trying to be cute. I think they are trying to hide their 
reality from others and there must be a reason for that. If a person is 
quite confident about his intention, he would not hide his real identity. 
Interviewee 5 I would look at what the nickname was and make a decision to look into 
it more. If it is something like “Miller Time” or “Jaeger Bomb” I would 
not trust that person at all, but if it is something like “Buzz” or “Chazz” 
or “Red”, I would assume that it is a family name and just treat them 
like anyone else. 
Interviewee 13 There are a lot of people out there that will use their middle names or 
any nicknames instead of their real names, and they do that to be 
professional, but I would highly recommend against that. I think I 
mentioned that I did hiring, and when I did and when I saw that someone 
did that the first thing that I thought of was that they were trying to hide 
something, so I would spend more time looking at their profile than 
someone else’s, and that would raise their chance of me finding 
something they would now like. 
Interviewee 8 I used my real name because it’s best to be honest about who you are.   
Interviewee 16 This is why before making any connection with strangers I usually go 
through their profiles and basic information to check whether they have a 
fake name or simply check if they made enough number of posts.  These 
can tell you a lot about the trustworthiness of the account. 
 
5.4.2 Facebook-Specific Source Characteristics Related to the 
Dimension of Competence 
The second stage of axial coding revealed three Facebook-specific source 
characteristics that impacted the perception of competence: 1) qualifications 
(educational level), 2) celebrity, and 3) wealth. The participants reported that they 
considered these three source characteristics when judging the perceived competence 
of a source. For example, Interviewee 11 indicated that he looked at SNSs such as 
Facebook as free environments that support the formation of networks: 
I don’t know if you agree with me or not, but I think that the primary 
benefit of social networks, including Facebook, is that they allow you to 
build a network of qualified and expert people in your field. Most of 
users write their disciplines and educational levels on their profiles. The 
only thing you need to do is send them a friend request. You lose nothing 
if they reject it!  
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Interviewee 7 cited education level as a relevant characteristic when making 
judgments about the competence of the source: “I seek information only from those 
who are capable to provide me with the information I need such as highly educated 
people”. 
The impact of celebrity was observed clearly in the interview data. One of 
those examples was the case of Interviewee 15. The observation indicated that this 
participant “liked” (followed or subscribed to) more than 40 celebrities from 
different countries and in different areas, such as sports, writing, acting, music and 
fashion. She later explained this as follows: 
P: I love to follow every aspect of celebrities’ lives, but I don’t think I’m 
the only one who does this. I have some friends who have entire 
conversations on the subject of celebrities, such as their marriages, 
divorces, and travels.  
I: If you come across a request from one of these celebrities, such as an 
invitation to participate to win a prize, or a request for a donation to a 
charitable organisation, do you think that their being a celebrity would 
have a different effect on your decision? 
P: I think so. You know, we always see them on TV, in the newspapers, 
and in the movies. They have become a part of our lives. I consider it 
reasonable to find myself trusting them or eager to communicate with 
them. 
Other examples regarding the impact of celebrity on perceptions about the 
competence of the source were provided by Interviewee 6 and Interviewee 4: 
Celebrities who are chosen as a brand ambassador must value their 
followers and fans, and I don’t think they will give them false information 
because of fear of their fans turning against them. (Interviewee 6) 
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Perhaps not all celebrities are highly educated, but they certainly have 
high level of competence since they have lots of money and fame. 
(Interviewee 4) 
The third characteristic related to competence was wealth. Interviewee 13 
shared a friend’s bad experience in which a scammer deceived her by pretending to 
be wealthy:  
One of my friends used to know a man on Facebook who pretended to be 
a rich person. After a couple of months of chatting with each other on 
Facebook, he said that his business was in trouble and that he needed to 
borrow a couple of thousand dollars from her. Unfortunately, my friend 
trusted him and gave him the money. Immediately after receiving the 
money, the man removed her from his friend list and disappeared.  
Moreover, the stories shared in the responses to the questionnaire showed that 
users’ beliefs regarding competence increased when the attackers used phony 
profiles that looked legitimate to the users. For example, Questionnaire Participant 
55 stated that the characteristics of wealth misled her judgment about the credibility 
of a source and influenced her to fall victim to a scam: 
I have never thought that this guy is a scammer. From his photos you can 
tell that he...drives luxury cars, and lives in a beautiful home.  
Another example of the impact of the characteristic of wealth on the perception 
of competence was provided by Interviewee 4: 
It is very simple to know if a person is successful or no. The more money 
he has, the more successful he is. 
Therefore, we can see from the previous examples just discussed, and other 
examples shown in Tables 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12, that participants repeatedly 
mentioned educational level of the source, celebrity of the source, and the wealth of 
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the source as reasons or cues to make judgment about the competence, expertise, 
professionalism, capability, success or other properties that are related to the 
dimension of the competence. Consequently, the following relationships can be 
hypothesized between the source educational level and perceived competence of the 
source (as shown in Table 5.10), between the celebrity of the source and perceived 
competence of the source (as shown in Table 5.11), and between the wealth of the 
source and perceived competence of the source (as shown in Table 5.12): 
Hb6: The perceived competence of a source is positively related to the source’s 
qualifications.  
Hb7: The perceived competence of a source is positively related to the celebrity 
of the source. 
Hb8: The perceived competence of a source is positively related to the wealth 
of the source. 
Table 5.10 Examples of the Participants’ Words Related to Hypothesis Hb6 
Hypothesis Participant Examples of participants’ words 
Hb6 
Interviewee 11 I don’t know if you agree with me or not, but I think that the primary 
benefit of social networks, including Facebook, is that they allow you to 
build a network of qualified and expert people in your field. Most of 
users write their disciplines and educational levels on their profiles. The 
only thing you need to do is send them a friend request. You lose nothing 
if they reject it! 
Interviewee 7 I seek information only from those who are capable to provide me with 
the information I need such as highly educated people 
Interviewee 17 I: What about your education level, birth date, or address? Do you share 
them with Facebook community? 
P: The education level yes indeed, I would like to reveal my 
educational background and level.  I am sure that it is useful and I 
have no reason why I should not reveal them. I think that education 
level indicates the capacity I hold, and this the most important thing that 
I look at when I make judgment about others capacity too. 
Interviewee 8 I: I noticed that you posted some photos of your educational certificates 
and awards. Don’t you have any concerns about your identity being 
abused or impersonated? 
P: Not really, I think that my education is what identifies me the most. I 
don’t care who someone is, but I care the most about what that person is 
capable to do, and qualified about, and I assume others look at me the 
same way. 
Interviewee 10 Anyway, for me I reveal my educational level and specialization as I 
think this is so important. I believe this kind of data will help people not 
just know me but can suggest to me possible opportunities out there that 
precisely match my expertise and professionalism. 
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Table 5.11 Examples of the Participants’ Words Related to Hypothesis Hb7 
Hypothesis Participant Examples of participants’ words 
Hb7 
Interviewee 15 P: I love to follow every aspect of celebrities’ lives, but I don’t think I’m 
the only one who does this. I have some friends who have entire 
conversations on the subject of celebrities, such as their marriages, 
divorces, and travels.  
I: If you come across a request from one of these celebrities, such as an 
invitation to participate to win a prize, or a request for a donation to a 
charitable organisation, do you think that their being a celebrity would 
have a different effect on your decision? 
P: I think so. You know, we always see them on TV, in the newspapers, 
and in the movies. They have become a part of our lives. I consider it 
reasonable to find myself trusting them or eager to communicate with 
them. Their fame is without questioning a strong evidence of their 
success. 
Interviewee 6 Celebrities who are chosen as a brand ambassador must value their 
followers and fans, and I don’t think they will give them false information 
because of fear of their fans turning against them 
Interviewee 4 Perhaps not all celebrities are highly educated, but they certainly have 
high level of competence since they have lots of money and fame. 
Interviewee 18 I: Talking about celebrities, why do you think they have this strong 
capacity? 
P: I think that the strong capacity that the celebrities have is related to 
their ability to change public opinions regarding anything whether it is 
political or social.  As I mentioned earlier, if a star celebrity posts a view 
regarding something this will have a strong influence and of course that 
will be very big news and many would do like and accept that view. 
Interviewee 17 I think celebrities have the most powerful influence on me and others as 
well. I look at them as arbiters of taste, political opinions, public opinion, 
and morality.  This is obvious when we see how companies exploit the 
powerful influence of them and employ it to advertise just about 
everything. I think celebrities with their fame, followers and attention are 
competent to do things in a way that no other people can. 
 
Table 5.12 Examples of the Participants’ Words Related to Hypothesis Hb8 
Hypothesis Participant Examples of participants’ words 
Hb8 
Interviewee 13 One of my friends used to know a man on Facebook who pretended to 
be a rich person. After a couple of months of chatting with each other 
on Facebook, he said that his business was in trouble and that he needed 
to borrow a couple of thousand dollars from her. Unfortunately, my 
friend trusted him and gave him the money. Immediately after receiving 
the money, the man removed her from his friend list and disappeared 
Questionnaire 55 I have never thought that this guy is a scammer. From his photos you 
can tell that he...drives luxury cars, and lives in a beautiful home. 
Interviewee 4 It is very simple to know if a person is successful or no. The more 
money he has, the more successful he is. 
Interviewee 6 Life now is all about money, with money you have the ability and the 
capacity to do anything. 
Interviewee 16 It is commonly agreed that wealth equals power in every aspect of our 
life, and I would say that the same roles are applicable in Facebook and 
any social media. A photo of someone driving Ferrari 2013 is not at all 
similar to the same person driving Corolla 2000. The impression is 
different and influence is also different. 
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5.4.3 Facebook-Specific Source Characteristics Related to the 
Dimension of Attraction 
The second stage of axial coding revealed two Facebook-specific source 
characteristics that impacted the perception of attraction: 1) good looks, and 2) good 
writing skills. The participants reported that they considered these two source 
characteristics when judging the attraction of a source. For instance, Interviewee 6 
explained the positive effect of a user’s good looks: 
I have tried to make relationship with girls in real life but never 
happened, but I found it interesting to see that this works on Facebook. 
Interaction with good-looking girls makes me feel good. I get an overall 
feeling of confidence, after I almost lost it. 
Interviewee 1 also mentioned the impact of looks on her judgment. She said 
that the first thing she looked at when she wanted to know more about somebody on 
Facebook was the user’s photos: 
I: Do you think that being good- or bad-looking has any impact on your 
judgment? 
P: In a real-life situation, it’s about attitude and personality and 
probably not about how bad-looking one is. But on Facebook, I would 
look at the photos initially to get a first impression.  
Another example regarding the impact of good looks on attraction was reported 
by Interviewee 1: 
My sister has been using Facebook for marketing for over a year now, 
and I can tell you, people who are more attractive tend to have a lot of 
conviction. Good looks means more likability and more money. 
Good writing skills were also identified as a factor that attracts others and 
reflects the credibility of the source: 
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I spend most of my time on Facebook reading others’ posts or comments, 
so the first thing that attracts me is good writing. When I see an 
impressive post or comment, I immediately look at the profile of the 
person who wrote it, and sometimes I send the person a friend request. 
(Interviewee 18) 
Another example regarding the impact of good writing skills on attraction was 
reported by Interviewee 8. She explained that good writing skills attracted her to join 
a group, even though all of the group members were strangers to her: 
I found it interesting to have such a relationship with these people… I 
like the way they write, this is perhaps what attracted me the most to this 
group. 
A similar example regarding the impact of good writing skills on attraction was 
reported by Interviewee 11: 
I read everything he writes and love his posts, especially when he argues 
with others. It's just interesting to have users like him around. 
Therefore, we can see from the previous examples just discussed, and other 
examples shown in Tables 5.13, and 5.14, that participants repeatedly mentioned 
good looks of the source, and good writing skills of the source as reasons or cues to 
make judgment about the impression, attention, attraction, being interesting, 
likability or other properties that are related to the dimension of the attraction. 
Consequently, the following relationships can be hypothesized between the good 
looks of the source and perceived attraction of the source (as shown in Table 5.13), 
and between the good writing by the source and perceived attraction of the source (as 
shown in Table 5.14): 
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Hb9: The perceived attraction of a source is positively related to the good looks 
of the source. 
Hb10: The perceived attraction of a source is positively related to good writing 
by the source.  
 
Table 5.13 Examples of the Participants’ Words Related to Hypothesis Hb9 
Hypothesis Participant Examples of participants’ words 
Hb9 
Interviewee 14 I have tried to make relationship with girls in real life but never 
happened, but I found it interesting to see that this works on Facebook. 
Interaction with good-looking girls makes me feel good. I get an overall 
feeling of confidence, after I almost lost it. 
Interviewee 1 I: Do you think that being good- or bad-looking has any impact on your 
judgment? 
P: In a real-life situation, it’s about attitude and personality and probably 
not about how bad-looking one is. But on Facebook, I would look at the 
photos initially to get a first impression. 
Interviewee 1 My sister has been using Facebook for marketing for over a year now, 
and I can tell you, people who are more attractive tend to have a lot of 
conviction. Good looks means more likability and more money 
Interviewee 15 You have nothing to make judgment about someone’s charisma in 
Facebook except their looking and their writings skills. Anything else 
can be opposite offline I think! 
Interviewee 7 I used his photo simply because he has a good-looking, and therefore 
has more attraction. This is quite common I think for those who use 
nicknames like me. And I can tell you, every time I used a photo for 
someone with good-looking I started getting more likes and more 
friendship invitations. 
 
Table 5.14 Examples of the Participants’ Words Related to Hypothesis Hb10 
Hypothesis Participant Examples of participants’ words 
Hb10 
Interviewee 18 I spend most of my time on Facebook reading others’ posts or 
comments, so the first thing that attracts me is good writing. When I see 
an impressive post or comment, I immediately look at the profile of the 
person who wrote it, and sometimes I send the person a friend request 
Interviewee 8 I found it interesting to have such a relationship with these people… I 
like the way they write, this is perhaps what attracted me the most to 
this group 
Interviewee 11 I read everything he writes and love his posts, especially when he 
argues with others. It's just interesting to have users like him around 
Interviewee 20 I think the most influential people in my Facebook network are those 
who have good writing skills. Probably because they make more 
attention. 
Interviewee 15 You have nothing to make judgment about someone’s charisma in 
Facebook except their looking and their writings skills. Anything else 
can be opposite offline I think! 
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5.4.4 Facebook-Specific Source Characteristics Related to the 
Dimension of Worthiness 
The second stage of axial coding revealed three Facebook-specific source 
characteristics that impacted the perception of worthiness: 1) authority (power over 
the user), 2) sexual compatibility with the user, and 3) reciprocity (compliments, 
likes and positive comments received from the source). The participants reported that 
they considered these three source characteristics when judging the worthiness of a 
source. Authority refers to the power over the recipient and the right to make 
decisions. It was identified as a persuasive factor when considering whether or not to 
accept a request:  
I: If someone asks you for a favor, such as a donation or document, 
would you accept? 
P: Documents, no, not unless from people who are authority figures like 
an employer or a professor or teacher. I am friends with my academic 
advisor right now, which I am perfectly ok with; I don’t see it as 
awkward that she is not supposed to be friends with me in the traditional 
sense, but I don’t think that being friends on Facebook is quite like being 
friends with someone in the traditional sense. The worthiness of the 
relationship with him is different than other relationships I would say. 
(Interviewee 19) 
Interviewee 2 stated that she felt compelled to react to posts made by her boss: 
 When I see a post from my boss, I feel hesitant to leave it without 
commenting, sharing, or at least clicking the ‘like’ button. 
Sexual compatibility is the degree to which two people perceive that they share 
sexual preferences or desires. Participants repeatedly mentioned that sexual 
compatibility with source can be a reason, an excuse or a cues to see the source as a 
worthy, beneficial, valuable, or deserving, which are properties related to the 
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dimension of the worthiness1. For example, the observations showed that Interviewee 
14 made a comment about sexual preferences in his profile. When later asked why he 
wrote it, he explained that he wanted to weed out poor matches: 
I wrote it explicitly because I had some experiences where I got together 
with a girl and we both liked each other, but it turned out that I really 
liked sex and she did not. So I wrote that in the profile to kind of weed 
out those people since I don’t see any benefit from them. 
Interviewee 14 also stated that sexual compatibility with the source is a 
characteristic that influences him to see the source as a beneficial, and therefore 
influences him to accept a request from that source: 
If I have a chance to have a sexual relationship with someone I want, and 
I know that accepting the request will make it happen, I would accept it. I 
think anybody who says differently is lying. As I said before, if there is a 
benefit I will accept, if there is a cost I will not accept.  
Another example was reported by Interviewee 17 who explained that sexual 
compatibility with the source is a characteristic that influences him to see the source 
as a valuable: 
Facebook somehow is just like any other online dating site, whereby I 
can find and develop personal romantic or sexual relationship. Thus, the 
most valuable person for me is the most sexual compatible one. 
                                                 
 
1 It is arguably possible that there is a relationship between sexual compatibility and 
perceived attraction. However, based on the collected data of this study (see some examples 
in Tables 5.16), the hypothesis is clearly emerged between sexual compatibility and 
perceived worthiness and not perceived attraction (please refer to Table 4.5 and Table 4.9 in 
Chapter 4 to see how this dimension has emerged). This is justifiable since perceived 
attraction dimension in this study represents the features that evoke interest and liking, and 
not necessary means physical or sexual attractiveness, as explained in section 5.3.3.  
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Many stories reported in the questionnaire showed that sexual compatibility 
alone, or along with other factors, had a great impact on the user’s judgment about 
the worthiness of others: 
I think I have involved in this relationship partly because she is so sexy, 
but mostly because I thought that I have nothing to lose. (Questionnaire 
Participant 49) 
Reciprocity is the cooperative interchange of favours or privileges. The results 
showed that reciprocity is an important factor in judgements about credibility on 
Facebook. Complimenting, commenting on or liking another user’s posts can build a 
credible relationship between users, thus encouraging them to accept each other’s 
requests. As Interviewee 9 stated:  
P: Some of the users in my friend list always like and write good 
comments on my photos or posts, and I usually do the same for them to 
keep them around. 
I: How about if they ask you for something, such as money or sensitive 
information? 
P: As I mentioned before, it depends on the amount of money or the type 
of information, but generally speaking, I would try to make them happy 
and maintain a positive appearance for them. I think this is reasonable, 
since they are important to me. 
Another example that shows the impact of reciprocity on perceiving the source 
as beneficial and advantageous has been stated by Interviewee 12:  
I look at Facebook as a place of gaining mutual benefits from 
exchanging opinions, news, good times, or any others things with other 
people. So, I think the advantageous people in my friends list are those 
who keep exchanging these things with me. 
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A participant in the questionnaire stated that interactivity (through chatting and 
commenting) with the source (an attacker) made him feel compelled to reveal private 
information, even in the absence of sufficient proof of the identity of the source: 
We spent several months chatting and commenting on each other’s posts, 
but I have never met her or even called her on the telephone…. To be 
honest, when she asked me about that, I was really compelled to answer 
her since she was the most important person among my friends list. 
(Questionnaire Participant 41) 
Therefore, we can see from the previous examples just discussed, and other 
examples shown in Tables 5.15, 5.16, and 5.17, that participants repeatedly 
mentioned the authority of the source, sexual compatibility with the source and the 
reciprocity (e.g., likes, and positive comments received from the source) as reasons 
or cues to make judgment about the source being worthwhile, being beneficial, being 
valuable, being advantageous, being deserving, or other properties that are related to 
the dimension of the worthiness. Consequently, the following relationships can be 
hypothesized between the authority of the source and perceived worthiness of the 
source (as shown in Table 5.15), between the sexual compatibility with the source 
and perceived worthiness of the source (as shown in Table 5.16), and between the 
compliments, likes, and positive comments received from the source and perceived 
worthiness of the source (as shown in Table 5.17): 
Hb11: The perceived worthiness of a source is positively related to the authority 
of the source.  
Hb12: The perceived worthiness of a source is positively related to their sexual 
compatibility with the source. 
Hb13: The perceived worthiness of a source increases as the compliments, likes, 
and positive comments received from the source increase. 
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Table 5.15 Examples of the Participants’ Words Related to Hypothesis Hb11 
Hypothesis Participant Examples of participants’ words 
Hb11 
Interviewee 19 I: If someone asks you for a favor, such as a donation or document, 
would you accept?  
P: Documents, no, not unless from people who are authority figures 
like an employer or a professor or teacher. I am friends with my 
academic advisor right now, which I am perfectly ok with; I don’t see it 
as awkward that she is not supposed to be friends with me in the 
traditional sense, but I don’t think that being friends on Facebook is 
quite like being friends with someone in the traditional sense. The 
worthiness of the relationship with him is different than other 
relationships I would say. 
Interviewee 2 When I see a post from my boss, I feel hesitant to leave it without 
commenting, sharing, or at least clicking the ‘like’ button. Such post 
requires extra care I guess.  
Interviewee 11 In addition to that, there are some people who I always avoid being 
friends with them in Facebook like my boss, my parents, and other 
important people whom I do respect. In some cases, people will tag me 
in photos which are embarrassing and I would not want people like my 
boss to see them. Also, having such people as my friends will force me 
to always like what they post and do what they request. 
Interviewee 14  I: Can you think about the most influential people in your friends list? 
P: I would say my manager. That is the kind of relationship that I would 
like to keep professional. My manager now is one of my good friends 
from college and I have him among the friends in Facebook. However, 
being friends from college doesn’t allow me to make jokes about him or 
reject a request that he makes, even though we talk to each other and 
hang out regularly. It was most about keeping a professional relationship 
and maintaining the valuable respect between us. 
Interviewee 7 I don’t think that I would respond to anyone who has authority in 
general. But I would respond to someone who has authority over me in 
particular. I also don’t think I will obey because of their power, I think it 
is kind of maintaining advantageous relationship with that person. 
 
Table 5.16 Examples of the Participants’ Words Related to Hypothesis Hb12 
Hypothesis Participant Examples of participants’ words 
Hb12 
Interviewee 14 I wrote it explicitly because I had some experiences where I got together 
with a girl and we both liked each other, but it turned out that I really 
liked sex and she did not. So I wrote that in the profile to kind of weed 
out those people since I don’t see any benefit from them. 
Interviewee 14 If I have a chance to have a sexual relationship with someone I want, 
and I know that accepting the request will make it happen, I would 
accept it. I think anybody who says differently is lying. As I said before, 
If there is a benefit I will accept, if there is a cost I will not accept. 
Questionnaire 
49 
I think I have involved in this relationship partly because she is so sexy, 
but mostly because I thought that I have nothing to lose 
Interviewee 17 Facebook somehow is just like any other online dating site, whereby I 
can find and develop personal romantic or sexual relationship. Thus, 
the most valuable person for me is the most sexual compatible one. 
Interviewee 5 Well, I have called Facebook a platonic dating site before, since it is a 
way to build relationships. Although these relationships are not always 
for sexual or romantic purposes, sexual or romantic relationships are 
welcome and deserving. 
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Table 5.17 Examples of the Participants’ Words Related to Hypothesis Hb13 
Hypothesis Participant Examples of participants’ words 
Hb13 
Interviewee 9 P: Some of the users in my friend list always like and write good 
comments on my photos or posts, and I usually do the same for them 
to keep them around. 
I: How about if they ask you for something, such as money or sensitive 
information? 
P: As I mentioned before, it depends on the amount of money or the type 
of information, but generally speaking, I would try to make them happy 
and maintain a positive appearance for them. I think this is reasonable, 
since they are important to me. 
Questionnaire 
41 
We spent several months chatting and commenting on each other’s 
posts, but I have never met her or even called her on the telephone…. 
To be honest, when she asked me about that, I was really compelled to 
answer her since she was the most important person among my friends 
list. 
Interviewee 5 They all won’t comment or like every single one, but there is a definite 
trend of who is liking my pictures on my Facebook. That would go the 
same for commenting and liking the statuses I make as well.  
Interviewee 5 Every so often I will get someone who I haven’t ever talked to or I 
haven’t talked to in a long time commenting or liking something I 
posted, and I really just use that as an excuse to care about them and 
catch up with them when I find the time. 
Interviewee 12 I look at Facebook as a place of gaining mutual benefits from 
exchanging opinions, news, good times, or any others things with 
other people. So, I think the advantageous people in my friends list are 
those who keep exchanging these things with me. 
 
5.5 A Priori Model  
The findings of this study confirmed three previously identified dimensions of 
source credibility from the domains of human communication and marketing 
research (i.e., sincerity, competence and attractiveness) and identified a new 
dimension, namely, perceived worthiness (or perceived benefit) of the source, which 
has not been previously identified as a dimension of source credibility (refer to the 
summary of previous works on source credibility in Chapter 3, Table 3.2). The fact 
that perceived worthiness has not been previously reported, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, as a dimension of source credibility in more than 30 studies conducted 
before the present study reflects a unique specification of social engineering on 
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Facebook. It also provides a positive indication about the contribution of this 
research.  
Moreover, it provides more evidence about the validity of the analysis in this 
research. The finding on a new dimension demonstrates that the analysis in this 
research relied on the collected data, and not on the studies in the literature. 
Furthermore, while identifying the source credibility dimensions is an important 
achievement, the analysis in this study does not stop at the perception level. The 
analysis of the results went further and explored 13 important Facebook-specific 
source characteristics that influence the perception of these dimensions in the context 
of Facebook. 
The previous sections explained the four dimensions of source credibility in 
terms of social engineering on Facebook, and the 13 Facebook-specific source 
characteristics that influence users to perceive a source as possessing one of those 
dimensions. Based on these findings and the hypotheses emerged from them, the a 
priori model was developed as presented in Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1 Source Credibility Dimensions in Terms of Social Engineering on Facebook. 
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5.6 Supportive Literature 
As discussed in Chapter 1, some grounded theory researchers suggest leaving 
the literature review until after the completion of data collection. Other researchers 
(e.g., (Dunne 2011; Urquhart 2000)) suggest that there is a need for a literature 
review to be conducted in the initial stages of research (especially in the case of a 
student) as it is important not to repeat earlier works. The present study followed the 
advice of Dunne (2011) and Urquhart (2000) who suggested that an early literature 
review is necessary. The idea behind deferring the literature review until after the 
data collection is to avoid affecting the analysis with knowledge of the theories 
already existing in the literature. However, in the case of the present study, the 
research questions had not been investigated in the context of Facebook previously. 
Moreover, there is no agreement in the literature on answers to the research questions 
in other online contexts or in real-life situations. Therefore, the concern about 
conducting the literature review prior to data collection was not relevant in the case 
of this research.  
To further enrich the argument propounded in the present study, supportive 
empirical and analytical studies in the literature are discussed in the following 
sections. Having completed the analysis of the qualitative phase results, these 
sections go back to the literature to discuss the findings of this research in relation to 
the findings reported in previous studies. It is noted that the a priori model and the 
related hypotheses were developed based on the findings of the qualitative phase; the 
purpose of discussing the literature in the following sections is to support and explain 
the findings.  
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5.6.1 Supportive Literature Related to the Dimension of Sincerity 
The first dimension of source credibility is perceived sincerity. This dimension 
has been found to be significant in many source credibility studies in the literature 
(e.g., (Ayeh et al. 2013; Bergh et al. 1981; Berlo et al. 1969; Corina 2006; Eisend 
2006; Falcione 1974; Gaziano and McGrath 1986; Lee 1978; Markham 1968; Meyer 
1988; Mosier and Ahlgren 1981; Newell and Goldsmith 2001; Ohanian 1990; 
Singletary 1976; Tuppen 1974; White 1990; Whitehead Jr 1968)). 
The role of perceived sincerity is explained in the literature by the factor model 
of Source credibility theory, which helps determine to what extent the receiver 
judges the source as credible. Perceived sincerity of a source makes the victim feel 
safe and therefore not perceive the threat. Safety, is the feeling of being protected 
from danger and risk. According to Greenberg et al. (1997), when people are 
threatened, they will alter their behavior depending on the number of risks they can 
accommodate. This modification is a psychological reaction that is determined by the 
seriousness of an attack and the amount of loss that they think will incur because of 
the occurrence of a hazard (Rosenstock 1974). Rosenstock (1974) illustrated the 
relationship between behavior and threat through the Health belief model (HBM) 
(Rosenstock 1974). The model indicates that the probability of performing a risky 
action is determined by four main elements: perceived threat of taking the action; 
perceived benefit of taking the action; perceived susceptibility to the threat; and 
perceived seriousness of the threat. Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) also 
proposes that individuals protect themselves based on four factors: the perceived 
severity of a threatening event, the perceived vulnerability (the probability of the 
occurrence of that threat), the efficacy of the recommended preventive action or 
behaviour, and the perceived self efficacy (Posey et al. 2014). This can explain how 
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participants make judgment about sincerity of a source based on information 
available on the source profile such as number of friends, number of posts, using real 
name, and so on, which can give them perhaps some indications about the risk 
associated with such a source. 
The impact of number of friends and mutual friends can be explained further 
by the Principle of social proof. Social proof is doing what others do regardless of 
the importance or the correctness of that action (Lun et al. 2007). It is the influence 
of others on the behavior of someone. It can lead people to do things that might not 
be in their interest, such as wearing specific clothes in a specific event because of the 
popularity of those kinds of cloths, or purchasing products because of their 
popularity (Cialdini 2001). Social proof has been found to be one of the more 
powerful strategies in persuasion (Cialdini et al. 1999). The risk of this principle 
from the security perspective is that people behave according to the general attitude 
rather than what is secured. In fact, information security research has showed that 
users can be influenced by the behavior of the majority to accept threats, even if 
security policy was written in a way that prevents the threat (Sasse et al. 2001).  
Social judgment theory can give an explanation about the impact of sharing the 
same belief on accepting a message. It suggests that people evaluate and judge the 
content of any message based on their anchors, or stance, on a particular topic or 
message. That is, people accept the message or reject it based on their cognitive map 
(Sherif and Hovland 1961). The implication behind this theory is that any person has 
three areas in which he/she accepts or rejects a particular persuasive message. The 
first is the acceptance area, which is where the person places the message he/she 
considers acceptable. The second is the latitude of rejection area, which is where the 
person places the message he/she considers rejectable. The third is the latitude of 
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non-commitment, which is when the person places the message in no opinion area as 
he/she finds it neither acceptable nor rejectable. Cognitive dissonance theory 
explains this behaviors by assuming that when individuals are persuaded to do 
something or not to do something, an outside source simply has to provide enough 
ammunition to change another’s beliefs (Festinger 1962). Similarity in religion has 
been found influential factor in several contexts such as marketing, dating couples, 
politics, and interpersonal relationships (e.g., (Lutz-Zois et al. 2006; Mollenhorst et 
al. 2008; Reader and English 1947; Simons et al. 1970)). Simons et al. (1970) 
explains this influence by stating that the receiver would think that the source who 
has the same belief, also shares the same concerns that the receiver has.  
5.6.2 Supportive Literature Related to the Dimension of Competence 
The second dimension is the perceived competence. This dimension has also 
been found to be significant in many source credibility studies in the literature (e.g., 
(Ayeh et al. 2013; Bergh et al. 1981; Berlo et al. 1969; Bowers and Phillips 1967; 
Corina 2006; Eisend 2006; Falcione 1974; Markham 1968; McCain et al. 1977; 
McCroskey et al. 1974; McCroskey and Jenson 1975; Mosier and Ahlgren 1981; 
Newell and Goldsmith 2001; Ohanian 1990; Salwen 1987; Singletary 1976; Tuppen 
1974; Whitehead Jr 1968)).  
The impact of perceived competence is strongly associated with trust in the 
literature. Trust has been studied in regards to user’s behaviors in SNSs, and the 
results of these studies showed strong relationship between users’ trust and their 
information sharing (e.g., (Chai and Kim 2010)). Trust has been studied in marketing 
in relation to persuasion, and it has been found that the characteristic of trusting 
people in advertisement is important in formulating marketing persuasion (Chen and 
Barnes 2007). Retailers utilize this weakness of trusting others too much to deceive 
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users that they have the endorsement of celebrities, high qualified, and wealthy 
people in order  to gain the trust of other people (Cialdini 2001). It has been shown 
through research that most people are drawn closer to individuals they are fond of 
and they end up developing trust for them (Seiter and Gass 2010). This explains why 
people tend to believe online professionals even if their expertise is not reflected in 
the sites that they operate. This fact can be used by social engineers to pretend to be 
celebrities endorsing a product to draw the attention of their victims (Hadnagy 2010; 
Mitnick and Simon 2001). 
The impact of educational level on the perceived competence has been argued 
in the literature. For example, Crisci and Kassinove (1973) have studied the impact 
of ("Dr." versus "Mr.") on behavioural compliance, and the result of their study has 
shown significant effect of educational level on the perceived competence (Crisci 
and Kassinove 1973). Research shows that people tend to trust other people because 
they are experts, popular (such as celebrities), and wealthy (Cialdini 2001; Ekman 
2007; Hadnagy 2010; Mitnick and Simon 2001). Ekman (2007), explains that these 
characteristics can be used to influence some people to do anything in order to get 
affection from those who have them. In some ways, people with those traits can 
cause real damage to other people while thinking that their behaviors are realistic and 
appropriate. The emotion that comes with those kinds of characteristics can lead 
some people to act in ways they may regret later. Social engineers could pretend to 
be celebrities, wealthy, or high educated people in order to trick users into 
maintaining ties with them (Hadnagy 2010). Such traits can draw many users into 
believing that they have met competent people and therefore the users will be more 
likely to accept their tricks. 
 184 Chapter 5: Qualitative Phase Results 
5.6.3 Supportive Literature Related to the Dimension of Attraction 
The third dimension is the perceived attraction. This dimension has also been 
found to be significant in many source credibility studies in the literature (e.g., 
(Baudhuin and Davis 1972; Bergh et al. 1981; Berlo et al. 1969; Corina 2006; Eisend 
2006; Markham 1968; McCain et al. 1977; McCroskey 1966; McCroskey et al. 1974; 
McCroskey and Jenson 1975; Ohanian 1990; Singletary 1976; Tuppen 1974; White 
1990; Whitehead Jr 1968)).  
The impact of attraction on accepting a message is associated with source 
likability in the literature. Ben Franklin Effect Theory states that when we like 
someone we are more willing to do him/her a favor (Jecker and Landy 1969). The 
reverse effect is also true. That is, when we do a person a favor, we tend to like them 
more as a result. It has been shown through research that people tend to communicate 
with other people because they are charming or attractive (Cialdini 2001; Ekman 
2007). Several studies have been conducted in marketing research and the results of 
those studies concluded that communicators who have good looks are consistently 
liked more and have a positive impact on influencing others (Joseph 1982).  
The impact of writing skills on a message acceptance can be explained through 
the central route of Elaboration likelihood model (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). The 
central route uses message elaboration and can produce a positive attitude change 
and encourage the receiver to obey. Centrally routed messages include a wealth of 
information, rational arguments, and evidence to support a particular conclusion. If 
the argument of the message is strong, it will create a positive cognitive response in 
the minds of receivers while also positively aligning the receivers’ beliefs with those 
views of the persuader. On the other hand, if the argument is weak, it will produce a 
negative cognitive response to the persuasive message, which in turn prevents an 
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attitude change and causes the receiver not to obey. This is perhaps why some studies 
(e.g., (Taylor and Kent 2010; Turk 2006)) suggest writing skills as the top-rated 
skills sought in hiring entry-level practitioners in public relation. Recent study 
conducted by Singh et al. (2014) on blog reading behaviour, found that textual 
characteristics that appeal to the sentiment of the reader affect both reader attraction 
and retention. 
5.6.4 Supportive Literature Related to the Dimension of Worthiness 
The fourth dimension is perceived worthiness. As explained earlier, it is 
believed that the influence of this dimension is a novel finding as it has not been 
reported in any previous source credibility studies (Chapter 3, Table 3.2). However, 
several theories and studies in the literature explain the important role played by 
worthiness in credibility perception. The difference between perceived worthiness 
and the three previous dimensions is that source worthiness represents the potential 
benefit that the particular user can get from a source. The role of perceived 
worthiness is partially explained in the literature by the functional model of source 
credibility theory, which views credibility as the degree to which a source meets a 
receiver’s needs (Hovland et al. 1953).  
Politeness theory also gives further explanation about the impact of perceived 
worthiness on accepting social engineering request. Politeness theory states that in 
response to any request, people maintain one of the two following faces: a positive-
based face or a negative-based face (Brown 1987). A positive-based face is one 
which reflects appreciating, or respecting. A negative-based face is one when there is 
no constraint in any way. Therefore, politeness theory indicates that people act 
politely or rudely depending on whether or not they care about the requester. That is, 
if they care about the person who requests that they do a favor (such as boss, sexual 
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compatible), they will show a positive face; however, if someone that they do not 
care about makes such a request, they will show a negative face.  
Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis gives more explanation about the impact of 
perceived worthiness on accepting social engineering request. This theory states that 
people are willing to help others in the following two main ways. If they feel 
empathy, they are likely to help others without any selfish thoughts. If they do not 
feel empathy, they will help others but only if the rewards (benefit) of helping them 
outweigh the costs (loss) (Batson et al. 1989; Toi and Batson 1982).The benefit can 
come in many forms, such as winning a prize, relief from distress, or gaining 
appreciation from others. The loss can include diminished health, lost time, or any 
other things. 
 In addition, the Elaboration likelihood model states that there are two routes or 
methods to influence others: the central route and the peripheral route (Petty and 
Cacioppo 1986). The central route uses message elaboration and can produce a 
positive attitude change and encourage the receiver to obey. The peripheral route 
relies on a receiver’s emotional involvement and thus persuade through more 
superficial means. The influences that were explained by participants in regards to 
authority, sexual compatibility, and reciprocity are all examples of peripheral cues or 
routes of Elaboration likelihood model. 
In scrutinizing the evaluation of a threat and the behavioral response to a risk, 
O'Conner, Seymour, and Dilts (2011) hold that these behaviours are based on the 
following psychological principles: (1) People regard their lives, liberty, and 
property to be more important than anything else;  (2) in as much as people may be 
wary of risks, they have some level of acceptance, preference, tolerance, and wishes 
toward some risks; and  (3) the extent of the danger they can accept is determined by 
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balancing the perceived  benefits over losses in choosing to behave in a certain way 
(O'Connor and Seymour 2011). Social engineers communicate with their users very 
confidently to try and bring out the in a person, and the need to be loved, and behave 
like they face the same situations. They explain that they could be their sexual match 
or pretend to be important people in order to trick users into maintaining ties with 
them (Hadnagy 2010). Such traits can draw many people into believing that they 
have met an important person and therefore the user will keep visiting a particular 
site in order to catch up on a conversation. Recent study, Huang et al. (2014), which 
monitored 3.5 million Facebook accounts, found that attackers use the trick of “I 
cares about”,  and “sexuality” as social incentives to influence users to be lured to 
click on malicious links in OSN malware campaigns. 
The research has provided a proof of the degree to which a person should give 
in to the wishes of a person in authority (Navarro and Karlins 2009). Compliance is a 
behavior that makes a person keep conforming to those who are more powerful or 
influential, for example a person who can withdraw some benefits. Therefore, the use 
of influence of authority to instill terror or panic in people causes people to submit to 
the “authorities” instructions because they fear losing a benefit or experiencing a 
degree of attack. Social engineering thrives on those people who give in to fear and 
orders from influential people (Mitnick and Simon 2001).  
The idea of reciprocity has been a subject of corporate research. When people 
receive a favor from other people, they develop a feeling of discordance until favors 
are reciprocated (Hadnagy 2010). A person will have a penchant to give back in an 
equal measure whenever a chance presents itself. The degree to which people 
reciprocate compliment, good comments, or liking depends on the intrinsic value of 
that work assigned by the receiver (Cialdini 2001). With continued reciprocity, a 
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psychological commitment to adhere to decisions made in the past is cultivated (Ma 
and Chan 2014), and it will sustain a consistent behavior that is attached to the 
decisions a person makes (O'Connor and Seymour 2011). 
 As explained in Chapter 2, Workman (2007) has identified three types of 
commitment behavior that contribute to the success of social engineers: normative 
commitment, continuance commitment, and affective commitment (Workman 2007). 
The mannerisms differ from one person to another depending on their psychological 
disposition to maintain a relationship, which compels them to evaluate the benefits 
that they are getting from such a relationship. The concept of consistent behavior 
explains that people develop a credible behavior towards others and will feel 
compelled to return a favor even in the absence of sufficient proof of their identity. 
The reciprocity that has been discussed so far is concerned with simple acts of 
mutual behavior where a person feels obligated to accept a request from the other to 
sustain a relationship. This behavior involves a series of investments in the form of 
time and resources that build from the perception that without such a relationship, 
one is at a loss (DeVries 2009). Therefore, the parties involved will always be loyal 
to each other directly or implicitly.  
Moreover, Venkatanathan et al. (2013) investigated the impact of reciprocation 
on sharing of personally identifiable information (PII) with strangers in SNSs. They 
found that individuals are influenced to reciprocate PII when the disclosure of PII is 
directed by strangers towards them, and also when it is not directed towards anyone 
in particular such as through public pages or channels. 
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5.7 Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter presented the results of the first (qualitative) phase of research. 
The findings highlighted how source credibility influences users to accept and fall 
for social engineering tricks on Facebook. The findings revealed four dimensions of 
source credibility in terms of social engineering victimisations on Facebook. 
Moreover, the findings showed there are 13 Facebook-specific source characteristics 
that significantly impact the perception of the four dimensions of credibility.  
Although qualitative methods, such as the grounded theory method used in this 
study, are scientific and reliable methods that do not need further quantitative testing 
if they have used carefully, a subsequent quantitative phase can enhance the validity 
of the results by testing them on a larger sample. A quantitative phase can also 
provide more objective knowledge regarding the extent to which the findings of the 
first phase are valid. In the present study, the quantitative phase also includes the 
analysis of the demographics effects and interactions, which were not explored in the 
qualitative phase of the research. This chapter included some discussion in the 
presentation of the results. However, the final discussion is combined with the 
discussion of the quantitative phase, and presented in Chapter 8. 
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 Research Methodology with Emphasis on Quantitative 
Phase 
6.1 Overview 
As discussed earlier, this research used a sequential exploratory mixed method 
design, which comprised two main phases: qualitative methods as a first phase, and a 
quantitative method as a second phase. The methodology of the first phase was 
explained in Chapter 4, and this chapter discusses the methodology of the second 
(quantitative) phase. This includes an explanation of the objectives of the second 
phase, the choice of methodology, and why it was considered appropriate for this 
research. This chapter also discusses the experimental design, the procedures, the 
scale development and testing and other details regarding statistical analysis. 
6.2 Objectives of the Second (Quantitative) Phase 
The first (qualitative) phase of this study investigated how people perceive and 
make judgments about the credibility of sources in Facebook, which is the key 
element in a user’s decision to accept or reject social engineering attacks. Using a 
qualitative grounded theory method, the first phase explored source credibility 
dimensions in terms of social engineering on Facebook, as well as the Facebook-
specific source characteristics that influence users to judge an attacker as credible 
and therefore make them susceptible to becoming a victim.  
The aim of the second (quantitative) phase was to test the findings of the first 
(qualitative) phase using a quantitative method, and to examine the extent to which 
the factors identified in the first phase affected users’ susceptibility to victimisation. 
Moreover, in order to predict users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation 
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based on their characteristics, the second phase investigated whether or not there was 
any relationship between the effectiveness of the factors that influenced Facebook 
users to judge an attacker as credible and users’ demographics. Therefore, the aim of 
the first phase was to answer the first and second research questions, while the aim of 
the second phase was to answer the third, fourth and fifth research questions: 
- To what extent do each of the source characteristics (found in the first phase) 
influence Facebook users to judge an attacker as credible? 
- Is there any relationship between the influence of any of the source 
characteristics (found in the first phase) on users’ susceptibility to social 
engineering victimisation in Facebook and users’ demographics such as age, 
gender, education, relationship status and level of awareness? 
- Is there any relationship between users’ demographics and susceptibility to 
social engineering victimisation on Facebook in general? 
Based on the findings of the qualitative exploratory phase, the a priori model 
that resulted from the qualitative phase was examined through the following 17 
hypotheses: 
Ha1: Users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation is positively 
related to the perceived sincerity of the source. 
Hb1: The perceived sincerity of a source increases as the source’s number of 
friends increases. 
Hb2: The perceived sincerity of a source increases as the number of friends 
the user has in common with the source increases. 
Hb3: The perceived sincerity of a source increases as the source’s number of 
posts increases.  
Hb4: The perceived sincerity of a source is positively related to sharing the 
same beliefs or religion with the source.  
Hb5: The perceived sincerity of a source is positively related to the source’s 
use of a real name. 
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Ha2: Users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation is positively 
related to the perceived competence of the source. 
Hb6: The perceived competence of a source is positively related to the 
source’s qualifications.  
Hb7: The perceived competence of a source is positively related to the 
celebrity status of the source. 
Hb8: The perceived competence of a source is positively related to the 
apparent wealth of the source. 
Ha3: Users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation is positively 
related to the perceived attraction of the source. 
Hb9: The perceived attraction of a source is positively related to the good 
looks of the source. 
Hb10: The perceived attraction of a source is positively related to good 
writing skills demonstrated by the source.  
Ha4: Users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation is positively 
related to the perceived worthiness of the source. 
Hb11: The perceived worthiness of a source is positively related to the 
authority of the source.  
Hb12: The perceived worthiness of a source is positively related to the 
user’s sexual compatibility with the source. 
Hb13: The perceived worthiness of a source increases as the number of 
compliments, likes and positive comments received from the source 
increases. 
6.3 Possible Methods to be used in the Second Phase 
To test the study hypotheses and the a priori model, and to predict the potential 
threats to the users based on their demographics, a quantitative method was used in 
the second phase. A quantitative method was used in the second phase to ensure the 
validity and reliability of the study by illuminating the limitations of the first phase 
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such as any bias and subjectivity in the interpretation. The quantitative study in the 
second phase included a relatively large sample to test the hypotheses that emerged 
from the first phase, and to link the findings to the demographic variables.  
The possible methods to be used in the quantitative study included a 
quantitative questionnaire or an experimental study. These two methods are the most 
frequently used techniques in information systems research (Recker 2012).  
A questionnaire-based survey gathers information about the actions, opinions 
and attitudes on a large population; however, surveys do not involve the treatment, 
control or manipulation of independent variables. Experimental methods examine 
cause-and-effect relationships through the treatment and control of specific variables 
and the isolation of other variables. This gives the experimental methods strength due 
to the emphasis on internal validity (Recker 2012). In order to estimate the 
effectiveness of the factors under study, each characteristic (causal factor) under 
examination must be tested while the other factors that can affect the participants’ 
decision making are isolated. Considering the strengths and advantages of each 
method, it was decided that the experimental method was the most suitable method 
to be used in the second phase of this research. 
One of the options for applying the experimental method in this research was 
to set actual “harmless” social engineering tricks on Facebook and measure the 
participants’ responses. However, some challenges prevented the use of actual 
experiments within the Facebook environment. These challenges included ethical 
issues related to the use of deception techniques, permission issues from the owners 
of Facebook, and the requirement to conduct the study in accordance with the 
National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans. Moreover, 
controlling the factors under examination and making sure that all other factors were 
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isolated during an experiment in the actual Facebook environment would be a 
difficult or perhaps impossible task. When challenges such as these are encountered, 
researchers (e.g., (Armstrong 2001; O'Leary et al. 1970; Rungtusanatham et al. 
2011)) suggest the use of role-play (scenario-based) experiments. 
There is debate in the literature regarding the validity and realism of the role-
play method. However, many studies, from the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., (Haney et al. 
1972; Mixon 1972; O'Leary et al. 1970; Olson and Christiansen 1966)) until recent 
years (e.g., (Dhamija et al. 2006; Downs et al. 2007; Furnell 2007; Pattinson et al. 
2012; Sheng et al. 2010)) have confirmed the degree of realism and involvement that 
can be achieved in role-playing studies. Role-playing has been used in many email 
phishing studies. Taking into account both the challenges of running an experiment 
in the actual Facebook environment and the advantages (control factors) of running a 
role-play experiment there was strong justification for using a role-play experiment 
in this research. 
The validity of the research conducted in this part of the study was enhanced 
through the use of some strategies commonly used in deception research. Literature 
of deception includes several practices that have been found to be effective, useful 
and morally justifiable strategies in experimental research (e.g., (Gibbins 1992; 
Kimmel 2000; Kimmel 2001)). 
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6.4 Choosing the Role-Play (Scenario-Based) Experiment 
As discussed in the previous section, a type of experimental design called a 
role-play or scenario-based experiment was used to test the research hypotheses. In a 
role-play experiment, participants act out scripts, pictures or examples based on real-
life situations (Yardley-Matwiejczuk 1997). In the information security field, the 
role-play experiment method has been used in several phishing email studies (e.g., 
(Dhamija et al. 2006; Downs et al. 2007; Furnell 2007; Pattinson et al. 2012; Sheng 
et al. 2010)) in which participants were presented with images of emails and then 
asked how they would respond if they received such an email.  
The present study used a role-play experimental questionnaire by presenting 
Facebook profiles that represented the source characteristics under study 
(manipulated variables) and asking the participants to rate each profile based on the 
information provided. In order to enhance the participants’ perceptions regarding the 
particular characteristics under study, the presentation of each profile included a 
scenario that provided the participants with extra information about the owner of the 
profile. A 10-point semantic differential scale was used to measure the items related 
to the credibility dimensions. This is a type of rating scale designed to measure the 
connotative meaning of concepts (Garland 1990). This type of scale has been widely 
employed in source credibility studies (e.g., (Burgoon 1976; Eisend 2006; Gaziano 
and McGrath 1986; McCroskey et al. 1974)).  
To measure susceptibility to social engineering victimisation, the participants 
were presented with five social engineering requests (high-risk actions). These 
requests were similar to the real tricks used on Facebook, such as Koobface, Zeus, 
Likejacking, Facebook Black and Who-Viewed-Your-Profile attacks (Baltazar et al. 
2009; Baumhof and Shipp 2012; Clark 2013; Sadeghian et al. 2013; Thomas and 
 196 Chapter 6: Research Methodology with Emphasis on Quantitative Phase 
Nicol 2010). Two additional low-risk requests were added to the role-play 
questionnaire in order to examine the impact of the manipulated variables on those 
low-risk requests, and to see whether the impact of the variables on the low-risk 
requests was different to the impact on high-risk social engineering requests. For 
example, instead of providing the URL “http://www.facebooc.com/login/” (which is 
a clearly fake website and considered to be high risk), the role-play used the URL 
“http://bit.ly/anyw” (which is not always an attacking attempt, and therefore 
considered to be low risk).  
As presented in Table 6.1, persuasive messages were added to the requests in 
order to encourage the participants to respond to (accept) the requests. Since the aim 
of the role-play was to study the impact of the characteristics of the source who sent 
the trick and not the trick itself, the messages were written in such a way that the 
participants would need to rely more on the source of the message. For example, the 
messages included phrases such as “I have checked this myself”, “I recommend that 
you download it” and so on. For each profile shown to them, the participants were 
asked to indicate how they would respond to the requests received from that profile. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used to measure the participants’ consent intentions and 
behavioural responses toward the social engineering requests, with a rating system of 
“Definitely yes”=5, “Very probably yes”=4, “Probably yes”=3, “Very probably 
no”=2, and “Definitely no”=1 (Albaum 1997). All the items were developed and 
validated using a pilot study, as explained in relation to the scale development and 
testing (Section 6.7). Table 6.1 shows the specifications of the social engineering 
items that were used in the role-play experiment, and Appendix J presents examples 
of the designed messages. 
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Table 6.1 Social Engineering Requests/Tricks and Persuasive Messages. 
Social engineering tricks Persuasive messages Risk 
Clickjacking through a video. The message (post) presents 
a video of “great white shark tears a captain apart in 
seconds” while the actual URL is: http://bit.ly/anyw  
Note: The mouse pointer is positioned on the video and the 
actual URL destination is displayed in the status bar as it 
would be if users prepared to click on the link on their own 
computer. 
Most people can't watch this 
video for more than 25 
seconds. It is really 
unbelievable! 
Low 
Clickjacking with executable file. The message offers a 
file that contains leaked government documents, while the 
actual extension is (.exe). The actual URL displayed in the 
status bar is: http://128.2.72.235/documents.jpg.exe 
I’m deeply shocked. And, 
what's more, ashamed! Check 
out these recently leaked 
government documents.  
High 
Phishing through a post offering free cell phone minutes. 
Yeah! Finally I found 
something for free. I received 
my minutes, and now you can 
too! 
High 
Downloading Who-Viewed-Your-Profile 
application/software. 
It is safe and works very well. I 
have checked this myself. I 
recommend that you download 
it. 
High 
Spam or malware, by giving permission/access to the site 
before it allows the user to see a video. 
Check this out. I watched it at 
least 20 times. 
High 
Phishing through a message from Facebook that threatens 
account suspension. The link in the message is written as: 
https://www.facebook.com/ while the actual URL displayed 
in the status bar is: http://www.facebooc.com/login/ 
Facebook started closing fake 
and duplicate accounts. Update 
your account soon. This is 
serious, I lost my old account 
:(  
High 
Clickjacking through a message containing a link that is 
written on the message as: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=quali&fea 
while the actual URL displayed in the status bar is: 
http://bit.ly/uei2 
Take a look at this video that I 
found of (guess who?) – it’s 
hilarious !  
Low 
 
6.5 Manipulated Variables Using a Fractional Factorial Design 
Fractional factorial design (Gunst and Mason 2009) was used to design and 
manipulate the variables under study. This design allows researchers to minimise the 
number of experiments in order to best utilise the participants’ time and effort, and it 
provides a good way to calculate the effect of each source characteristic individually 
and interactively with others (Dey 1985).  
The purpose of the experiment is to predict the susceptibility to social 
engineering by introducing a change of the preconditions or the predictor (which are 
the source characteristics in this study). Generally speaking, there are two main 
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experimental designs that can be used, the full factorial design and the fractional 
factorial design. Full factorial design is expressed using the notation L f , where L is 
the number of levels of each factor under investigation, and f is the number of factors 
under investigation (Gunst and Mason 2009). If only two levels for every factor are 
used, the number of experiments required for this study, using full factorial design, is 
52 experiments (25  = 32, for the source characteristics related to the dimension of 
sincerity + 23  = 8, for the source characteristics related to the dimension of 
competence + 22  = 4, for the source characteristics related to the dimension of 
attraction + 23  = 8, for the source characteristics related to the dimension of 
worthiness).  
Although the full factorial design may provide more accurate result, the 
number of experiments required for the full factorial is very large. The solution to 
this problem is to use only a subset (e.g., ½, ¼, etc.) of the experiments specified by 
the full factorial design, which is known as fraction factorial design. Fractional 
factorial design is expressed using the notation L f-p , where p is the number of 
generators, in which interactions are confounded (Gunst and Mason 2009). For 
example, rather than the 32 experiments that would be required for the source 
characteristics related to the dimension of sincerity ( 25 ) using full factorial design, it 
requires only eight ( 25-2 ) experiments using fractional factorial design.  
Fractional factorial design uses various strategies that ensure an appropriate 
choice of experiments, and the purpose is to best utilise the participants’ time and 
effort. Minitab 17.0 was used to suggest the experiments needed for this study. 
Minitab is a software application that states which main effects and interactions are 
confounded with an alias structure. Based on the hypotheses being examined, and 
using fractional factorial design, only 20 different Facebook profiles needed to be 
 Chapter 6: Research Methodology with Emphasis on Quantitative Phase 199 
designed to examine the effectiveness of every variable of the 13 Facebook-specific 
source characteristics that influence users to judge an attacker as credible. As 
presented in Table 6.2, each profile represented one experiment, and each experiment 
was a combination of a low level (represented by (-)) or high level (represented by 
(+)) of the 13 source characteristics under study. Table 6.2 shows the characteristics 
for every profile that was shown to the participants in every experiment. For 
example, Experiment 1 (Facebook Profile 1) included a low number of friends, a 
high number of common friends, a high number of posts, a different belief (religion) 
than the participant, and a nickname as a profile identifier.  
Table 6.2 The design of the experiments based on fractional factorial design. 
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Profile/Experiment 1 - + + - -         
Profile/Experiment 2 - - - - +         
Profile/Experiment 3 - + - + -         
Profile/Experiment 4 - - + + +         
Profile/Experiment 5 + - + - -         
Profile/Experiment 6 + + - - +         
Profile/Experiment 7 + - - + -         
Profile/Experiment 8 + + + + +         
Profile/Experiment 9      + + +      
 Profile/Experiment 10      - - +      
Profile/Experiment 11      + - -      
Profile/Experiment 12      - + -      
Profile/Experiment 13         + +    
Profile/Experiment 14         - -    
Profile/Experiment 15         - +    
Profile/Experiment 16         + -    
Profile/Experiment 17           + + + 
Profile/Experiment 18           - - + 
Profile/Experiment 19           + - - 
Profile/Experiment 20           - + - 
 
For the rest of the source characteristics that were not related to the design of a 
particular experiment, such as “good looking” within Experiment 1, these were made 
as average as possible. To estimate the effect of one characteristic (manipulated 
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variable), the variance and effect size for the corresponding high level group were 
calculated and compared with the low level group. For example, to calculate the 
effect of the variable “number of friends”, the answers from Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 
4 were calculated as one component (representing the low level group), and this was 
compared with the answers from Experiments 5, 6, 7 and 8 as another component 
(representing the high level group).  
6.6 Selection of Representative Characters 
For some source characteristics under study, such as sexual compatibility, the 
role-play experiment used different profiles that were representative of men and 
women. Part of the challenge in this stage was the difficulty of choosing people who 
were well known to the participants and who represented some of the experiments in 
the design well. For example, it was necessary to find: a celebrity who would be 
perceived by the majority of participants as being wealthy and possessing a high 
level of qualifications (Experiment 9); a celebrity who would be perceived by the 
majority of participants as having a low level of wealth and a low level of 
qualifications (Experiment 12); a person who would be perceived by the majority of 
participants as having good looks (Experiments 13 and 16); a person who would be 
perceived to have a high level of sexual compatibility for the majority of males 
(Experiments 17 and 20, when the participant was male); and so on for the rest of the 
experiments. The same difficulty was faced while preparing Experiments 13 to 16, 
for which it was necessary to find posts that would be perceived as impressive or 
well-written and other posts that would be perceived as badly written.  
The task of selecting the characters and posts to be used in the profiles was 
done in two steps and using two different groups of participants. The first group was 
asked to name up to three people for every experiment. For example, the participants 
 Chapter 6: Research Methodology with Emphasis on Quantitative Phase 201 
were asked to name a celebrity who was wealthy and had a high level of educational 
qualifications (Experiment 9). The first group consisted of 93 participants (44 
women and 49 men). This task was performed in a computer lab where Internet 
access was provided to the participants to help them search, choose and take 
snapshots, and then email their suggestions to the researcher. The names that were 
most frequently suggested by the first group were provided to the second group of 
participants who were asked to rate every individual based on the characteristics 
under study. The second group consisted of 89 participants (46 women and 43 men). 
The same procedures were performed in regard to choosing the posts that represented 
low and high levels of writing skills. The characters that were selected for the 
profiles may be identifiable by their names or photos, and the terms of permission 
and ethical approval restrict the full reproduction of the profiles in this thesis. Table 
6.2 includes the non-identifiable specifications of the 20 Facebook profiles designed 
for the role-play experiments. 
6.7 Scale Development and Testing 
6.7.1 Pool of Sample Items 
As suggested by Cronbach and Thorndike (1971), the first step in the 
measurement process involves delimiting the domain of the construct and generating 
sample items. For validity purposes in the present study, representative items were 
first drawn from a universal pool including academic literature and relevant trade 
press articles. The review of the literature included studies regarding advertiser 
credibility, company credibility, seller credibility, corporate credibility, salesperson 
credibility, communicator credibility and spokesperson credibility (see supportive 
references in Table 6.3). Those studies have suggested a number of representative 
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items, which showed high loadings of factor analysis, for measuring the dimensions 
under study.  
The researchers involved in those studies provided their participants with a 
number of semantic differential items with which to rate the credibility of the sources 
under study. The resulting data were then combined into factors through factor 
analysis, and then the factors were interpreted as dimensions of credibility. While 
those studies provide items for the measurement of the first three dimensions under 
study (perceived sincerity, perceived competence, and perceived attraction), there is 
a lack of research in the literature regarding the fourth dimension of credibility, 
namely, perceived worthiness, which emerged as a new dimension in the first phase 
of this research. In order to identify items for the measurement of perceived 
worthiness, some items that have been used in the literature to measure related 
constructs were considered. Because different researchers use different names and 
expressions to describe the dimensions they have found, and in order to have 
loadings on identical items, all of the scales with high loadings on factors from those 
studies were included in the sample. 
Other potential items that had emerged from the first phase of this research 
were also added to the representative items drawn from the literature. The data from 
the interviews and the open-ended questionnaire responses helped in exploring 
additional potential items, especially for the dimension of perceived worthiness since 
it had not been previously measured as a dimension of credibility in the literature. 
These additional items had been repeatedly mentioned by the interviewees and open-
ended questionnaire participants during the first phase. Overall, the measurement 
process yielded 112 representative items, as presented in Table 6.3. 
 Chapter 6: Research Methodology with Emphasis on Quantitative Phase 203 
Table 6.3 Sample Items before Refinement 
Sample Items 
Supportive 
References 
 
Believable/unbelievable; Unobtrusive/obtrusive; Exciting/dull; 
Sincere/insincere; Powerful/powerless; Skilled/unskilled; 
Constructive/destructive; True/false; Honest/dishonest; Organized/chaotic; 
Concerned/not concerned; Appealing/ unappealing; Just/ unjust; 
Clear/unclear; Unselfish/selfish; Qualified/unqualified; Involved/indifferent; 
Attractive/ unattractive; Frank/reserved; Simple/complex; 
Accurate/inaccurate; Resolute/hesitant; Active/passive; Open minded/closed 
minded; Appropriate/ inappropriate; Right/wrong;  Practical/impractical; 
Authentic/not authentic; Unbiased/biased; Expressive /inexpressive; 
Positive/negative; Dynamic/static ; Competent/incompetent; Good/bad ; 
Nice/awful; Experienced/ inexperienced; Trained/ untrained; 
Helpful/unhelpful; Useful/useless; Likely/unlikely; Profound/superficial; 
Friendly/ unfriendly; Liked/disliked; Important/unimportant; 
Objective/subjective; Smart/stupid; Trustworthy/not trustworthy; Reliable/ 
unreliable; Realistic/ unrealistic; Dignified/undignified; Fair/unfair; 
Interesting/uninteresting; Pleasant/unpleasant; Reasonable/ unreasonable; 
Professional/unprofessional; Natural/artificial; Expert/inexpert; 
Comprehending/ uncomprehending; Informative/ uninformative; 
Successful/ unsuccessful; Rational/irrational; Founded/unfounded; 
Unprejudiced/ prejudiced; Convincing/not convincing; 
Intelligent/unintelligent; Sociable/unsociable; Cheerful/gloomy; Tense/ 
relaxed; Sinful/virtuous; Good-natured/ irritable; Intellectual/narrow; 
Outgoing/withdrawn; Meek/aggressive; Calm/ Anxious; Verbal/quiet; 
Logical/illogical; Confident/lacks confidence; Extroverted/introverted; 
Timid/bold; Energetic/ tired; Composed/excitable; Cruel/kind; Talkative/ 
silent; Impressive/ unimpressive; Adventurous/ cautious;  Gainful/ not 
gainful; Rewarding/ unrewarding;  Notable/not notable ; 
Satisfying/unsatisfying ; Weighty/not weighty; Admirable/ not admirable;  
Advisable/ not advisable; Sensible/not sensible; Influential/not influential; 
Significant/ insignificant; Essential/not essential; Vital/not vital; 
Prominent/not prominent; Commendable/not commendable; Eligible/not 
eligible; Beneficial/unbeneficial; Worthwhile/worthless; Deserving/ 
undeserving; Meaningful/meaningless; Advantageous/ disadvantageous; 
Profitable/unprofitable; Valuable/invaluable; Laudable/not Laudable; 
Safe/dangerous; Fake-account/ Real-account; Passionate/ dispassionate; 
strong/weak 
 
(McCroskey 1966); 
(Markham 1968); 
(Whitehead Jr 1968); 
(Berlo et al. 1969); 
(Baudhuin and Davis 
1972); (Tuppen 1974); 
(McCroskey et al. 
1974); (McCroskey 
and Jenson 1975); 
(Singletary 1976); 
(McCain et al. 1977); 
(Bergh et al. 1981); 
(Ohanian 1990); 
(White 1990); (Eisend 
2006); (Corina 2006); 
(Bowers and Phillips 
1967); (Falcione 
1974); (Tuppen 1974); 
(Mosier and Ahlgren 
1981); (Salwen 1987); 
(Newell and 
Goldsmith 2001); 
(Ayeh et al. 2013); 
(Lee 1978); (Gaziano 
and McGrath 1986); 
(Meyer 1988) ; 
(Johnston and 
Warkentin 2012); and 
our previous 
qualitative studies: 
(Algarni et al. 2014a) 
and (Algarni et al. 
2014b). 
   
6.7.2 Refinement of the Item Sample 
 The sample items were assessed using the Delphi method. The Delphi method 
is a structured, systematic and interactive technique, which relies on a panel of 
experts. Those experts evaluate items under study in two or more rounds. After each 
round, the experts are encouraged to refine their earlier items in light of the replies of 
other members of the panel. It is believed that, during this process, the range of the 
items will reduce and the group will converge towards the correct items (Coates 
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1975; Dalkey and Helmer 1963). During the scale development and testing of this 
reseach, five information systems scholars were asked to evaluate the items and 
make any necessary changes in order to eliminate repetitive, non-user-oriented and 
ambiguous items.  
The Delphi technique was applied for the four dimensions; that is, it was also 
applied for the three dimensions for which there were measurement items in the 
literature, since they have been measured for different purposes, such as marketing 
and teaching, and in contexts other than Facebook. After three evaluation rounds, 35 
items remained in the list: nine items for the dimension of sincerity, seven for the 
dimension of competence, eight for the dimension of attractiveness, and 11 for the 
dimension of worthiness. The information systems scholars deleted some items that 
they suggested were unrelated to social engineering-based tricks or not related to the 
context of Facebook (such as “right: wrong” or “natural/artificial”). They also 
deleted some items that can be categorised under more than one dimension, such as 
“nice/awful”, which was categorised under the dimension of attraction during 
coding. Table 6.4 shows the representative items for every dimension after applying 
the Delphi refinement process.  
A similar technique was used to develop the social engineering questions and 
tricks that measured susceptibility to social engineering victimisation on Facebook. 
Three information security scholars were asked to evaluate the questions and make 
any necessary changes. After three evaluation rounds, using the Delphi method, the 
resulting social engineering questions were chosen as the measurement of 
susceptibility to social engineering victimisation on Facebook. 
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Table 6.4 Sample Items after Refinement 
Dimension Sample Items After Refinement Supportive References 
Perceived 
Sincerity 
Honest/ Dishonest; Sincere/Insincere; 
Believable/ Unbelievable; Trustworthy/ 
Not Trustworthy; Realistic/ Unrealistic; 
Fake-account/ Real-account; 
Dangerous/ Safe; Authentic/ Not 
Authentic; Unbiased/ Biased 
(Markham 1968); (Whitehead Jr 1968); (Berlo et 
al. 1969); (Falcione 1974); (Tuppen 1974); 
(Singletary 1976); (Lee 1978); (Bergh et al. 
1981); (Mosier and Ahlgren 1981); (Gaziano and 
McGrath 1986); (Meyer 1988) ; (Ohanian 1990); 
(White 1990); (Newell and Goldsmith 2001); 
(Eisend 2006); (Corina 2006); (Ayeh et al. 
2013); and our qualitative phase. 
Perceived 
Competence 
 
Professional/ Unprofessional; 
Competent/ Incompetent;; Successful/ 
Unsuccessful; Skilled/ Unskilled; 
Qualified/ unqualified; Expert/ 
Inexpert; Powerful/ Powerless 
(Bowers and Phillips 1967); (Markham 1968); 
(Whitehead Jr 1968); (Berlo et al. 1969); 
(Falcione 1974); (Tuppen 1974); (McCroskey et 
al. 1974); (McCroskey and Jenson 1975); 
(Singletary 1976); (McCain et al. 1977); (Bergh 
et al. 1981); (Mosier and Ahlgren 1981); 
(Salwen 1987); (Ohanian 1990); (Newell and 
Goldsmith 2001); (Eisend 2006); (Corina 2006); 
(Ayeh et al. 2013); and our qualitative phase. 
Perceived 
Attraction 
Dynamic/ Static; Expressive/ 
Inexpressive; Appealing/Unappealing; 
Attractive/ Unattractive; Exciting/ Dull; 
Interesting/ Uninteresting; Cheerful/ 
Gloomy; Impressive/ Unimpressive 
(McCroskey 1966); (Markham 1968); 
(Whitehead Jr 1968); (Berlo et al. 1969); 
(Baudhuin and Davis 1972); (Baudhuin and 
Davis 1972); (Tuppen 1974); (McCroskey et al. 
1974); (McCroskey and Jenson 1975); 
(Singletary 1976); (McCain et al. 1977); (Bergh 
et al. 1981); (Ohanian 1990); (White 1990); 
(Eisend 2006); (Corina 2006); and our 
qualitative phase. 
Perceived 
Worthiness 
Beneficial/ Unbeneficial; Worthwhile/ 
Worthless; Deserving/ Undeserving; 
Important/ Unimportant; Advantageous/ 
Disadvantageous; Profitable/ 
Unprofitable; Useful/ Useless; 
Valuable/ Invaluable; Laudable/ Not 
Laudable; Eligible/ Not Eligible; Vital/ 
Not Vital 
Most of these items have been obtained 
from our previous qualitative studies. 
 
6.7.3 Translation 
Although the target population (participants) used English as a business 
language (or as the language of tuition for students), they spoke Arabic as a first 
language. Thus, for increased validity, the scale items, questions, scenarios and 
profiles were presented in the experimental questionnaire in both English and Arabic. 
An effective translation method is essential for developing valid scale instruments. 
Following the recommendation made by many researchers (e.g., (Brislin 1970; Cha 
et al. 2007; Su and Parham 2002)), the experimental questionnaire was translated 
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into the Arabic language using the translation and back-translation technique. The 
purpose of this technique is to ensure the accuracy of the translation. 
The task of translation and back-translation was conducted in three main steps. 
Firstly, a certified translator made a translation of the experimental questionnaire 
from English to Arabic. Secondly, a different certified translator made a translation 
of the Arabic (from the first step) back into English. Finally, the translated 
experimental questionnaire (from the second step) was reviewed and compared to the 
original English version to make sure that no change in meaning had occurred. Based 
on the result of this task, a few words in the Arabic version were modified, and the 
final Arabic version was presented along with the English version during the 
experiment. The task of translation was done with the assistance of the Translation 
Department of the Research Centre, Institute of Public Administration, Saudi Arabia. 
6.7.4 Testing the Items using a Pilot Study 
A pilot study was conducted to test the measurement scale before conducting 
the main study. The purpose of the pilot study was to validate the measurement scale 
for every dimension of source credibility. The experimental design and procedures 
for the pilot study were designed to be similar to those of the main experiment; 
however, the participant selection strategy was different. The participants of the pilot 
study were selected on the basis of convenience, willingness and ability to 
participate. 
In total, 120 participants completed the pilot study. This was considered to be a 
good number, since it constituted 2,400 profile observations (20 different profiles for 
every participant). Around 70% of the participants were undergraduate students and 
the remainder were employees; 60% were male and 40% were female. All of the 
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participants in the pilot study were from Saudi Arabia. This was a necessary criterion 
for selection because the characters (e.g., celebrities) used as experimental treatments 
were relevant to (chosen based on) Saudi culture. All of the participants of the pilot 
study were approached through the Brisbane-based Saudi Students Association, the 
members of which are current or former undergraduate or postgraduate students of 
universities located in Brisbane or the Gold Coast.  
After the data collection from the pilot study was completed, the reliability 
coefficients of the scales using Cronbach’s alpha were tested first for perceived 
sincerity, perceived competence, perceived attraction and perceived worthiness. The 
reliability tests suggested that screening the data would improve the reliability levels. 
Therefore, the collected data were screened by discarding items that showed a low 
loading. Then, the semantic differential data were submitted to principal component 
analysis and varimax rotation. 
 An eigenvalue of 1.0 was established as the criterion for the termination of 
factor extraction. For an item to be considered loaded on a resulting factor, a loading 
of 0.60 or higher was required, with no loading of 0.40 or higher on any other factor. 
After several screening attempts, 29 items remained in the pool. However, for the 
purpose of the main experiment of this research, only the top six items for every 
dimension were chosen, as presented in Table 6.5. Appendex L presents the full 
results of the factor analysis for the pilot study, which contains the four dimensions 
with their corresponding items.   
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Table 6.5 Measurement Items after Pilot Study 
Sincerity Competence Attraction Worthiness 
Honest/ 
Dishonest 
Professional/ 
Unprofessional 
Attractive/ 
Unattractive 
Worthwhile/ 
Worthless 
Sincere/ 
Insincere 
Competent/ 
Incompetent 
Expressive/ 
Inexpressive 
Advantageous/ 
Disadvantageous 
Trustworthy/ 
Not Trustworthy 
Qualified/ 
Unqualified 
Appealing/ 
Unappealing 
Beneficial/ 
Unbeneficial 
Safe/ 
Dangerous 
Powerful/ 
Powerless 
Interesting/ 
Uninteresting 
Useful/ 
Useless 
Believable/ 
Unbelievable 
Expert/ 
Inexpert 
Cheerful/ 
Gloomy 
Eligible/ 
Not Eligible 
Real-account/ 
Fake-account 
Successful/ 
Unsuccessful 
Exciting/ 
Dull 
Valuable/ 
Invaluable 
 
6.8 Approach and Procedures 
After verifying the measurement scale for the dimensions of source credibility 
and susceptibility to social engineering victimisation using the pilot study, the main 
experiment was conducted. A letter of invitation for participation was sent to various 
organisations asking the directors if they would be willing to disseminate the letter to 
their personnel. In order to avoid sample bias, ensure variation in the demographics 
(e.g., gender, age, education, security knowledge/awareness, and interest) and 
estimate the non-response error, three organisations were selectively recruited.  
The letter of invitation was distributed to the participants by email in two 
rounds. Twitter and Facebook were also utilised in a third round (the invitation was 
posted on the three organisations’ pages/accounts, with the clear specification that 
the participants had to be from these organisations). Around 65% of the final pool of 
participants responded after the first round of recruitment (using email), 20% 
responded after the second round (using email), and 15% responded after the third 
round (using Facebook and Twitter). The first organisation operated in the petroleum 
industry, the second organisation operated in education and training, and the third 
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organisation operated in electricity production. All of the organisations were located 
in Saudi Arabia.  
As suggested by (Dillman 2011; Hair et al. 2006a; Porter and Whitcomb 2003), 
a lottery approach was used in this study. The lottery approach is a technique which 
offers participants a reward (e.g., a prize) in an effort to increase the response rate 
and the time taken to complete the questionnaire, and to reduce non-response bias. In 
the present study, in order to encourage more people to participate and to screen out 
those participants who would not pay attention to the questions, the participant were 
offered an amount equivalent to US$5 or an entry in a prize draw for the chance to 
win an iPhone 6. This reward was made available to those participants who answered 
five qualifying questions (which could be answered correctly by a careful reading of 
the profiles’ content and the provided scenarios). To avoid multiple participation 
from the same participant, the online questionnaire was designed so that a participant 
could only engage in one response session from a single device. Another survey was 
developed to collect the identities of the participants who chose to enter the prize 
draw. In order to ensure anonymity, the data on the participants’ identities were held 
separately from the experimental data. 
As suggested by Posner (1978), to increase response validity, the 20 profiles 
and their corresponding questions were displayed to the participants in random order. 
Moreover, in order to maximise the response rates, whilst minimising errors, the 
design of the questionnaire was guided by the following procedures suggested by 
Dillman (2011): 
1. Add an introductory letter to explain the research team, number of questions, 
and the expected time needed to complete the experiment. 
2. Show positive regard to the participants and thank them in advance 
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3. Use appropriate, simple and specific language 
4. Make the questionnaire interesting by designing the layout well and 
structuring the order of the questions in logical way 
5. Notify the respondents in advance and give them enough time to gain their 
cooperation 
6. Make it convenient for the respondents to complete the questionnaire. 
In total, 377 participants completed the entire study (after the required 
screening was performed, as explained in the next chapter). This constituted 7,540 
profile observations for the required 20 experiments. The overall response rate was 
51% (43%, 63% and 47% for the first, second and third organisations, respectively). 
While 377 participants completed the entire study, 37 participants started the 
experiment but did not complete it. This rate is considered to be average and similar 
to the rates reported in the majority of information systems research (Sivo et al. 
2006). Table 6.6 shows a descriptive summary about the participants of the pilot 
study and the main experiment. Detailed profiles of the participants are presented in 
section 7.2, in the next chapter. 
Table 6.6 Summary of the Participants of the Pilot Study and the Main Experiment 
Pilot Study Main Experiment 
Number of valid participants: 120 Participants Number of valid participants: 377 Participants 
Number of observations: 2,400 profile 
observations (20 different profiles for every 
participant) 
Number of observations: 7,540 profile 
observations 
(20 different profiles for every participant) 
Gender: 60% Male, 40% Female Gender: 66% Male, 34% Female 
Nationality: Saudis Nationality: Saudis 
Approached through: The Brisbane-based Saudi 
Students Association 
Approached through: (43%, 63% and 47% for the 
first, second and third organisations, respectively).  
Recruitment: 60% after the first round of 
recruitment (using email), 40% after the second 
round (using Twitter) 
Recruitment: 65% after the first round of 
recruitment (using email), 20% after the second 
round (using email), and 15% after the third round 
(using Facebook and Twitter). 
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Although some researchers suggest asking participants about their 
demographics at the end of a questionnaire, it was necessary in the present study to 
ask some demographic questions at the beginning of the questionnaire in order to 
examine the impact of some of the manipulated variables, such as sexual 
compatibility, celebrity and common belief, which varied based on the participants’ 
demographics. Therefore, the participants were asked to provide their basic 
demographic information first (such as age and gender), and then specific profiles 
were displayed to them based on their demographics. The rest of the demographic 
questions were asked at the end of the questionnaire. In similar role-play studies 
reported in the literature (e.g.,(Sheng et al. 2010)) there was no apparent difference 
between asking participants about their demographics at the beginning and at the end 
of the questionnaire. 
The demographic information was provided through multiple choice answers.  
The demographic questions were basic and straightforward, except the information 
related to the participant’s security knowledge (security awareness level). For the 
security knowledge, the questionnaire asked five questions, adapted from Sheng et 
al. (2010). The five questions asked the participants to choose the best definition for 
five terms related to computer security, namely, cookie, phishing, spyware, virus and 
spam. The answer for each term was chosen from the following list: 
1. Something that protects your computer from unauthorised communication 
outside the network. 
2. Something that watches your computer and sends that information over the 
Internet. [the correct answer for “spyware”] 
3. Something websites put on your computer so you don’t have to type in the 
same information the next time you visit. [cookie] 
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4. Something put on your computer without your permission, that changes the 
way your computer works. [virus] 
5. An email trying to trick you into giving your sensitive information to thieves. 
[phishing] 
6. Sending the same message indiscriminately to a large number of Internet 
users, usually to advertise something. [spam] 
7. Other software that can protect your computer. 
8. Other software that can hurt your computer. 
9. I have seen this word before but I don’t know what it means for computers. 
10. I have never seen this word before. 
11. Decline to answer. 
12. Other (please specify). 
 
The demographics that were measured were those that have been found to be 
important in email phishing studies (as discussed in Chapter 2) such as gender, age, 
gender, education, frequency of Facebook usage, number of friends, time since 
joining Facebook, belief, relationship status and security knowledge. Key Survey 8.4 
was used for the experimental questionnaire design and online data collection, and 
SPSS Version 21.0 and AMOS Version 22.0 were used in the data analysis. 
6.9 Structural Equation Modelling 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) is a multistep technique used to evaluate 
the validity of a theoretical model, by evaluating the relationships between the 
constructs in such a model, while taking into account measurement errors during the 
statistical analysis of data (Hair et al. 2006b). SEM is considered to be an extension 
of statistical multivariate methods such as regression analysis. Some researchers 
(e.g., (Crockett 2012)) suggest that SEM should be involved from the model 
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specification stage while a researcher hypothesises the relationships based on related 
theories or previous research. Table 6.7 presents the main steps involved in SEM as 
suggested by Crockett (2012).  
SEM is a confirmatory approach rather than an exploratory approach; that is, it 
takes into account the observed and unobserved variables, and it gives explicit 
estimates of the measurement errors’ parameters (Hair et al. 2006b). As the 
theoretical model in this research was explored and developed in the first phase of 
the research, the use of SEM involved three main tasks. The first task was assessing 
the data requirements for SEM, which include: there is a limited number of missing 
values, the data are free of extreme outliers, the data are not distorted significantly by 
the different opinions of particular groups, and the assumptions of distribution 
normality and linearity are upheld (Hair et al. 2006b). 
Table 6.7 Steps for Conducting SEM Analysis as Suggested by Crockett (2012) 
SEM Step Description of Step 
Model specification This step involves the specification of a theoretical model that utilizes applicable, related 
theory and research to determine the latent and observed variables of interest and the 
relationships among them. In particular, researcher must specify a measurement and 
structural model. A path diagram can be constructed to visually represent the hypothesized 
relationships among variable in the theoretical model 
Model 
identification 
This step helps the researcher to determine whether the specified model is capable of 
producing actual results that can be estimated in SEM analysis. Models must be identified 
and able to generate a unique solution and parameter estimates. 
Model estimation This step involves the use of an iterative procedure (i.e., fitting function) to generate the 
theoretical covariance matrix P, as well as minimize the differences between the estimated 
theoretical covariance matrixPand the observed covariance matrix S. Maximum likelihood 
(ML) and generalized least squares (GLS) are the most commonly used fitting functions 
Model testing This step involves the analysis of both the measurement and structural models in order to 
determine (a) the global fit of the entire model, and (b) the fit of individual model 
parameters. Multiple indices of fit (i.e., absolute, comparative, and parsimonious) should 
be analyzed to determine the degree to which the theoretical model fits the sample data. 
The w2 difference test can also be used when working with nested models to compare the 
plausibility of the theoretical model to viable alternative models. It should be noted that 
the measurement model must yield a good fit to the data before the structural model can be 
analyzed 
Model modification The final step involves using theory trimming or the addition of new parameters to attempt 
to improve the theoretical model’s fit to the data. Researchers should be advised to model 
modification is an exploratory procedure and is based on the sample data instead of the 
extant literature. Respecified models will need to be cross-validated with a new sample 
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The second task was validating the measurement model, which was done 
mainly through confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The main purpose of CFA is to 
confirm whether the collected data appropriately fit the proposed measurement. This 
is done by examining whether the measurement items (factor indicators) are loaded 
on the constructs (latent variables) in the direction expected (Crockett 2012).  
The third task was examining the fit of the structural model. The structural 
model assessment included examining the standardised path coefficients of the 
relationships included in the model, and examining the model fit indices (Hair et al. 
2006b). The details of these tasks are presented along with the results of the SEM 
analysis in the next chapter.  
6.10 Ethical Issues 
The role-play experiment conducted in this study involved the active 
participation of human subjects. The activities were categorised as low risk in 
accordance with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving 
Humans. An application for the conduct of low-risk research involving human 
participants was approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at Queensland 
University of Technology (approval number: 1300000371). Appendix M presents the 
ethical approval for the role-play experiment, and Appendix N presents the 
information sheet for participants in the role-play experiment. 
6.11 Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter explained the methodology of the second (quantitative) phase. It 
explained the objectives of the second phase, discussed the use of the role-play 
experiment, and justified why this approach was considered appropriate for this 
research. This chapter also presented the role-play design, the procedures of the scale 
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development and testing, the details regarding statistical analysis, and the ethical 
issues involved with conducting the second phase of this research. The next chapter 
presents the results of the second phase, along with further discussion about the 
statistical methods used and the related assumptions. 
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 Quantitative Phase Results  
7.1 Overview 
This chapter presents the results of the second (quantitative) phase. It starts by 
presenting a profile of the research participants. The steps taken in data screening 
and preparation are then discussed, followed by an overview of the exploratory factor 
analysis and the assessment of the reliability of the measurement. The chapter then 
presents the CFA procedure. The hypotheses testing is presented then, followed by 
the demographics analysis, the structural model fit assessment and testing mediation 
effects. As this chapter is dedicated to the presentation of the results of the second 
phase, there is only a brief discussion of the results. However, the detailed discussion 
about the results is presented in the next chapter. 
7.2 Profile of Participants 
The participants who completed the role-play study represented diverse 
demographics, including both genders (Table 7.1) and a variety of security 
knowledge levels (Table 7.2), ages (Table 7.3), relationship statuses (Table 7.4), time 
elapsed since joining Facebook (Table 7.5), frequency of Facebook usage (Table 
7.6), number of friends (Table 7.7) and education (Table 7.8). 
Table 7.1 Participants’ Gender 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Female 127 33.7 33.7 33.7 
 Male 
250 66.3 66.3 100.0 
 Total 377 100.0 100.0  
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Table 7.2 Participants’ Security Knowledge/Awareness Level 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 1.00 Very Low 47 12.5 12.5 12.5 
 2.00 Low 89 23.6 23.6 36.1 
 3.00 Medium  93 24.7 24.7 60.7 
 4.00 High 99 26.3 26.3 87.0 
 5.00 Very High 49 13.0 13.0 100.0 
 Total 377 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Table 7.3 Participants’ Age 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 18-25 Years 71 18.8 18.8 18.8 
 26-35 79 21.0 21.0 39.8 
 36-45 105 27.9 27.9 67.6 
 46-55 64 17.0 17.0 84.6 
 56 and Over 58 15.4 15.4 100.0 
 Total 377 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Table 7.4 Participants’ Status 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Married 48 12.7 12.7 12.7 
 Single 228 60.5 60.5 73.2 
 Unmarried Partners 39 10.3 10.3 83.6 
 Engaged 36 9.5 9.5 93.1 
 Divorced 26 6.9 6.9 100.0 
 Total 377 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Table 7.5 Participants’ Time Elapsed Since Joining Facebook 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 6 Months or Less 36 9.5 9.5 9.5 
 Over 6 Months, to 1 Year 90 23.9 23.9 33.4 
 Over 1 Year, to 2 Years 114 30.2 30.2 63.7 
 Over 2 Year, to 3 Years 83 22.0 22.0 85.7 
 More than 3 Years 54 14.3 14.3 100.0 
 Total 377 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Table 7.6 Participants’ Frequency of Facebook Usage 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 One Hour or Less Per Week 36 9.5 9.5 9.5 
 From 2 Hours to 5 Hours 41 10.9 10.9 20.4 
 Over 6 Hours, to 10 Hours 74 19.6 19.6 40.1 
 Over 11 Hours, to 15 Hours 76 20.2 20.2 60.2 
 Over 16 Hours, to 20 Hours 75 19.9 19.9 80.1 
 Over 20 Hours Per Week 75 19.9 19.9 100.0 
 Total 377 100.0 100.0  
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Table 7.7 Participants’ Number of Friends 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 0 - 20 Friends 7 1.9 1.9 1.9 
 21 - 100 Friends 74 19.6 19.6 21.5 
 101- 200 Friends 48 12.7 12.7 34.2 
 201- 300 Friends 57 15.1 15.1 49.3 
 301- 400 Friends 50 13.3 13.3 62.6 
 401- 500 Friends 37 9.8 9.8 72.4 
 501- 600 Friends 35 9.3 9.3 81.7 
 601- 1000 Friends 28 7.4 7.4 89.1 
 Over 1000 Friends 41 10.9 10.9 100.0 
 Total 377 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 7.8 Participants’ Educational Levels 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
High school of lower, and not 
currently studying Bachelor 
57 15.1 15.1 15.1 
 
Finished Bachelor or currently 
studying  Bachelor/ undergraduate 
174 46.2 46.2 61.3 
 
Finished Master or currently studying 
Master 
71 18.8 18.8 80.1 
 
Finished Doctorate or currently 
studying Doctorate 
75 19.9 19.9 100.0 
 Total 377 100.0 100.0  
 
7.3 Data Screening and Preparation 
The analysis started by assessing the data requirements for SEM, which 
include: the data have limited missing values; the data are free of extreme outliers; 
the data are not distorted significantly by the different opinions of particular groups; 
and the assumptions of distribution normality and linearity are upheld (Hair et al. 
2006b). 
7.3.1 Assessing the Normality 
Normality refers to the shape of the data distribution for a given variable (Hair 
et al. 2006b). Normality assessment is required in order to justify the use of specific 
statistical analysis methods. According to Hair et al. (2006b), normality assessment 
can be done visually or statistically. Statistical assessment was chosen in this study in 
order to avoid subjectivity. According to Stevens (2002), the data are normally 
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distributed if both skewness (having a mean not in the centre of the distribution)<2 
and kurtosis (which refers to the peakedness or flatness of a distribution)<7. As 
presented in Table 7.9, the assessment of the normality showed that the data 
collected in this study were normally distributed. 
Table 7.9 Assessing the Normality of the Distribution 
Dimensions/Factors Items/Variables Skewness Kurtosis 
Sincerity 
Honest/Dishonest  .697 .690 
Sincere/Insincere .719 .119 
Trustworthy/Not Trustworthy .759 .303 
Safe/Dangerous .686 -.026 
Believable/Unbelievable .684 .030 
Real Account/Fake Account .739 .298 
Competence 
Professional/Unprofessional .661 -.588 
Competent/Incompetent .608 -.641 
Qualified/Unqualified .630 -.616 
Powerful/Powerless .621 -.647 
Expert/Inexpert .648 -.614 
Successful/Unsuccessful .643 -.596 
Attraction 
Attractive/Unattractive .725 .102 
Expressive/Inexpressive .628 -.182 
Appealing/Unappealing .669 -.019 
Interesting/Uninteresting .587 -.196 
Cheerful/Gloomy .658 -.043 
Exciting/Dull .718 .110 
Worthiness 
Worthwhile/Worthless .562 .020 
Advantageous/Disadvantageous .576 .088 
Beneficial/Unbeneficial .533 -.009 
Useful/Useless .591 .122 
Eligible/Not Eligible .572 .090 
Valuable/Invaluable .561 -.049 
Social Engineering 
SE Request1 .273 -.108 
SE Request2 .280 -.004 
SE Request3 .244 -.134 
SE Request4 .281 -.041 
SE Request5 .273 -.076 
 
7.3.2 Assessing Missing Values 
It is common for data to have missing values, which can accrue due to many 
reasons such as data entry errors (Hair et al. 2006b). In this study, 37 of the 
participants started the experiment but did not complete it, resulting in significant 
missing values. Therefore, their responses were removed. The missing values were 
very low in the rest of the data (only 26 missing values), and the pattern of these 
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missing values was random. According to Hair et al. (2006b), if the number of 
missing values is less than 10%, any imputation method can be used. The series 
mean method was used in this study, which replaces the missing data with the mean 
of the entire series. 
7.3.3 Assessing Outliers 
Outliers are the values that are significantly and substantially different from the 
majority of other values in the data (Hair et al. 2006b). It is important for the data to 
be free of “extreme” outliers in order to avoid mean bias and an inflated standard 
deviation. Different methods are suggested in the literature for assessing outliers. 
This study used one of the most common statistical methods, suggested by Hoaglin 
et al. (1986), which assesses the outliers based on the data distribution. This method 
declares values to be outliers if they lie outside the interval: 
 
((Q1 - g(Q3 – Q1), Q3 + g(Q3 – Q1)) 
where Q1 is the lower side tail, Q3 is the upper side tail, and g is suggested to 
be 2.2 (Hoaglin et al. 1986). The lower and upper tails were computed using SPSS, 
where the lower tail was represented by 25 percentiles and the upper tail was 
represented by 75 percentiles. Considering that all the values ranged from 1 to 10 for 
the dimensions’ items, and ranged from 1 to 5 for the social engineering items, the 
collected data appeared to be free from extreme outliers, as presented in Table 7.10. 
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Table 7.10 Assessing Outliers 
Dimensions/Factors Items/Variables 
Percentiles 
Lowest Value Highest Value  
25  75  
Sincerity 
Honest/Dishonest 3.0000 5.0000 -1.4 9.4 
Sincere/Insincere 3.0000 6.0000 -3.6 12.6 
Trustworthy/Not Trustworthy 3.0000 6.0000 -3.6 12.6 
Safe/Dangerous 3.0000 6.0000 -3.6 12.6 
Believable/Unbelievable 3.0000 6.0000 -3.6 12.6 
Real Account/Fake Account 3.0000 6.0000 -3.6 12.6 
Competence 
Professional/Unprofessional 3.0000 6.0000 -3.6 12.6 
Competent/Incompetent 3.0000 6.0000 -3.6 12.6 
Qualified/Unqualified 3.0000 6.0000 -3.6 12.6 
Powerful/Powerless 3.0000 6.0000 -3.6 12.6 
Expert/Inexpert 3.0000 6.0000 -3.6 12.6 
Successful/Unsuccessful 3.0000 6.0000 -3.6 12.6 
Attraction 
Attractive/Unattractive 3.0000 5.0000 -1.4 9.4 
Expressive/Inexpressive 3.0000 6.0000 -3.6 12.6 
Appealing/Unappealing 3.0000 6.0000 -3.6 12.6 
Interesting/Uninteresting 3.0000 6.0000 -3.6 12.6 
Cheerful/Gloomy 3.0000 6.0000 -3.6 12.6 
Exciting/Dull 3.0000 6.0000 -3.6 12.6 
Worthiness 
Worthwhile/Worthless 4.0000 6.0000 -0.4 10.4 
Advantageous/Disadvantageous 3.0000 6.0000 -3.6 12.6 
Beneficial/Unbeneficial 4.0000 6.0000 -0.4 10.4 
Useful/Useless 4.0000 6.0000 -0.4 10.4 
Eligible/Not Eligible 4.0000 6.0000 -0.4 10.4 
Valuable/Invaluable 4.0000 6.0000 -0.4 10.4 
Social Engineering 
SE Request1 2.0000 3.0000 -0.2 5.2 
SE Request2 2.0000 3.0000 -0.2 5.2 
SE Request3 2.0000 3.0000 -0.2 5.2 
SE Request4 2.0000 3.0000 -0.2 5.2 
SE Request5 2.0000 3.0000 -0.2 5.2 
 
7.3.4 Assessing the Standard Deviation and the Mean 
Standard deviation is a measure for estimating the variation of a set of data. 
Estimating the variability of a set of data is useful in showing how well the mean 
represents the observed data. On the other hand, the standard error of the mean 
shows how well a particular sample represents the population (Hair et al. 2006b). As 
presented in Table 7.11, the values of the standard deviation and the standard errors 
of all the items were relatively small in this study when compared to the means. 
Therefore, it was reasonably concluded that the mean value can be used as a 
representative score for each variable. Moreover, the small values of the standard 
errors in this study showed that most of the observations’ means for the data 
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collected in this study were similar to the population mean. This suggested that the 
sample was sufficiently representative of the population.  
Table 7.11 Assessing Standard Deviation and Standard Error of the Mean 
Factor (Dimension) 
Properties 
Items 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error  
Sincerity 
 
Honest/Dishonest 7540 4.34 1.79 0.018 
Sincere/Insincere 7540  4.56 1.99 0.020 
Trustworthy/Not Trustworthy 7540 4.60 1.99 0.020 
Safe/Dangerous 7540  4.57 2.0 0.021 
Believable/Unbelievable 7540  4.58 2.0 0.021 
Real Account/Fake Account 7540  4.50 1.9 0.019 
Competence 
 
Professional/Unprofessional 7540  4.45 2.12 0.024 
Competent/Incompetent 7540  4.50 2.11 0.024 
Qualified/Unqualified 7540  4.43 2.13 0.025 
Powerful/Powerless 7540  4.51 2.12 0.024 
Expert/Inexpert 7540  4.46 2.14 0.024 
Successful/Unsuccessful 7540  4.43 2.15 0.024 
Attraction 
 
Attractive/Unattractive 7540  4.44 1.89 0.025 
Expressive/Inexpressive 7540  4.58 1.98 0.025 
Appealing/Unappealing 7540  4.81 1.93 0.024 
Interesting/Uninteresting 7540  4.64 1.95 0.024 
Cheerful/Gloomy 7540  4.57 1.94 0.024 
Exciting/Dull 7540  4.50 1.93 0.024 
Worthiness 
 
Worthwhile/Worthless 7540  5.04 1.95 0.019 
Advantageous/Disadvantageous 7540  4.81 1.96 0.020 
Beneficial/Unbeneficial 7540  5.12 1.94 0.020 
Useful/Useless 7540  4.99 1.90 0.020 
Eligible/Not Eligible 7540 4.98 1.91 0.021 
Valuable/Invaluable 7540  5.02 1.98 0.020 
Susceptibility to 
Social Engineering 
 
SE Request1 7540  2.71 0.68 0.007 
SE Request2 7540  2.72 0.69 0.007 
SE Request3 7540  2.70 0.69 0.008 
SE Request4 7540  2.70 0.68 0.007 
SE Request5 7540  2.72 0.68 0.007 
 
 
7.3.5 Assessing Scale Reliability 
Scale reliability was estimated for both the internal consistency and item-total 
correlations. Reliability of the internal consistency is the consistency of the scale 
scores even when the scale is administered multiple times (Creswell 2008). One of 
the most commonly used technique to assess the reliability of the internal 
consistency is the Cronbach (or coefficient) alpha. Creswell (2008) suggests that 
Cronbach’s alpha is an appropriate measure of reliability if the scale is metric, such 
as the Likert scale used in this study. 
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 In fact, Likert scale can be treated in behaviour research as categorical or 
metric (Dittrich et al. 2007). In this study, Likert scale is treated as metric. The main 
purpose of using Cronbach’s alpha is to assess the internal consistency between the 
measurement items, and it is the most frequently used method to assess the reliability 
of Likert-type scale. As Gliem and Gliem (2003) stated “The majority of individuals 
correctly reported Cronbach’s alpha as the measure of internal consistency 
reliability” (P. 83). 
Following this suggestion, the reliability coefficients of the scales were 
computed using Cronbach’s alpha. The overall reliability of the Cronbach’s alpha 
value for the overall items used in the study was 0.94, and the Cronbach’s alpha 
values for perceived sincerity (6 items), perceived competence (6 items), perceived 
attraction (6 items), perceived worthiness (6 items) and susceptibility to social 
engineering (5 items) were 0.93, 0.96, 0.94, 0.94 and 0.90, respectively. According 
to Hair et al. (2006b), a Cronbach’s alpha value above 0.70 is an acceptable indicator 
of internal consistency, and therefore the internal consistency was established in this 
study.  
Item-total correlation is the correlation of an item, with the composite score of 
all items forming the measure of a specific construct (Pallant 2011). Pallant (2011) 
explains that SPSS (which was used in this study) excludes the score of an item of 
interest when calculating the composite score, and suggests that item-total correlation 
should be above 0.30 in order to be valid. The work on the scale development and 
testing which was done prior to the second phase of the present study using a pilot 
study (as explained in Chapter 6 section 6.7) helped in eliminating problematic 
measurement items. As presented in Table 7.12, all the item-total correlation values 
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in this study were above 0.60, and therefore the reliability of the item-total 
correlation was established. 
Table 7.12 Assessing Scale Reliability 
Factor (Dimension) 
Properties 
Items 
Number of 
Observations 
Corrected 
Item- Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
Name: Sincerity 
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.93 
Honest/Dishonest 7540 .667 .936 
Sincere/Insincere 7540  .836 .915 
Trustworthy/Not Trustworthy 7540 .819 .918 
Safe/Dangerous 7540  .824 .917 
Believable/Unbelievable 7540  .847 .914 
Real Account/Fake Account 7540  .813 .919 
Name: Competence 
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.96 
 
Professional/Unprofessional 7540  .888 .958 
Competent/Incompetent 7540  .857 .962 
Qualified/Unqualified 7540  .909 .956 
Powerful/Powerless 7540  .877 .960 
Expert/Inexpert 7540  .895 .958 
Successful/Unsuccessful 7540  .899 .957 
Name: Attraction 
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.94 
 
Attractive/Unattractive 7540  .865 .928 
Expressive/Inexpressive 7540  .835 .932 
Appealing/Unappealing 7540  .774 .939 
Interesting/Uninteresting 7540  .819 .934 
Cheerful/Gloomy 7540  .803 .936 
Exciting/Dull 7540  .873 .927 
Name: Worthiness 
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.94 
 
Worthwhile/Worthless 7540  .841 .925 
Advantageous/Disadvantageous 7540  .773 .934 
Beneficial/Unbeneficial 7540  .793 .931 
Useful/Useless 7540  .846 .925 
Eligible/Not Eligible 7540 .846 .925 
Valuable/Invaluable 7540  .811 .929 
Name: Susceptibility to 
Social Engineering 
Cronbach’s alpha: .90 
 
SE Request1 7540  .746 .885 
SE Request2 7540  .761 .882 
SE Request3 7540  .762 .881 
SE Request4 7540  .763 .881 
SE Request5 7540  .759 .882 
 
 
7.3.6 Other Assessments 
An assessment was done regarding the qualification of the participants. As 
explained in Chapter 6 (Section 6.8), the participants were offered the equivalent of 
US$5 or an entry in a prize draw for the chance to win an iPhone 6 if they qualified 
for the study by answering five qualifying questions. These questions could be 
answered correctly by a careful reading of the content in the provided profiles and 
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scenarios. The responses of any unqualified participants were removed without any 
further assessment. 
Another assessment was done regarding unengaged responses. An unengaged 
response is one in which the participant responded with the same or almost the same 
score for every question, indicating that the participant did not fully engage in the 
exercise. This was assessed using standard deviation for each participant’s responses. 
If the overall standard deviation of a participant’s responses was less than 0.5, then 
there was an indication that the participant was not fully engaged in the experiment. 
This was the last assessment, and none of the participants whose responses who had 
already passed the previous screenings were found to be unengaged. 
7.4 Principal Component Factor Analysis Using SPSS 
After testing reliability using Cronbach’s alpha, the semantic differential data 
were subjected to principal component analysis in SPSS Version 21.0. Principal 
component analysis is a common method used in checking the validity of the 
constructs and the internal consistency among the variables in a set of data (Costello 
and Osborne 2005). The main purpose of conducting principal component analysis in 
this study was to examine the existence of the four dimensions of source credibility 
identified in the qualitative phase, namely, perceived sincerity, perceived 
competence, perceived attraction and perceived worthiness. 
The results of the factor analysis revealed five factors (four for the credibility 
dimensions and one for susceptibility to social engineering) with an eigenvalue of 1 
or greater. A varimax rotation was used with Kaiser normalisation, and the rotation 
converged in six iterations. The overall Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy was 0.96, the significance was 0.0001, and the total variance was 0.76. 
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All the items loaded significantly and higher on their presumed factors, and the 
average variance extracted for each construct exceeded the variance due to 
measurement error. These results suggested appropriate convergent validity for the 
measures. Convergent validity refers to the degree to which an item is related to the 
construct (Hair et al. 2006b). In addition, for each factor, the average variance 
extracted for each construct was also higher than the squared correlation between 
that and any other construct considered, which indicated discriminant validity. 
Discriminant validity refers to the extent to which a construct is distinct from other 
constructs (Hair et al. 2006b). Table 7.13 presents the results of the principal 
component analysis. 
Table 7.13 Principal Component Factor Analyses 
Factor (Dimension) 
Properties 
Items 
Number of 
Observations 
Loading 
Name: Sincerity 
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.93 
Eigenvalue: 4.88 
Variance Explained: .16 
 Honest/Dishonest 7540 .728 
 Sincere/Insincere 7540  .851 
 Trustworthy/Not Trustworthy 7540 .837 
 Safe/Dangerous 7540  .841 
 Believable/Unbelievable 7540  .850 
 Real Account/Fake Account 7540  .835 
Name: Competence 
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.96 
Eigenvalue: 5.31 
Variance Explained: .18 
 Professional/Unprofessional 7540  .872 
 Competent/Incompetent 7540  .843 
 Qualified/Unqualified 7540  .881 
 Powerful/Powerless 7540  .860 
 Expert/Inexpert 7540  .873 
 Successful/Unsuccessful 7540  .874 
Name: Attraction 
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.94 
Eigenvalue: 4.76 
Variance Explained: .16 
 Attractive/Unattractive 7540  .847 
 Expressive/Inexpressive 7540  .826 
 Appealing/Unappealing 7540  .774 
 Interesting/Uninteresting 7540  .817 
 Cheerful/Gloomy 7540  .803 
 Exciting/Dull 7540  .851 
Name: Worthiness 
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.94 
Eigenvalue: 4.78 
Variance Explained: .16 
 Worthwhile/Worthless 7540  .819 
 Advantageous/Disadvantageous 7540  .772 
 Beneficial/Unbeneficial 7540  .805 
 Useful/Useless 7540  .840 
 Eligible/Not Eligible 7540 .838 
 Valuable/Invaluable 7540  .807 
Name: Susceptibility to Social 
Engineering 
Cronbach’s alpha: .90 
Eigenvalue: 2.8 
Variance Explained: .10 
 SE Request1 7540  .654 
 SE Request2 7540  .670 
 SE Request3 7540  .658 
 SE Request4 7540  .665 
 SE Request5 7540  .660 
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7.5 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Using AMOS 
Although the reliability of the model constructs and items were confirmed as 
explained in the previous section, it was also important to confirm whether the 
collected data were appropriate (fit) the hypothesised model and proposed 
measurement (Hair et al. 2006b). CFA, which is a subset of the SEM technique, was 
used for this purpose. SEM is a group of statistical methods that allow the use of 
multiple indicators to measure unobserved constructs, while taking into account any 
measurement errors during the statistical analysis.  
SEM can be performed with the assistance of some specialised computer 
software packages, such as LISREL, EQS and AMOS. This study used AMOS 
Version 22.0 because it is extension software of SPSS, which was used in the 
exploratory phase, and because the data of this study meets the requirements of 
covariance-based SEM such as sample size and distribution assumptions (Astrachan 
et al. 2014). CFA was performed on the model using AMOS 22.0 in order to confirm 
whether the collected data were an appropriate fit with the hypothesised model 
before conducting further statistical analysis. As presented in Figure 7.1, the model 
was assessed for the five constructs (the source credibility dimensions of perceived 
sincerity, perceived competence, perceived attraction and perceived worthiness, and 
susceptibility to social engineering victimisation (SE_Susceptibility)). The 13 
Facebook-specific source characteristics were not included since they were given to 
the participants as experimental treatments and were assessed using analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) and Eta-squared effect size, as explained in relation to the 
hypotheses testing (Section 7.6). 
Figure 7.1 presents the CFA model, with no structural relationships between 
the constructs, except the covariance between them. Table 7.14 presents the other 
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estimation results for the measurement items. The values of the correlations between 
perceived sincerity, perceived competence, perceived attraction, perceived 
worthiness and susceptibility to social engineering victimisation (SE_Susceptibility) 
provided an indication of the discriminant validity, with all the correlations less than 
0.55 between the independent constructs and less than 0.70 when both the 
independent and dependent constructs were included. In addition, all the factor 
loadings were high (ranging from 0.69 to 0.93) and significant at the p<0.01 level, 
suggesting convergent validity. As the discriminant and convergent validities were 
met, it was concluded that the construct validity was established.  
 
Figure 7.1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis, using AMOS 22.0 
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Table 7.14 Result for the CFA for the Model without Structural Relationships 
Relationships 
Estimate 
Substandard 
Standard 
Error 
Critical 
Ratio 
Standard 
Estimate 
Loading 
P 
Label Items  Construct 
Sin3 (Trustworthy/Not 
Trustworthy) 
<- Sincerity 1.391 .020 69.411 .856 *** 
Sin4 (Safe/Dangerous) <- Sincerity 1.451 .021 69.579 .858 *** 
Sin5 (Believable/ 
Unbelievable) 
<- Sincerity 1.484 .021 71.456 .883 *** 
Com2 (Competent/ 
Incompetent) 
<- Competence .945 .008 117.04 .874 *** 
Com3 (Qualified/ 
Unqualified) 
<- Competence 1.012 .007 138.32 .930 *** 
Com4 (Powerful/ 
Powerless) 
<- Competence .980 .008 124.58 .896 *** 
Com5 (Expert/Inexpert) <- Competence 1.009 .008 131.88 .914 *** 
Att2 (Expressive/ 
Inexpressive) 
<- Attraction 1.008 .009 109.64 .866 *** 
Att3 (Appealing/ 
Unappealing) 
<- Attraction .912 .010 93.488 .801 *** 
Att4 (Interesting/ 
Uninteresting) 
<- Attraction .974 .009 104.89 .848 *** 
Att5 (Cheerful/ Gloomy) <- Attraction .949 .009 100.42 .830 *** 
Worth2 (Advantageous/ 
Disadvantageous) 
<- Worthiness .923 .010 90.210 .802 *** 
Worth3 (Beneficial/ 
Unbeneficial) 
<- Worthiness .933 .010 94.135 .821 *** 
Worth4 (Useful/ Useless) <- Worthiness .977 .009 107.40 .879 *** 
Worth5 (Eligible/Not 
Eligible) 
<- Worthiness .983 .009 107.43 .879 *** 
SE1 (SE Request1) <- SE_Suscept. 1.000 
  
   .795  
SE2 (SE Request2 ) <- SE_Suscept. 1.029 .013 77.672 .809 *** 
SE3 (SE Request3) <- SE_Suscept. 1.031 .013 78.219 .813 *** 
SE4 (SE Request4) <- SE_Suscept. 1.029 .013 78.125 .812 *** 
SE5 (SE Request5 ) <- SE_Suscept. 1.028 .013 77.713 .809 *** 
Sin2 (Sincere/Insincere) <- Sincerity 1.448 .021 70.611 .872 *** 
Sin1 (Honest/Dishonest) <- Sincerity 1.000 
  
   .692  
Com6 
(Successful/Unsuccessful) 
<- Competence 1.009 .008 133.90 .919 *** 
Com1 (Professional/ 
Unprofessional ) 
<- Competence 1.000 
  
   .907  
Att6 (Exciting/ Dull) <- Attraction 1.027 .008 121.61 .905 *** 
Att1 (Attractive/ 
Unattractive) 
<- Attraction 1.000 
  
   .897  
Worth6 (Valuable/ 
Invaluable) 
<- Worthiness .976 .010 98.426 .841 *** 
Worth1 (Worthwhile/ 
Worthless) 
<- Worthiness 1.000 
  
   .876  
Sin6 (Real Account/Fake 
Account) 
<- Sincerity 1.348 .020 68.628  .845 *** 
*** Means that P is significant at level less than 0.001; S.E. means  
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Due to the confirmatory nature of SEM, it is essential for a model under 
assessment to meet some requirements, known as the goodness of fit (GOF) 
requirements. These requirements give reliable indications about the extent to which 
the collected data fit the hypothesised model. Therefore, assessments were done for 
the model presented above in Figure 7.1 in regard to the GOF requirements 
suggested by SEM. For the model to be considered as having a good fit, researchers 
(e.g., (Hair et al. 2006b; Hooper et al. 2008)) have suggested the following criteria: 
minimum discrepancy (chi-square, χ²) divided by the degree of freedom (df)<5.0; 
goodness of fit index (GFI)>0.90; comparative fit index (CFI)>0.90; incremental fit 
index (IFI)>0.90; and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)<0.08. The 
model appeared to have a good fit with acceptable model fit indices. Table 7.15 
presents those values, as well as some other important fit assessment values such as 
the standardised root mean square residual (S-RMR), the adjusted goodness of fit 
index (AGFI) and the adjusted comparative fit index (PCFI). 
Table 7.15 Model Fit Indices for the Model without Structural Relationships 
Model Fit Indices For the Model Without Structural Relationships  
      χ² (CMIN) 1769.813 S-RMR  .0183 
      DF 367 GFI .98 
      χ²/DF  4.822 AGFI .98 
      CFI .993 PCFI .90 
      IFI .993 RMSEA .023 
 
7.6 Hypotheses Testing 
Different and multiple statistical techniques were used to test the proposed 
hypotheses. First, linear regression analysis was used to test Ha1 to Ha4. Second, 
ANOVA and effect size estimations were used to test Hb1 to Hb13. This section 
provides the justifications, procedures and other details of those tests. 
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7.6.1 Testing Ha1 to Ha4 
Linear regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses from Ha1 to Ha4. 
Ha1 to Ha4 proposed the existence of positive relationships between susceptibility to 
social engineering victimisation and the perceived sincerity, perceived competence, 
perceived attraction and perceived worthiness of the source. In other words, the aim 
was to examine the possibility of predicting susceptibility to social engineering 
victimisation based on the perceived sincerity, perceived competence, perceived 
attraction and perceived worthiness of the source.  
To gain more validity and further explanation about the impact of the factors 
involved in the hypotheses (Ha1 to Ha4), hierarchical regression analyses were run 
using SPSS 21.0. Four hierarchical regression analyses were estimated for four 
different models. The first model only contained perceived sincerity as a predictor of 
social engineering victimisation. For the second to fourth models, an extra 
independent factor was added each time to the previous model in a stepwise manner.  
The purpose of using this technique was to see whether the resulting model 
improved by including the four factors of perceived sincerity, perceived competence, 
perceived attraction and perceived worthiness as predictors. In other words, this 
technique allows a researcher to see how much better the explanatory power 
becomes if a particular dimension is added or deleted (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). 
However, linear regression requires some assumptions to be met, including the 
assumption of the reliability of the measurement, linearity, homoscedasticity and 
normality of the error distribution (Osborne and Waters 2002). The testing of the 
reliability of the measurement in the present study was explained above in the 
previous sections, with the results showing that this assumption was met. Further 
tests were conducted in regard to the linearity, homoscedasticity and normality of the 
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error distribution, with the results showing that the data in this study met the 
acceptable levels regarding these issues (Appendix O presents the results of testing 
these assumptions).  
The results shown in Tables 7.16 and 7.17 indicate that every factor of 
perceived sincerity, perceived competence, perceived attraction and perceived 
worthiness significantly contributed to the prediction of susceptibility to social 
engineering victimisation. The overall model fits gained significant improvement 
every time; that is, adding these factors step-by-step increased the R square of the 
regression models from 0.372 for Model 1 (which only included perceived sincerity 
as a predictor) to 0.648 for Model 4 (which included perceived sincerity, perceived 
competence, perceived attraction and perceived worthiness as predictors). This 
increase occurred with the changes in R square being significant in each step (F 
change=742.7, p<0.01 for Model 1; F change=500.0, p<0.01 for Model 2; F 
change=156.3, p<0.01 for Model 3; and F change=170.2, p<0.01 for Model 4). This 
provided more evidence that the proposed model (Model 4 in Table 7.16) had 
explanatory power.  
The coefficient results, as presented in Table 7.16 for the final model (Model 
4), showed that all the correlation coefficients were significant at p<0.001 and that 
perceived sincerity was the strongest predictor (beta value=0.412), followed by 
perceived worthiness (beta value=0.295), perceived competence (beta value=0.271) 
and perceived attraction (beta value=0.123). The results also showed a high 
percentage of variance explained by the model, with R²=0.64.  
Finally, the collinearity statistics were examined. Multi-collinearity is present 
when tolerance is close to 0 (<0.01 ) or when the variance inflation factor (VIF) is 
high (>10), in which case the beta and p coefficients may be unstable (Haitovsky 
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1969). The VIF and tolerance measures (Table 7.16) suggested that multi-collinearity 
was not an issue in the data in this study. It was concluded that there was enough 
evidence to accept the hypotheses from Ha1 to Ha4. 
Table 7.16 Coefficient Results of the Hierarchical Linear Regression Analysis 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 1.778 0.015  118.491 <.0001   
Sincerity 0.206 0.003 0.609 66.722 <.0001 1.000 1.000 
2 
(Constant) 1.424 0.014  99.932 <.0001   
Sincerity 0.156 0.003 0.461 56.333 <.0001 0.891 1.123 
Competence 0.130 0.002 0.448 54.744 <.0001 0.891 1.123 
3 
(Constant) 1.241 0.015  83.618 <.0001   
Sincerity 0.129 0.003 0.380 46.282 <.0001 0.792 1.263 
Competence 0.114 0.002 0.392 49.087 <.0001 0.840 1.191 
Attraction 0.083 0.003 0.243 29.474 <.0001 0.786 1.273 
4 
(Constant) 1.041 0.015  67.593 <.0001   
Sincerity 0.140 0.003 0.412 52.751 <.0001 0.779 1.284 
Competence 0.086 0.002 0.271 36.276 <.0001 0.717 1.395 
Attraction 0.042 0.003 0.123 14.163 <.0001 0.630 1.589 
Worthiness 0.093 0.003 0.295 31.061 <.0001 0.623 1.604 
Dependent Variable: Susceptibility to Social Engineering Victimization. 
 
Table 7.17 Summary of the Hierarchical Linear Regression Analysis 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .610 .372 .371 .46556 .372 742.705 6 7533 <.0001 
2 .742 .551 .550 .39383 .179 500.040 6 7527 <.0001 
3 .775 .601 .600 .37149 .050 156.390 6 7521 <.0001 
4 .805 .648 .647 .34869 .048 170.278 6 7515 <.0001 
   
7.6.2 Testing Hb1 to Hb13 
To test the hypotheses from Hb1 to Hb13, ANOVA tests were conducted to 
evaluate the differences between the participants’ responses on the credibility 
dimensions of the source in the profiles that contained low levels of treatments (the 
variables under study) and in the profiles that contained high levels of treatments. 
The testing commenced by testing Hb1 to Hb5, which proposed that the perceived 
sincerity of a source increases as the source’s number of friends increases, the 
number of friends the user and the source have in common increases and as the 
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source’s number of posts increases, and that the perceived sincerity of a source is 
positively related to the user and source sharing the same beliefs and the source’s use 
of a real name.   
As explained earlier, the fractional factorial design contained eight experiments 
(profiles) for perceived sincerity: four contained a low level of the variable under 
study, and the other four contained a high level of the variable under study. For 
example, for the variable “number of friends”, ANOVA tests were conducted to 
measure the difference between the participants’ responses on perceived sincerity in 
Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4 (since they were given profiles that contained a low 
number of friends) and the participants’ responses on perceived sincerity in 
Experiments 5, 6, 7 and 8 (since they were given profiles that contained a high 
number of friends).  
Partial Eta-squared was also used with the ANOVA tests in order to present in 
the proportion of variance (effect size that ranges from 0 to 1) in the dependent 
variable that is explained by the independent variable (Cohen 1977). As presented in 
Table 7.18, the results of the ANOVA tests demonstrated the significant effects of 
the treatments on the perception of sincerity (with p value<0.0001, F value=1121.78 
and Eta-squared=.27 for the number of friends; p value<0.0001, F value=504.61 and 
Eta-squared=0.14 for the number of common friends; p value<0.0001, F 
value=428.09 and Eta-squared=0.12 for the number of posts; p value<0.0001, F 
value=145.28 and Eta-squared=0.045 for sharing a common belief; and p 
value<0.0001, F value=710.37 and Eta-squared=0.19 for using a real name). Based 
on these results, it was concluded that there was enough evidence to accept Hb1 to 
Hb5. 
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Table 7.18 One-Way ANOVA and Effect Sizes for Hypotheses Hb1-Hb5 
Constructs 
Treatment 
Group 
Cases (N) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean F Value P 
Mean 
Difference 
Eta 
Squared 
Number of Friends 
( Hypothesis: Hb1) 
Low Level  1508  1.119257  4.0752 
1121.78 
 
 <.0001  1.834 0.27 
High Level  1508  1.809194  5.9101 
Number of Common 
Friends 
(Hypothesis: Hb2) 
Low Level  1508  1.080642  4.3256 
504.61  <.0001 1.334 0.14 
High Level  1508  2.03764  5.6598 
Number of Posts 
(Hypothesis: Hb3) 
Low Level  1508  1.37236  4.3715 
 428.09 <.0001  1.242  0.12 
High Level  1508  1.88538  5.6139 
Common Belief 
(Hypothesis: Hb4) 
Low Level  1508  1.28314  4.6149 
145.28 <.0001   0.755 0.045 
High Level  1508  2.06843  5.3705 
Real Name 
(Hypothesis: Hb5) 
Low Level  1508  0.77483  4.2234 
710.37  <.0001   1.538 0.19 
High Level  1508  2.10369  5.762 
 
Hb6 to Hb8 proposed that the perceived competence of a source is positively 
related to the qualification (education level), celebrity status and wealth of the 
source. Similar techniques to those used to test Hb1 to Hb5 were used to test these 
hypotheses; that is, ANOVA tests and Eta-squared were used to measure the 
influence of the qualification, celebrity and wealth of the source on the participants’ 
responses regarding perceived competence. As presented in Table 7.19, the ANOVA 
tests results demonstrated the significant effects of the source’s qualifications, 
celebrity status and wealth on influencing users to perceive the source as competent: 
p<0.0001, F value=266.94 and Eta-squared=0.150 for the source’s qualifications; 
p<0.0001, F value=567.40 and Eta-squared=0.273 for the source’s celebrity status; 
and p<0.0001, F value=160.90 and Eta-squared=0.096 for the source’s wealth. Based 
on these results, it was concluded that there was enough evidence to accept Hb6 to 
Hb8. 
 
 236 Chapter 7: Quantitative Phase Results 
Table 7.19 One-Way ANOVA and Effect Sizes for Hypotheses Hb6-Hb8 
Constructs 
Treatment 
Group 
Cases (N) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean F Value P 
Mean 
Difference 
Eta 
Squared 
Qualification 
(Hypothesis: Hb6) 
Low Level   754  0.998  3.664 
266.94 <.0001 1.358 0.150 
High Level   754  2.051  5.022 
Celebrity 
(Hypothesis: Hb7) 
Low Level   754 1.076 3.4283 
567.40 <.0001  1.975 0.273 
High Level   754 1.814 5.2584 
Wealth 
(Hypothesis: Hb8) 
Low Level   754 1.0645 3.799 
160.90 <.0001 1.087 0.096 
High Level   754 2.0981 4.886 
 
Hb9 and Hb10 proposed that the perceived attraction of a source is positively 
related to the good looks and good writing skills of the source. As for the previous 
hypotheses testing, ANOVA tests and Eta-squared were used to measure the 
influence of good looks and good writing skills on the participants’ responses 
regarding perceived attraction. As presented in Table 7.20, the results of the ANOVA 
tests demonstrated the significant effects of the source’s good looks and good writing 
skills on influencing users to perceive the source as attractive (with p value<0.0001, 
F value=894.13 and Eta-squared=0.372 for good looks; and p value<0.0001, F 
value=32.282 and Eta-squared=0.020 for good writing skills). Based on these results, 
it was concluded that there was enough evidence to accept Hb9 and Hb10. 
Table 7.20 One-Way ANOVA and Effect Sizes for Hypotheses Hb9-Hb10 
Constructs 
Treatment 
Group 
Cases (N) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean F Value P 
Mean 
Difference 
Eta 
Squared 
Good Looks 
(Hypothesis: Hb9) 
Low Level   754  1.13137  3.0009 
 894.13  <.0001  2.213 0.372 
High Level   754  1.68897  5.2146 
Good Writing Skills 
(Hypothesis: Hb10) 
Low Level   754  0.83095  3.8450 
32.282  <.0001  0.525 0.020 
High Level   754  2.3994  4.3705 
 
Hb11 to Hb13 proposed that the perceived worthiness of a source is positively 
related to the authority, sexual compatibility and reciprocity of the source. The 
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ANOVA tests and Eta-squared were conducted to measure the influence of the 
authority of the source, sexual compatibility with the source and reciprocity 
(compliments, likes and positive comments received from the source) on the 
participants’ responses regarding perceived worthiness. As presented in Table 7.21, 
the results showed that the authority of the source, sexual compatibility with the 
source and reciprocity had significant effects on users’ perceptions of worthiness 
(with p value<0.0001, F value=3888.60 and Eta-squared=0.720 for authority; 
p<0.0001, F value=125.219 and Eta-squared=0.076 for sexual compatibility; and p 
value<0.0001, F value=123.89 and Eta-squared=0.076 for reciprocity). Based on 
these results, it was concluded that there was enough evidence to accept Hb1 and 
Hb13. 
Table 7.21 One-Way ANOVA and Effect Sizes for Hypotheses Hb11-Hb13 
Constructs 
Treatment 
Group 
Cases (N) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean F Value P 
Mean 
Difference 
Eta 
Squared 
Authority 
(Hypothesis: Hb11) 
Low Level   754  0.60613  3.9812 
 3888.60  <.0001  3.775 0.720 
High Level   754  1.29313  7.7564 
Sexual Compatibility 
(Hypothesis: Hb12) 
Low Level   754  1.4510  5.1938 
125.219   <.0001 1.174 0.077 
High Level   754  2.4911  6.3687 
Reciprocity 
(Hypothesis: Hb13) 
Low Level   754  1.50344  5.1967 
123.89  <.0001 1.169 0.076 
High Level   754  2.46121  6.3658 
 
7.7 Demographics Analysis 
7.7.1 Interaction Effects between Treatments and Participants’ 
Demographics 
Although the impacts of the source characteristics on the participants’ 
perceptions regarding the source credibility dimensions were examined during the 
hypotheses testing, it was also of interest to examine whether any of those 
characteristics had significantly different impacts on any particular demographic 
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group. For this purpose, a two-way ANOVA was run to examine whether there were 
any significant interactions between the effects of the source characteristics (which 
were the treatments given to the participants) and the participants’ demographic 
groups.  
Table 7.22 presents all the interactions that were significant at p<=0.05. 
Although all the hypothesised source characteristics were found to have a significant 
influence on the users’ judgments for all demographic groups, the results showed that 
some source characteristics had even more impact on particular demographic groups. 
For example, the source’s number of friends had a statistically significant interaction 
with the user’s gender (F=109, p<0.0001). By running pairwise comparisons 
(measuring the difference between the differences which occurred due to the 
treatments), it was seen that the number of friends had more impact on male users 
(mean difference=2.34) compared to the impact on female users (mean 
difference=0.811).  
The results also showed that the number of common friends interacted 
significantly with the user’s educational level; the number of posts interacted 
significantly with the user’s educational level; using a real name interacted 
significantly with the user’s gender; qualifications interacted significantly with the 
user’s gender; qualifications interacted significantly with the user’s security 
knowledge; qualifications interacted significantly with the user’s age; celebrity status 
interacted significantly with the user’s age; celebrity status interacted significantly 
with the user’s gender; wealth interacted significantly with the user’s gender; good 
looks interacted significantly with the user’s gender; and authority interacted 
significantly with the user’s educational level. The partial Eta-squared presented in 
the table shows the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that is explained 
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by the independent variable. The observed power indicated that the sample size was 
adequate (Cohen 1977). Finally, all the post-hoc tests, which compared the groups 
presented in the table with each other, were statistically significant at p<0.01. 
 
Table 7.22 Significant Interaction Effects between Treatment and Participants’ Demographics 
Interaction Specifications Effect of the Treatment 
(Mean Difference) for These Demographic 
Group Interaction F Sig 
Observed 
Power 
P. Eta 
Square 
Number of Friends 
with User’s Gender 
109.7 <.0001 1.0 0.036 
Female Male 
0.811 2.34 
Number of Common 
Friends with User’s 
Educational Level 
2.75 0.04 0.67 0.003 
Lower 
than 
Bachelor 
Bachelor Masters 
PhD or 
Doctorate 
0.86 1.20 1.62 1.64 
Number of Posts with 
User’s Educational 
Level 
2.09 0.05 0.64 .002 
Lower 
than 
Bachelor 
Bachelor Masters 
PhD or 
Doctorate 
0.89 1.17 1.41 1.55 
Using Real Name with 
User Gender 
33.59 <.0001 1.0 0.011 
Female Male 
2.20 1.20 
Qualifications with 
User’s Gender 
7.72 0.005 0.79 0.005 
Female Male 
1.90 1.20 
Qualifications with 
User’s Security 
Knowledge 
7.15 <.0001 0.99 0.019 
Lowest 
Level 
Level  
2 
Level 
3 
Level 
4 
Highest 
Level 
1.74 1.71 1.52 1.17 0.39 
Qualifications with 
User’s Age 
2.64 0.031 0.743 0.007 
18-25 
Years 
26-
35 
36-
45 
46-
55 
56 and 
Over 
1.06 1.03 1.45 1.58 1.71 
Celebrity with User’s 
Age 
3.32 0.01 0.84 0.009 
18-25 
Years 
26-
35 
36-
45 
46-
55 
56 and 
Over 
2.29 1.87 1.91 1.53 1.39 
Celebrity with User’s 
Gender 
10.8 0.001 0.90 0.008 
Female Male 
2.26 1.62 
Wealth with User’s 
Gender 
53.8 <.0001 1.0 0.036 
Female Male 
2.050 0.480 
Good Looks with 
User’s Gender 
8.75 0.003 0.84 0.006 
Female Male 
2.60 1.95 
Authority with User’s 
Educational Level 
3.76 0.01 0.76 0.007 
Lower 
than 
Bachelor 
Bachelor Masters 
PhD or 
Doctorate 
3.71 3.41 3.68 3.90 
 
7.7.2 Relationship between Participants’ Demographics and 
Susceptibility to Social Engineering Victimisation  
This section examines the relationship between the participants’ demographics 
and the susceptibility to social engineering victimisation by measuring the 
participants’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation in general, and 
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regardless of the source’s type of influence. This was done first by measuring the 
participants’ responses to the five high-risk social engineering requests. As presented 
in Table 7.23, the results of regression analysis showed that the participants’ security 
knowledge significantly and linearly predicted their susceptibility to social 
engineering victimisation (beta value=-0.10, p<0.0001). The result of an ANOVA 
comparing the security knowledge groups showed that, the more security knowledge 
the participants had, the less susceptible they were (F(4, 7535)=99.25, p<0.0001).   
The results also showed that gender had a significant effect on susceptibility to 
social engineering victimisation (beta value=-0.05, p<0.0001), with the t-test result 
showing that women were more susceptible than men (t(7538)=10.423, p<0.0001). 
In addition, the results showed that the time elapsed since joining Facebook was a 
significant predictor of susceptibility to social engineering victimisation (beta 
value=-0.02, p=0.001), and the result of an ANOVA showed that, the less time 
elapsed, the more susceptible the user (F(4,7535)=10.59, p<0.0001). Finally, the 
results showed that age was a significant predictor of susceptibility to social 
engineering victimisation (beta value=-0.04, p<0.0001), and the result of the 
ANOVA showed that young adults were more susceptible to social engineering 
victimisation (F(4,7535)=15.06, p<0.0001). 
Table 7.23 Regression Analysis for Demographic Groups and Group Differences 
Regression Analysis Variance Tests 
Means 
 Demographic 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Sig 
T or F 
Values 
Sig 
 Security 
knowledge 
- 0.10 <.0001 
F = 
99.25 
<0.0001 
Lowest 
Level 
Level 
2 
Level 3 Level 4 
Highest 
Level 
2.89 2.76 2.74 2.69 2.40 
 Gender - 0.05 <.0001 
T = 
10.42 
<0.0001 
Female Male 
2.81 2.66 
 Time elapsed 
since joining 
Facebook  
- 0.02 .001 
F = 
10.59 
<0.0001 
6 
Months 
or Less 
6 
Months 
to 1 
Year 
1 to 2 
Years 
2 to 3 
Years 
More 
than 3 
Years 
2.80 2.73 2.71 2.69 2.63 
 Age - 0.04 <.0001 
F = 
15.06 
<0.0001 
18-25 
Years 
26-35 36-45 46-55 
56 and 
Over 
2.81 2.70 2.68 2.69 2.66 
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7.7.3 Comparing Responses on High-Risk Social Engineering 
Requests and Low-Risk Social Engineering Requests 
The participants’ responses on the two low-risk requests were examined. These 
two requests were designed to be similar to the susceptibility to social engineering 
requests in that they both relied on social engineering persuasion techniques, but the 
difference was that they were relatively low risk. For example, instead of providing 
the URL “http://www.facebooc.com/login/” (which is a clearly fake website and 
considered to be high risk), the URL “http://bit.ly/anywords” was used (which is not 
always an attacking attempt, and therefore considered to be low risk). The rationale 
behind adding these requests and analysing them was to examine the extent to which 
the participants relied on the source characteristics when they responded to social 
engineering requests. The literature suggests that the quality of an argument has an 
impact on participants’ responses to requests (Petty and Cacioppo 1984). The results 
in this study showed that the participants were affected by the source characteristics 
when they encountered high-risk social engineering requests and when they 
encountered low-risk requests, with no significant difference.  
The results of the demographics analysis revealed two important indications. 
First, the requests used to measure social engineering mimicked real-life situations, 
and those tricks were more identifiable by participants who were knowledgeable 
about security than by normal users. Second, the majority of the participants in this 
study relied on the source characteristics when they answered the experimental 
questionnaire. 
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7.8 Structural Model Fit Assessment 
As explained earlier, the performance of SEM involves tasks including 
validating the measurement model and fitting the structural model in order to 
examine the relationships between model constructs (Hooper et al. 2008). While 
assessment of the measurement model was performed during CFA, it was essential to 
examine the model with the relationships between the model constructs. Structural 
model assessment includes examining the standardised path coefficients of the 
relationships in the model, and examining the model fit indices (Hair et al. 2006b).  
This also provides more reliable evidence upon which to accept or reject the 
research hypotheses Ha1 to Ha4. As explained previously, the other 13 hypotheses 
related to the Facebook-specific source characteristics (Hp1 to Hp13) were not 
included in the model since they were given directly to the participants as 
experimental treatments, and therefore they were assessed using ANOVA. 
Figure 7.2 presents the model, using AMOS 22.0, containing all the 
relationships between the constructs, and Table 7.24 presents the results of the 
standardised path coefficients of these relationships. The results showed that the 
perceived sincerity, perceived competence, perceived attraction and perceived 
worthiness were all significant contributors to the prediction of susceptibility to 
social engineering victimisation. All the correlation coefficients were significant at 
p<0.001, and perceived sincerity was the strongest predictor (beta value=0.45), 
followed by perceived worthiness (beta value=0.30), perceived competence (beta 
value=0.29) and perceived attraction (beta value=0.12). The results also showed a 
high percentage explained by the model, with R²=0.73. It can be seen in the results in 
Figure 7.2 and Table 7.24 that some values (e.g., beta values and model fit indices) 
were not identical, but very similar, to the SPSS results discussed in relation to the 
 Chapter 7: Quantitative Phase Results 243 
hypotheses testing (Section 7.6), which is a normal and common occurrence in such 
statistical applications. 
Table 7.24 Structure Model Results 
Structural Relationships 
Unstandardi
zed Estimate 
Stand. 
Error 
Critical 
ratio 
Standardized 
Estimate 
(beta value) 
P 
Label 
SE_Susceptibility <--- Sincerity .196 .005 41.034 .452 *** 
SE_Susceptibility <--- Competence .078 .002 31.170 .292 *** 
SE_Susceptibility <--- Attraction .037 .003 11.779 .118 *** 
SE_Susceptibility <--- Worthiness .093 .003 28.340 .295 *** 
SE_Susceptibility <--- Age -.016 .003 -5.316 -.039 *** 
SE_Susceptibility <--- Gender -.062 .008 -7.435 -.054 *** 
SE_Susceptibility <--- TimeSinceJoiningFB -.011 .003 -3.128 -.023 .002 
SE_Susceptibility <--- Security_Knowledge -.046 .003 -13.96 -.105 *** 
*** Means that P is significant at level less than 0.001 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Model Fit Assessment, Using AMOS 22.0 
 
The second task of SEM in regard to assessing the structure model is to 
examine the model fit indices. For the model to be considered as having a good fit, 
researchers (e.g., (Hair et al. 2006b; Hooper et al. 2008)) have suggested the 
following criteria: minimum discrepancy (chi-square, χ²) divided by df<5.0; 
GFI>0.90; CFI>0.90; IFI>0.90; and RMSEA<0.08. The model appeared to have a 
good fit with acceptable model fit indices. Table 7.25 presents those values, as well 
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as some other important fit assessment values such as the S-RMR, AGFI and PCFI. 
The GOF provides reliable evidence that the collected data in this study fit the 
hypothesised model.  
Table 7.25 Model Fit Indices for the Model with Structural Relationships 
Model Fit Indices for the Model Without Structural Relationships  
      χ² (CMIN) 2194.262. S-RMR  .0291 
      DF 479 GFI .982 
      χ²/DF  4.581 AGFI .98 
      CFI .992 PCFI .900 
      IFI .992 RMSEA .022 
 
7.9 Testing Mediation Effects 
A mediator variable is a variable that intervenes in the relationship between 
independent and dependent variables (Recker 2012). The main purpose of a mediator 
variable is to explain why a relationship exists between the independent and 
dependent variables. In the present study, mediation effects were not among the 
hypotheses that emerged from the first (qualitative) phase; however, testing 
mediation effects can provide more information about how the constructs involved in 
the hypothesised model affect each other. Before examining the mediation, one-way 
ANOVA was used to test the effects between Facebook-specific source 
characteristics and susceptibility to social engineering victimisation (some 
researchers refer to this effect as total effect). This was different from the test 
involved in the hypotheses. During the hypotheses testing of Hb1 to Hb13, the 
dependent variables were the source credibility dimensions (perceived sincerity, 
perceived competence, perceived attraction and perceived worthiness). In the testing 
of the mediation effects, the dependent variable was susceptibility to social 
engineering victimisation. As presented in Table 7.26, two of the 13 Facebook-
specific source characteristics were not statistically significant (number of mutual 
 Chapter 7: Quantitative Phase Results 245 
friends, and sexual compatibility) while the other 11 Facebook-specific source 
characteristics were statistically significant. This demonstrated the possibility of 
having mediation effects of the perceived source credibility dimensions between the 
Facebook-specific source characteristics and susceptibility to social engineering 
victimisation. 
To test the mediation using the path coefficient, a variable was added for every 
Facebook-specific source characteristic, thus representing the treatment given to the 
participants. The additional variables were assigned the number 2 (coded 2) for high 
levels of each of the Facebook-specific source characteristics (treatments) (e.g., high 
number of friends), and assigned the number 1 for low levels of each of the source 
characteristics (e.g., low number of friends). 
Table 7.26 Effects between Facebook-Specific Source Characteristics and Susceptibility to 
Social Engineering 
Constructs 
Treatment 
Group 
Cases (N) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean F Value P 
Eta 
Squared 
Number of Friends --> 
Susceptibility to SE  
Low Level 1508 0.5398 2.787 
4.677 0.030 0.001 
High Level 1508 0.3623 2.823 
Number of Common Friends -
-> Susceptibility to SE 
Low Level 1508 0.5215 2.814 
1.142 0.285 0.0003 
High Level 1508 0.3887 2.796 
Number of Posts --> 
Susceptibility to SE 
Low Level 1508 0.4296 2.691 
196.29 <0.000 0.0611 
High Level 1508 0.4613 2.918 
Common Belief --> 
Susceptibility to SE 
Low Level 1508 0.3982 2.744 
53.86 <0.000 0.017 
High Level 1508 0.5072 2.866 
Real Name --> Susceptibility 
to SE 
Low Level 1508 0.3658 2.615 
614.93 <0.000 0.169 
High Level 1508 0.4666 2.994 
Qualifications --> 
Susceptibility to SE 
Low Level 754 0.5076 2.164 
214.06 <0.000 0.124 
High Level 754 0.3511 2.493 
Celebrity --> Susceptibility to 
SE 
Low Level 754 0.4518 2.106 
443.15 <0.000 0.227 
High Level 754 0.3634 2.551 
Wealth --> Susceptibility to SE 
Low Level 754 0.3649 2.196 
133.20 <0.000 0.081 
High Level 754 0.5163 2.462 
Good Looks --> Susceptibility 
to SE 
Low Level 754 0.3417 2.401 
828.79 <0.000 0.354 
High Level 754 0.6895 3.208 
Good Writing Skills --> 
Susceptibility to SE 
Low Level 754 0.4386 2.522 
317.32 <0.000 0.174 
High Level 754 0.7523 3.087 
Authority --> Susceptibility to 
SE 
Low Level 754 0.3236 2.249 
4342.5 <0.000 0.742 
High Level 754 0.3493 3.392 
Sexual Compatibility --> 
Susceptibility to SE 
Low Level 754 0.5420 2.792 
2.789 0.095 0.009 
High Level 754 0.7651 2.849 
Reciprocity --> Susceptibility 
to SE 
Low Level 754 0.6273 2.698 
52.64 <0.000 0.034 
High Level 754 0.6764 2.942 
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After adding the variables that represented the Facebook-specific source 
characteristics, the mediation effects were examined. The traditional classification of 
mediation was suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986), who classified mediation as 
full mediation, partial mediation or no mediation. Full mediation occurs when the 
total effect (the path coefficient between the independent and dependent variables 
without mediation) is statistically significant, while the direct effect (the path 
coefficient between the independent and dependent variables with mediation) is not 
significant. Partial mediation occurs when both the total effect and direct effect are 
significant but the value of the direct effect has been reduced due to the impact of the 
mediator.  
No mediation occurs when the total effect is not significant. Other researchers 
(e.g., (Conger 1974; MacKinnon et al. 2000; Rucker et al. 2011)) identified an 
additional, and important, type of mediation, namely, suppression mediation. 
According to Conger (1974), a suppressor variable is a variable that “increases the 
predictive validity of another variable (or set of variables) by its inclusion in a 
regression equation” (p. 36). Rucker, Preacher, Tormala and Petty (2011) explain 
that suppression mediation occurs “when an indirect effect has a sign that is opposite 
to that of the total effect, and thus omission of the suppressor might lead the total 
effect to appear small or nonsignificant” (p. 366). In a further extension of the 
traditional classification of mediation, Zhao et al. (2010) argued that Baron and 
Kenny (1986) model was “somewhat coarse and misleading” (p. 200) and proposed a 
new and comprehensive classification (as presented in Figure 7.3). 
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Figure 7.3 Mediation Classification of Zhao et al. (2010) 
 
The main difference in Zhao et al. (2010) classification is that it suggests that 
mediation occurs even when the total effect is not significant. Moreover, they 
proposed new types of mediation, such as competitive mediation which occurs when 
the direct effect (c) and mediated effect (a x b) are both significant and point in 
opposite directions. As presented in Table 7.27, the application of Zhao et al. (2010) 
classification in the present study showed that the source credibility dimension of 
perceived sincerity had a competitive mediation effect between susceptibility to 
social engineering victimisation and the number of posts, number of mutual friends, 
number of friends, and common belief. However, it was found to be a 
complementary mediator between susceptibility to social engineering victimisation 
and the source’s use of a real name. Complementary mediation indicates that the 
Facebook-specific source characteristics and their corresponding source credibility 
dimensions had consistently similar impacts on susceptibility to social engineering 
victimisation. For more clarification, Tables 7.27 presents the mediation effects 
based on both the traditional classification and Zhao et al. (2010) classification of 
mediation. 
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Table 7.27  Mediation Effect of Perceived Sincerity 
Relationship 
Mediated by Perceived Sincerity 
Direct Effect 
(with mediation) 
Un-Standardized 
Type of 
Mediation 
Based on 
Zhao, Lynch and 
Chen 2010 
Type of 
Mediation 
Based on 
Traditional 
Classification 
 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
SE <--- Number of Posts -.034 .021 -1.60 .108 
Competitive 
Mediation 
Inconsistent 
Mediation 
SE <--- 
Number of Common 
Friends 
-.300 .022 -13.56 *** 
Competitive 
Mediation 
Suppression 
Mediation 
SE <--- Real Name .061 .023 2.612 .009 
Complementary 
Mediation 
Partial 
Mediation 
SE <--- 
Number of  
Friends 
-.349 .027 -12.94 *** 
Competitive 
Mediation 
Inconsistent 
Mediation 
SE <--- Common Belief -.040 .017 -2.35 .018 
Competitive 
Mediation 
Inconsistent 
Mediation 
 
 
As shown in Table 7.28, the source credibility dimension of perceived 
competence was found to have a competitive mediation effect between susceptibility 
to social engineering victimisation and the apparent wealth of the source. However, 
perceived competence was a complementary mediator between susceptibility to 
social engineering victimisation and the qualification and celebrity status of the 
source.  
Table 7.28 Mediation Effect of Perceived Competence 
Relationship 
Mediated by Perceived 
Competence 
Direct Effect 
 (with mediation) 
Un-Standardized 
Type of 
Mediation 
Based on 
Zhao, Lynch and  
Chen 2010 
Type of 
Mediation 
Based on 
Traditional 
Classification Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
SE <--- Qualification .148 .019 7.58 *** 
Complementary  
Mediation 
Partial  
Mediation 
SE <--- Celebrity .199 .022 9.15 *** 
Complementary  
Mediation 
Partial  
Mediation 
SE <--- Wealth -.405 .021 -19.60 *** 
Competitive 
Mediation 
Inconsistent 
Mediation 
 
 
In addition, the source credibility dimension of perceived attraction, as 
presented in Table 7.29, was found to have a complementary mediation effect 
between susceptibility to social engineering victimisation and the good looks and 
writing skills of the source. Finally, as Table 7.30 shows, the source credibility 
dimension of perceived worthiness was found to have a complementary mediation 
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effect between susceptibility to social engineering victimisation and authority and 
reciprocity, and a competitive mediation effect between susceptibility to social 
engineering victimisation and sexual compatibility. 
Table 7.29 Mediation Effect of Perceived Attraction 
Relationship 
Mediated by Perceived 
Attraction 
Direct Effect 
 (with mediation) 
Un-Standardized 
Type of 
Mediation 
Based on 
Zhao, Lynch and  
Chen 2010 
Type of 
Mediation 
Based on 
Traditional 
Classification 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
SE <--- Good Looks .345 .025 13.76 *** 
Complementary  
Mediation 
Partial  
Mediation 
SE <--- 
Good Writing 
Skills  
.434 .021 21.09 *** 
Complementary  
Mediation 
Partial  
Mediation 
 
 
Table 7.30 Mediation Effect of Perceived Worthiness 
Relationship 
Mediated by Perceived 
Worthiness 
Direct Effect 
 (with mediation) 
Un-Standardized 
Type of 
Mediation 
Based on 
Zhao, Lynch and Chen 
2010 
Type of 
Mediation 
Based on 
Traditional 
Classification 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
SE <--- Authority .598 .087 6.86 *** 
Complementary  
Mediation 
Partial  
Mediation 
SE <--- 
Sexual 
Computability 
-.104 .031 -3.36 *** 
Competitive 
Mediation 
Inconsistent 
Mediation 
SE <--- Reciprocity .074 .031 2.35 .019 
Complementary  
Mediation 
Partial 
Mediation 
 
 
It is important to mention here that competitive mediation does not mean that 
the effects of the independent variable (e.g., sexual compatibility) and the mediator 
variable (e.g., perceived worthiness) are always opposite to each other. Rather, it 
means that the impact of the mediator (e.g., perceived worthiness, which was 
affected by other factors in the experiments such as authority and reciprocity) is more 
powerful than the independent variable (e.g., sexual compatibility). Other researchers 
refer to this type of mediation as inconsistent mediation (e.g., (MacKinnon et al. 
2000; Shrout and Bolger 2002)).  
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7.10 Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter presented the results of the second (quantitative) phase. It 
presented an overview of the participants’ profiles, data screening and preparation 
steps, the exploratory factor analysis, and the assessment of the reliability of the 
measurement. This chapter also presented the CFA, the hypotheses testing and the 
demographics analysis. In addition, this chapter presented the structural model fit 
assessment. As explained in the introduction to this chapter, while this chapter was 
dedicated to a presentation of the results of the second phase, it presented these 
results with some discussion. However, the final discussion is presented in the next 
chapter.
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 Discussion and Conclusion 
8.1 Overview 
The results of the qualitative phase of the study were presented in Chapter 5 
and the results of the quantitative phase were presented in Chapter 7. While some 
discussion has been presented with those results, this chapter presents a detailed and 
integrated discussion of the results and the final conclusion of the study. The chapter 
first presents a summary of the findings with reference to each of the research 
questions (Section 8.2). An evaluation of the prediction and effect sizes is presented 
(Section 8.3), followed by an evaluation of the demographics’ effects (Section 8.4). 
The limitations of the first phase (Section 8.5) and the second phase (Section 8.6) are 
discussed. The theoretical contribution of the study is outlined (Section 8.7), 
followed by the study’s practical contribution (Section 8.8). Recommended best 
practices (Section 8.9) and future research directions are highlighted (Section 8.10). 
Finally, the conclusion of the chapter is presented (Section 8.11). 
8.2 Summary of the Findings with Reference to Research Questions 
8.2.1 Addressing the First Research Question 
The first question that this research aimed to address was: “What source 
characteristics influence Facebook users to judge an attacker as credible?” This 
question represented the first objective of the research, namely, to explore the source 
characteristics that influence Facebook users to fall victim to social engineering. To 
address this question, the first phase of the research methodology was carried out. 
The first phase used an exploratory qualitative method, based on the grounded theory 
approach. This phase inductively identified the following 13 Facebook-specific 
source characteristics that influence Facebook users to judge an attacker as credible:  
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1. The number of friends that the source is connected to on Facebook (number of 
friends) 
2. The number of members that the source and the user are connected to in 
common (common friends) 
3. The number of posts made by the source (number of posts) 
4. The sharing of a common religion between the source and the user (common 
belief) 
5. The source’s use of a real name (i.e., not using a nickname) (real name) 
6. The educational level of the source (qualification) 
7. The celebrity status of the source (celebrity) 
8. The apparent wealth of the source (wealth) 
9. The good looks of the source (good looks) 
10. The good writing skills of the source (good writing skills) 
11. The power that the source has over the user (authority) 
12. The sexual compatibility between the source and the user (sexual 
compatibility) 
13. The number of compliments, likes and positive comments received from the 
source (reciprocity). 
8.2.2 Addressing the Second Research Question 
The second question of the research was: “How do source characteristics 
influence Facebook users to judge an attacker as credible?” This question represented 
another important objective of the research, namely, to provide a theoretical 
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justification of how the 13 identified Facebook-specific source characteristics 
influence users to accept social engineering requests. This question was also 
addressed in the first phase of the research, using the qualitative exploratory method 
based on the grounded theory approach. Source credibility theory was the 
overarching theoretical framework for addressing this question. Because credibility 
is a perception (Tseng and Fogg 1999), and because it is a complex concept that is 
composed of other concepts (dimensions), addressing the second research question 
was done also during the first (qualitative) phase. The first phase showed that the 13 
Facebook-specific source characteristics influence Facebook users to judge the 
attacker according to one or more of the following four source credibility 
dimensions:  
1. The degree to which the message receiver perceives the source as honest and 
free from duplicity (perceived sincerity) 
2. The quality of adequacy and possessing a required skill or capacity (perceived 
competence) 
3. The feature or the quality that evokes interest and liking (perceived attraction) 
4. The degree to which the source is perceived to be advantageous for the user, 
which inspires the user’s effort, respect and care (perceived worthiness). 
The source characteristics that were found to have an impact on the perceived 
sincerity dimension are: 1) number of friends, 2) common friends, 3) number of 
posts, 4) common beliefs, and 5) the source’s use of a real name. The source 
characteristics that were found to have an impact on the perceived competence 
dimension are: 1) qualifications, 2) celebrity, and 3) wealth. The source 
characteristics that were found to have an impact on the perceived attraction 
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dimension are: 1) good looks, and 2) good writing skills. The source characteristics 
that were found to have impact on the perceived attraction dimension are: 1) 
authority, 2) sexual compatibility, and 3) reciprocity. 
Based on the answers to the first and second research questions, an a priori 
model was developed as shown in Figure 8.1. In addition, the following 17 
hypotheses were postulated: 
Ha1: Users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation is positively related to 
the perceived sincerity of the source. 
Ha2: Users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation is positively related to 
the perceived competence of the source. 
Ha3: Users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation is positively related to 
the perceived attraction of the source. 
Ha4: Users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation is positively related to 
the perceived worthiness of the source. 
Hb1: The perceived sincerity of a source increases as the source’s number of friends 
increases. 
Hb2: The perceived sincerity of a source increases as the number of friends the user 
and the source have in common increases. 
Hb3: The perceived sincerity of a source increases as the source’s number of posts 
increases.  
Hb4: The perceived sincerity of a source is positively related to the user and the 
source sharing the same beliefs or religion.  
Hb5: The perceived sincerity of a source is positively related to the source’s use of a 
real name. 
Hb6: The perceived competence of a source is positively related to the source’s 
qualifications.  
Hb7: The perceived competence of a source is positively related to the celebrity 
status of the source. 
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Hb8: The perceived competence of a source is positively related to the apparent 
wealth of the source. 
Hb9: The perceived attraction of a source is positively related to the good looks of 
the source. 
Hb10: The perceived attraction of a source is positively related to the good writing 
skills of the source.  
Hb11: The perceived worthiness of a source is positively related to the authority of 
the source.  
Hb12: The perceived worthiness of a source is positively related to the sexual 
compatibility between the user and the source. 
Hb13: The perceived worthiness of a source increases as the number of 
compliments, likes and positive comments received from the source increases. 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Source Credibility Dimensions in Terms of Social Engineering on Facebook. 
 
8.2.3 Addressing the Third Research Question 
The third question posed in this research was: “To what extent do each of the 
source characteristics influence Facebook users to judge an attacker as credible?” 
This question was answered in the second (quantitative) phase of the research. 
Answering this question was done through testing the a priori model and the 17 
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hypotheses (presented in the previous section) using a quantitative role-play 
experiment. The results of the quantitative experiment showed that the perceived 
sincerity, perceived competence, perceived attraction and perceived worthiness of a 
source were significant predictors of susceptibility to social engineering 
victimisation, with a high percentage of the variance explained. Perceived sincerity 
was found to have the most influence on users’ judgment toward accepting or 
rejecting social engineering attacks on Facebook, followed by perceived worthiness, 
perceived competence and perceived attraction. The results also explained which 
source characteristics influenced Facebook users to judge an attacker according to 
one of the source credibility dimensions, and the extent of that influence.  
The results showed that the source characteristics with a significant impact on 
perceived sincerity, in order of the effectiveness of the influence, were: 1) number of 
friends, 2) the source’s use of a real name, 3) common friends, 4) number of posts, 
and 5) common beliefs. The source characteristics that had an impact on perceived 
competence, in order of the effectiveness of the influence, were: 1) celebrity status, 
2) qualifications (educational level), and 3) wealth. The source characteristics that 
had an impact on perceived attraction, in order of the effectiveness of the influence, 
were: 1) good looks, and 2) good writing skills. The source characteristics that had 
an impact on perceived worthiness, in order of the effectiveness of the influence, 
were: 1) authority, 2) sexual compatibility, and 3) reciprocity. Table 8.1 and Table 
8.2 present a summary of the hypotheses testing results. 
Table 8.1 Results of Hypotheses Testing at Perception Level 
Hypotheses Relationship 
t- 
Value 
P- 
Value 
Path 
Coefficient 
Supported? 
  Ha1 Perceived Sincerity     Susceptibility to SE 2.751 <.0001 0.412 Yes 
  Ha2 Perceived Competence    Susceptibility to SE 6.276 <.0001 0.271 Yes 
  Ha3 Perceived Attraction      Susceptibility to SE 4.163 <.0001 0.123 Yes 
  Ha4 Perceived Worthiness    Susceptibility to SE 1.061 <.0001 0.295 Yes 
 Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion 257 
 
Table 8.2  Results of Hypotheses Testing at Facebook-Specific Level 
Hypotheses Relationship F Value P Value 
Eta 
Squared 
Supported? 
  Hb1 Number of Friends    Perceived Sincerity        1121.78 <.0001 0.27 Yes 
  Hb2 Number of Common    Perceived Sincerity        504.61 <.0001 0.14 Yes 
  Hb3 Number of Posts    Perceived Sincerity        428.09 <.0001 0.12 Yes 
  Hb4 Common Belief    Perceived Sincerity        145.28 <.0001 0.045 Yes 
  Hb5 Real Name   Perceived Sincerity        710.37 <.0001 0.19 Yes 
  Hb6 Qualification      Perceived Competence 266.94 <.0001 0.150 Yes 
  Hb7 Celebrity  Perceived Competence 567.40 <.0001 0.273 Yes 
  Hb8 Wealth    Perceived Competence 160.90 <.0001 0.096 Yes 
  Hb9 Good Looks  Perceived Attraction 894.13 <.0001 0.372 Yes 
  Hb10 Good Writing Skills    Perceived Attraction 32.282 <.0001 0.020 Yes 
  Hb11 Authority   Perceived Worthiness 3888.60 <.0001 0.720 Yes 
  Hb12 Sexual Compatibility    Perceived Worthiness 125.219 <.0001 0.077 Yes 
  Hb13 Reciprocity  Perceived Worthiness 123.89 <.0001 0.076 Yes 
8.2.4 Addressing the Fourth Research Question 
The fourth question posed in this research was: “Is there any relationship 
between the influence of any of the source characteristics on users’ susceptibility to 
social engineering victimisation in Facebook and users’ demographics such as age, 
gender, education, relationship status and security awareness level?” This question 
represented an important objective of this research, namely, to investigate whether it 
is possible to predict users’ vulnerability based on their demographics. This question 
was addressed in the second phase of the research, which involved a quantitative 
role-play experiment. The results of the quantitative phase indicated that people are 
different in their judgments toward source credibility and therefore different in their 
vulnerabilities. 
 Out of the eight demographic variables investigated (gender, security 
knowledge/awareness level, age, status, time since joining Facebook, frequency of 
usage, number of friends, and educational level), four of the variables were found to 
be significantly different in their role in user vulnerabilities, namely, the user’s 
gender, education, security awareness and age. These differences were found to be 
significant in relation to nine out of the 13 Facebook-specific source characteristics 
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under study. Table 8.3 summarises the significant interactions between those four 
demographic variables and the nine relevant Facebook-specific source 
characteristics. 
Table 8.3 Summary of Demographics and Source Characteristics Interactions 
 User/Participant 
Users’ Gender Users’ Educational 
Level 
Users’ Security 
Knowledge 
Users’ Age 
S
o
u
rc
e 
Source Number of  
Friends 
Significant 
Interaction 
   
Source Number of  
Common Friends 
 
Significant 
Interaction 
  
Source Number of  
Posts 
 
Significant 
Interaction 
  
The Source’s Use  
of a Real Name 
Significant 
Interaction 
   
Source Educational 
Level 
Significant 
Interaction 
 
Significant 
Interaction 
Significant 
Interaction 
Celebrity of the 
Source 
Significant 
Interaction 
  
Significant 
Interaction 
Wealth of the  
Source 
Significant 
Interaction 
   
Good looks of the  
Source 
Significant 
Interaction 
   
Authority of the  
Source 
 
Significant 
Interaction 
  
 
The results of the quantitative phase showed that the source’s number of 
friends had a statistically significant interaction with the user’s gender (F=109, 
p<0.0001). By running pairwise comparisons (measuring the difference between the 
differences which occurred due to the treatments), the number of friends was found 
to have more impact on male users (mean difference=2.34) than on female users 
(mean difference=0.811). Similarly, the results of the quantitative phase showed that 
the number of common friends interacted significantly with the user’s educational 
level (F=2.75, p=0.04). By running pairwise comparisons, common friends was 
found to have more influence on highly educated participants, with a mean difference 
of 1.64 for the PhD group, 1.62 for the Master’s group, 1.20 for the Bachelor’s 
group, and 0.86 for the group with educational attainment lower than a Bachelor’s 
degree.  
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In addition, the results of the quantitative phase showed that the source’s 
number of posts interacted significantly with the user’s educational level (F=2.09, 
p=0.05). By running pairwise comparisons, the source’s number of posts was found 
to have more influence on highly educated participants, with a mean difference of 
1.55 for the PhD group, 1.41 for the Master’s group, 1.17 for the Bachelor’s group, 
and 0.89 for the group with educational attainment lower than a Bachelor’s degree. 
The results also showed that the source’s use of a real name interacted significantly 
with the user’s gender (F=33.59, p<0.0001). By running pairwise comparisons, the 
source’s use of a real name was found to have more influence on female users (with 
a mean difference of 2.20) than on male users (with a mean difference of 1.20). 
Another significant interaction was found between the source’s qualification 
and the user’s gender (F=7.72, p=005). By running pairwise comparisons, the 
source’s qualification was found to have more influence on female users (with a 
mean difference of 1.90) than on male users (with a mean difference of 1.20). The 
results also showed that source’s qualification interacted significantly with the user’s 
security knowledge (F=7.15, p<0.0001). By running pairwise comparisons, the 
source’s qualification was found to have more influence on participants with lower 
levels of security knowledge, with a mean difference of 1.74 for the Level 1 group 
with the lowest level of security knowledge, 1.71 for the Level 2 group, 1.52 for the 
Level 3 group, 1.17 for the Level 4 group, and 0.39 for Level 5 group with the most 
knowledge about security. 
In addition, the results showed that the source’s qualification interacted 
significantly with the user’s age (F=2.64, p=0.031). By running pairwise 
comparisons, the source’s qualification was found to have more influence on older 
participants, with a mean difference of 1.71 for the group aged 56 or older, 1.58 for 
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the 46–55 group, 1.45 for the 36–45 group, 1.03 for the 26–35 group, and 1.06 for 
the 18-25 group. Moreover, the results of the quantitative phase showed that the 
source’s celebrity status had a statistically significant interaction with the user’s 
gender (F=10.8, p<0.001). By running pairwise comparisons, the source’s celebrity 
status was found to have more impact on female users (with a mean difference of 
2.26) than on male users (with a mean difference of 1.62). Similarly, the results 
showed that the source’s celebrity status interacted significantly with the user’s age 
(F=3.32, p=0.01). By running pairwise comparisons, the source’s celebrity status was 
found to have less influence on older participants, with a mean difference of 1.39 for 
the 56 or older group, 1.53 for the 46–55 group, 1.91 for the 36–45 group, 1.87 for 
the 26–35 group, and 2.29 for the 18–25 group. 
Furthermore, the results of the quantitative phase showed that the source’s 
wealth had a statistically significant interaction with the user’s gender (F=53.8, 
p<0.001). By running pairwise comparisons, the source’s wealth was found to have 
more impact on female users (with a mean difference of 2.05) than on male users 
(with a mean difference of 0.480). Similarly, the results of the quantitative phase 
showed that the source’s good looks had a statistically significant interaction with the 
user’s gender (F=8.75, p=0.003). By running pairwise comparisons, the source’s 
good looks was found to have more impact on female users (with a mean difference 
of 2.60) than on male users (with a mean difference of 1.95).  
The results of the quantitative phase showed that the authority of the source 
interacted significantly with the user’s educational level (F=3.76, p=0.01). By 
running pairwise comparisons, the authority of the source was found to have more 
influence on the PhD group (with a mean difference of 3.90), followed by the group 
with educational attainment lower than a Bachelor’s degree (with a mean difference 
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of 3.71), then the Master’s group (with a mean difference of 3.68), and finally the 
Bachelor’s group (with a mean difference of 3.41). 
Finally, a comparison of the responses to the high-risk social engineering 
requests and the low-risk social engineering requests showed that the participants 
were affected by the source’s characteristics when they encountered both high-risk 
and low-risk requests with no significant differences. 
8.2.5 Addressing the Fifth Research Question 
The fifth question posed in this research was: “Is there any relationship 
between users’ demographics and susceptibility to social engineering victimisation 
on Facebook in general?” This question was addressed in the second phase of the 
research by examining the relationship between demographics and susceptibility to 
social engineering victimisation in general, and regardless of the source’s type of 
influence. The results of the regression analysis showed that the participants’ security 
knowledge significantly and linearly predicted their susceptibility to social 
engineering victimisation (beta value=-0.10, p<0.0001). An ANOVA comparing the 
participants on the basis of their security knowledge showed that, the more security 
knowledge the participants had, the less susceptible they were (F(4, 7535)=99.25, 
p<0.0001).  
The results also showed that gender had a significant effect on susceptibility to 
social engineering victimisation (beta value=-0.05, p<0.0001), with the t-test results 
showing that female users were more susceptible than male users (t(7538)=10.423, 
p<0.0001). In addition, the results showed that the time elapsed since joining 
Facebook was a significant predictor of susceptibility to social engineering 
victimisation (beta value=-0.02, p=0.001); the results of an ANOVA showed that, the 
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less time elapsed, the more susceptible the user (F(4,7535)=10.59, p<0.0001). 
Finally, the results showed that age was a significant predictor of susceptibility to 
social engineering victimisation (beta value=-0.04, p<0.0001); with the result of the 
ANOVA showing that young adults were more susceptible to social engineering 
victimisation than users in other age groups (F(4,7535)=15.06, p<0.0001). 
8.3 Evaluation of the Prediction Ability and Effect Sizes 
The evaluation of the prediction and effect sizes was done at two levels. The 
first evaluation was at the perception level, in which the hypotheses from Ha1 to Ha4 
were examined. This examination was done using two reliable methods: hierarchical 
regression analysis implemented in SPSS, and path analysis implemented in AMOS. 
The coefficient results from the regression analysis showed that all the correlation 
coefficients were significant at p<0.001, and that perceived sincerity was the 
strongest predictor (beta value=0.412), followed by perceived worthiness (beta 
value=0.295), perceived competence (beta value=0.271) and perceived attraction 
(beta value=0.123). The results also showed that a high percentage of variance was 
explained by the model, with R²=0.64. 
Similar results were obtained using AMOS 22.0. The results of the 
standardised path coefficients showed that perceived sincerity, perceived 
competence, perceived attraction and perceived worthiness were all significant 
contributors to the prediction of susceptibility to social engineering victimisation. All 
the correlation coefficients were found to be significant at p<0.001, and perceived 
sincerity was found to be the strongest predictor (beta value=0.45), followed by 
perceived worthiness (beta value=0.30), perceived competence (beta value=0.29) and 
perceived attraction (beta value=0.12). The results also showed that a high 
percentage of variance was explained by the model, with R²=0.73. Some of the 
 Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion 263 
values (e.g., the beta values) were very similar but not identical to the SPSS results, 
and this is a normal and common occurrence in such statistical applications. 
The second evaluation of the prediction and effect sizes was done at the 
Facebook-specific level, in which the hypotheses from Hb1 to Hb13 were examined. 
The Eta-squared represents the effect size associated with F value in ANOVA test. 
While there are no clear-cut rules for evaluating the effect size of this type, Cohen 
(1977) defined effect sizes for Eta-squared as: 0.01=small effect, 0.06=moderate 
effect, 0.14=large effect. Table 8.4 presents all of the Eta-squared effect sizes and 
their interpretations based on the suggested evaluation criteria of Cohen (1977). 
However, since there are only two groups that need to be compared for every 
Facebook-specific source characteristic (high level and low level), Cohen (1977) 
suggests that t-tests can also be used along with Cohen’s distance (d), in order to 
present the difference between the groups in terms of standard deviation units. For 
better evaluation of the effect sizes, both ANOVA (with Eta-squared) and t-tests 
(with Cohen’s D) have been used to estimate the effect sizes, as presented in Table 
8.4. 
The results of the t-tests demonstrated the significant effects of the treatments 
on the perception of sincerity (with p value<0.0001, t value=-33.4 and Cohen’s 
d=1.219 for the number of friends; p value<0.0001, t value=-22.4 and Cohen’s 
d=0.818 for the number of common friends; p value<0.0001, t value=-20.69 and 
Cohen’s d=0.753 for the number of posts; p value<0.0001, t value=-12.053 and 
Cohen’s d=0.439 for sharing a common belief; and p value<0.0001, t value=-26.653 
and Cohen’s d=0.970 for using a real name).  
 
 264 Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion 
Table 8.4 Evaluation of Effect Sizes based on both Cohen’s D and Eta-Squared 
 
Relationship 
Assessment using T-tests Assessment using ANOVA 
T- 
Value 
P- 
Value 
Cohen's 
D 
Evaluation of 
the Effect Size 
F- 
Value 
P- 
Value 
Eta- 
Squared 
Evaluation of 
 the Effect Size 
Number of Friends    
Perceived Sincerity        
-33.493 <.0001 1.219  Large Effect 1121.78 <.0001 0.27 Large Effect 
Number of Common    
Perceived Sincerity        
-
22.464  
<.0001 0.818 Large Effect 504.61 <.0001 0.14 Large Effect 
Number of Posts    
Perceived Sincerity        
-20.69 <.0001 0.753 Medium Effect 428.09 <.0001 0.12 Medium Effect 
Common Belief    
Perceived Sincerity        
-12.053 <.0001 0.439 Small Effect 145.28 <.0001 0.045 Small Effect 
Real Name    
Perceived Sincerity        
26.653 <.0001 0.970 Large Effect 710.37 <.0001 0.19 Large Effect 
Qualification      
Perceived Competence 
23.577 <.0001 1.214 Large Effect 266.94 <.0001 0.150 Large Effect 
Celebrity  
Perceived Competence 
32.067 <.0001 1.651 Large Effect 567.40 <.0001 0.273 Large Effect 
Wealth     
Perceived Competence 
9.610 <.0001 0.494 Small Effect 160.90 <.0001 0.096 Medium Effect 
Good Looks  
Perceived Attraction 
29.902 <.0001 1.540  Large Effect 894.13 <.0001 0.372 Large Effect 
Good Writing Skills    
Perceived Attraction 
-5.682 <.0001 0.292 Small Effect 32.282 <.0001 0.020 Small Effect 
Authority  
Perceived Worthiness 
72.586 <.0001 3.738 Large Effect 3888.60 <.0001 0.720 Large Effect 
Sexual Compatibility    
Perceived Worthiness 
9.321 <.0001 0.480 Small Effect 125.219 <.0001 0.076 Medium Effect 
Reciprocity  
Perceived Worthiness 
9.264  <.0001 0.477 Small Effect 123.89 <.0001 0.076 Medium Effect 
 
Similarly, the results of the t-tests showed the significant effects of the source’s 
qualifications, celebrity status and wealth on influencing users to perceive the source 
as competent (with p<0.0001, t value=-23.577 and Cohen’s d=1.214 for the source’s 
qualifications; p<0.0001, t value=-32.067 and Cohen’s d=1.651 for the source’s 
celebrity status; and p<0.0001, t value=-9.610 and Cohen’s d=0.494 for the source’s 
wealth). In addition, the results of the t-tests showed the significant effects of the 
source’s good looks and the source’s good writing skills on influencing users to 
perceive the source as attractive (with p value<0.0001, t value=-29.902 and Cohen’s 
d=1.540 for good looks; and p value<0.0001, t value=-5.682 and Cohen’s d=0.292 
for good writing skills). Finally, the results showed that the authority of the source, 
sexual compatibility between the user and the source and reciprocity had significant 
effects on users’ perceptions of worthiness (with p value<0.0001, t value=-72.586 
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and Cohen’s d=3.738 for authority; p<0.0001, t value=-9.321 and Cohen’s d=0.480 
for sexual compatibility; and p value<0.0001, t value=-9.264 and Cohen’s d=0.477 
for reciprocity). Again, while there are no clear-cut rules for evaluating the effect 
size of this type, Cohen (1977) defined effect sizes for Cohen’s D as: small if the d 
value is =0.2, medium if the d value is =0.5, and large if the d value is =0.8. Table 
8.4 presents all the Cohens’ D effect sizes and their interpretations based on the 
suggested evaluation criteria of Cohen (1977). 
8.4 Evaluation of the Demographic Effects 
The results of the demographics analysis were interesting in a number of ways. 
First, they provided more validity in regard to the questions used to measure 
susceptibility to social engineering victimisation. The results showed that the 
requests used to measure social engineering mimicked real-life situations, whereby 
those tricks were more identifiable by users who were knowledgeable about security 
than by normal users, including highly educated people in different study areas.  
Second, the results showed that the majority of the participants in this study 
relied on the source’s characteristics when they answered the experimental 
questionnaire. Therefore, the results gave more validity that the arguments used in 
the messages had achieved the goal, which was studying the impact of the source 
characteristics. Third, although the users with security knowledge were less willing 
to respond to social engineering requests, the results showed that the source’s 
characteristics still influenced them to accept social engineering requests from 
attackers who looked credible to them (since the beta value was only -0.10).  
 To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study was the first study to be 
dedicated to understanding which demographic factors correlate with the influence of 
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different source characteristics toward social engineering victimisation on Facebook. 
However, some studies have the measured susceptibility to specific types of email 
(not SNS) attacks or studied the effectiveness of one or more email phishing 
countermeasures in relation to some demographic factors, as explained in Chapter 3. 
In addition, Vishwanath (2015) recently studied the impact of habitual Facebook use 
on phishing victimisation on Facebook. This section first compares the results of the 
present study with the results of the email phishing studies in the literature, and then 
with Vishwanath’s study.  
Darwish, Zarka and Aloul (2012) conducted a review of email phishing studies 
(Table 8.4) in order to understand the relationship between victims’ backgrounds and 
phishing victimisation. They found that users’ demographic and personality traits 
were useful factors in social engineering studies and other information security 
research (Darwish et al. 2012). Although email phishing occurs in a different context 
than social engineering on Facebook, email phishing attacks do use social 
engineering techniques, indicating that it might be worthwhile to compare the impact 
of demographics found in this study with the impacts found in email phishing 
studies.  
 
Table 8.5 Demographic Variables of Potential Email Phishing Victims (Darwish et al., 2012) 
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In the present study, the impact of demographics was studied in two ways. 
First, the study examined the presence of any significant interactions between the 
effects of the source characteristics (which were the treatments given to the 
participants) and the participants’ demographic groups. Second, the study examined 
the relationship between demographic groups and susceptibility to social engineering 
victimisation in general, and regardless of the source’s type of influence. Due to the 
fact that the email phishing studies in the literature measured the susceptibility to 
victimisation in general, the comparison here focuses only on the results of the 
demographics analysis related to susceptibility to social engineering victimisation in 
general. 
The results of the regression analysis conducted in this study showed that the 
participants’ security knowledge significantly and linearly predicted their 
susceptibility to social engineering victimisation (beta value=-0.10, p<0.0001). The 
results of an ANOVA comparing the security knowledge groups showed that, the 
more security knowledge the participants had, the less susceptible they were (F(4, 
7535)=99.25, p<0.0001). This result is similar to the finding in the literature that 
participants who had undertaken anti-phishing training were less susceptible to 
victimisation. Although anti-phishing training does not necessarily infer security 
knowledge, it is the closest demographic factor that the present study’s results can be 
compared with.  
The results of this study showed that gender had a significant effect on 
susceptibility to social engineering victimisation (beta value=-0.05, p<0.0001), with 
the t-test results showing that female users were more susceptible than male users 
(t(7538)=10.423, p<0.0001). This result is similar to the finding in the literature that 
female users were more susceptible to email phishing victimisation. Furthermore, the 
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results of the present study showed that age was a significant predictor of 
susceptibility to social engineering victimisation (beta value=-0.04, p<0.0001), with 
the result of an ANOVA showing that young adults (18–25 age group) were more 
susceptible to social engineering victimisation (F(4,7535)=15.06, p<0.0001). This 
result is similar to the findings in email phishing studies.  
Sheng et al. (2010) sought an explanation for why gender and age affect 
susceptibility to phishing victimisation and suggested that the high level of 
susceptibility to phishing victimisation among female users was attributable to 
female users having less technical experience than male users. They also suggested 
that users aged from 18 to 25 were more susceptible to phishing victimisation 
because they had a lower level of education, had spent fewer years on the Internet, 
had less exposure to training, and had a lower aversion to risk. 
In order to investigate whether or not the explanation given by Sheng et al. 
(2010) also applied in the context of the present study, the relationship between the 
gender, age and security knowledge of the participants was examined. As presented 
in Table 8.5 and Figure 8.2, there was a negative relationship between female users 
and security knowledge (female users were relatively less knowledgeable about 
security), and this relationship was statistically significant. Similarly, there was a 
positive relationship between age and security knowledge (the older users were 
relatively more knowledgeable about security) and this relationship was also 
statistically significant. The results of the mediation test showed that security 
knowledge was a partial mediator of the relationship between age and susceptibility 
to social engineering victimisation and a suppressor mediator of the relationship 
between gender and susceptibility to social engineering victimisation. This is line 
with the suggestion made by Sheng et al. (2010). As explained previously, partial 
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mediation occurs when both the total effect and direct effect are significant but the 
value of the direct effect has reduced due to the impact of the mediator variable, 
while in the case of suppression mediation, the suppressor variable increases the 
predictive validity of another variable by its inclusion in a regression equation 
(Conger 1974). The results of the mediation tests in the present study support the 
claim that female users and younger adult users are more susceptible to social 
engineering victimisation because they have less security knowledge. 
Moreover, the results of this study showed that the time elapsed since joining 
Facebook was a significant predictor of susceptibility to social engineering 
victimisation (beta value=-0.02, p<0.01). The result of an ANOVA showed that, the 
less time elapsed, the more susceptible the user (F(4,7535)=10.59, p<0.0001). This 
factor, however, is not related to any of the factors found in the email phishing 
studies in the literature. Interestingly, the relationship between the time elapsed since 
joining Facebook and security knowledge in this study was statistically significant 
(as presented in Table 8.6 and Figure 8.2). The results of the mediation test also 
showed that security knowledge partially mediated the relationship between the time 
elapsed since joining Facebook and susceptibility to social engineering victimisation. 
Therefore, it can be said that the participants in this study for whom more time had 
elapsed since joining Facebook were less susceptible to social engineering 
victimisation, perhaps because they were more knowledgeable about security. 
However, these results are limited to the sample of this study, and do not provide 
enough evidence to draw a conclusion about the relationship between gender, age, 
time elapsed since joining Facebook and security knowledge. 
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Table 8.6 Relationships between Demographics and Social Engineering 
Relationship 
Total Effect 
(without mediation) 
Un-Standardized 
Direct Effect 
(with mediation) 
Un-Standardized Type of 
Mediation 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
SE <--- TimeSinceJoiningFB -.035 .006 -6.3 *** -.014 .006 -2.6 .009 Partial Mediation 
SE <--- Age -.032 .005 -6.4 *** -.029 .005 -5.9 *** Partial Mediation 
SE <--- Gender -.151 .014 -10.8 *** -.164 .014 -12.0 *** Suppression Mediation 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Mediation Effect of Security_Knowledge 
 
Vishwanath (2015) examined habitual Facebook use and its impact on 
becoming a victim of deception in Facebook. Vishwanath found that habitual 
Facebook use (measured by the participant’s frequent use of Facebook, maintenance 
of a large social network, and limited ability to regulate behaviour) was a significant 
predictor of phishing victimisation. Among the three factors that Vishwanath (2015) 
used to measure habitual Facebook use, the maintenance of a large social network 
(participants’ number of friends) and the frequency of Facebook usage were also 
examined in the present study. However, neither of them was found to be a 
significant predictor of social engineering victimisation in this study. This neither 
endorses nor rejects the findings by Vishwanath (2015), since endorsing or rejecting 
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this argument would require a specific investigation, and there are many possible 
factors that can impact such a result such as the sample size or other factors outside 
of the study scope. Moreover, the findings of the present study were drawn from an 
investigation of five social engineering tricks, while Vishwanath studied the phishing 
technique only. This may explain the difference between these two results. 
8.5 Limitations of the First (Qualitative) Phase 
The main limitation of any qualitative method is the subjective interpretation 
bias. Bias can occur in qualitative studies where a researcher has to interpret the data 
to explore the most important factors under study. The second general limitation is 
that qualitative methods cannot determine the existence of a relationship between the 
factors under study and users’ demographics due to the small number of participants. 
In addition, observations and interviews can present challenging biases. 
Interviews and observations are conducted in a social context that is not anonymous. 
Therefore, participants may present themselves to researchers in a certain light rather 
than reporting their actual experience. For this reason, the qualitative open-ended 
questionnaire was also implemented in this study in order to eliminate the limitations 
of the interviews and observations by allowing subjects to anonymously report their 
real experiences of social engineering attacks.  
The questionnaire method also has some limitations. In order to encourage 
more participants to respond, the questionnaire was concise with limited and focused 
questions. Therefore, it lacked the in-depth interactivity with the participants and 
richness of information that would provide a fuller picture of potential hidden 
factors. The interpretation of the questionnaire was only based on what had been 
written and described by the participants themselves. Unlike the interviews, there 
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was no opportunity to interact, ask and discuss with the participants. Nevertheless, 
this limitation could be overcome by using the observations and interviews. 
Therefore, combining the methods was very helpful to eliminate the limitations in 
each method. Moreover, all of these issues could be eliminated by using a second 
phase of research, which helped test all the hypotheses and findings that emerged in 
the first phase.  
8.6 Limitations of the Second (Quantitative) Phase 
The findings of the second phase (quantitative experiment) must be viewed in 
light of some limitations. The first limitation relates to the use of role-play and not 
using an actual experiment. There is debate in the literature about the validity and 
realism of the role-play method; however, its selection as the quantitative method in 
the present study was justifiable for seven main reasons. First, various studies, from 
the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., (Haney et al. 1972; Mixon 1972; O'Leary et al. 1970; 
Olson and Christiansen 1966)) until more recent years (e.g., (Dhamija et al. 2006; 
Downs et al. 2007; Furnell 2007; Pattinson et al. 2012; Sheng et al. 2010)), have 
confirmed the degree of realism and involvement that can be achieved in role-play 
studies, and the role-play is one of the most common and effective methods used in 
email phishing studies. 
Second, there was a strong justification for using role-play in this study, due to 
the challenges of the ethical issues associated with running an experiment in the 
actual Facebook environment, permission issues from the owners of Facebook, and 
the need to conduct the study in accordance with the National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Research Involving Humans. Third, several reliability and validity tests 
were performed on the data collected in this study, and the findings suggested that 
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there was no reason to believe that the predictors described in this study would differ 
in their relationship to role-play behaviour compared to real-world behaviour.  
Fourth, the validity of the research conducted in this part of the study was 
enhanced through the use of some strategies commonly used in deception research. 
Literature of deception includes several practices that have been found to be 
effective, useful and morally justifiable strategies in experimental research (Gibbins 
1992) (Kimmel 2000)). 
Fifth, in this study, both low and high levels of the treatment were tested using 
the same method, and the analysis relied on measuring the change only. This 
strengthened the study, as it would be difficult to ensure in the actual Facebook 
environment. Sixth, the results of the demographics analysis provided more validity 
that the experiment mimicked real-life situations. In real life, social engineering 
tricks are more identifiable by people who are knowledgeable about security than by 
normal users, including highly educated people in different study areas, and the same 
phenomenon was observed in this study. Seventh and finally, in order to estimate the 
effect of every source characteristic under study, it was necessary that the experiment 
controlled the factor under examination and isolated all other factors that could affect 
the participant’s decision making. This would have been a difficult or perhaps 
impossible task if the experiment had been conducted in the actual Facebook 
environment. Therefore, the use of the role-play experiment was perhaps a better 
strategy in the particular case of this research. 
The second limitation of the quantitative phase relates to the measurement of 
social engineering susceptibility. While extensive steps were taken to ensure the use 
of representative social engineering-based requests, it cannot be guaranteed that the 
profiles created for the experiments covered all the types of tricks that can be used by 
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attackers. Social engineering is very broad, and it is sometimes difficult to classify a 
request as an attacking attempt or legitimate request (purely risky or purely safe). 
However, the focus of this study was on the characteristics of the source who sends 
the message, not the characteristics of the message itself. In addition, with adequate 
consistency among the requests for all the experiments and enough variance between 
each experiment (treatment) and the others, the validity of the requests used to 
measure social engineering susceptibility was achieved.  
The third limitation relates to the participants and the sample of the second 
phase. The participants for the quantitative experiment were chosen from three 
organisations located in Saudi Arabia. This means that the sample didn’t include all 
demographics, such as all religions or cultures, which would be impossible due to 
geographical isolation, time and funding limitations. However, efforts were made to 
make the sample as representative as possible in the exploratory qualitative phase, as 
explained in Chapter 4.  
Another limitation of the study relates to the generality of the findings. 
Facebook is a major SNS, but may not necessarily be representative of all SNSs. At 
the time of this study, there were several other popular SNSs including Twitter, 
Tumblr, Instagram and Snapchat. Facebook was chosen for the present study in 
particular for multiple reasons. The most obvious reason is that Facebook is the most 
ubiquitous SNSs, with a user base that far exceeds other SNSs. At the time of 
writing, Facebook is the biggest social networking service based on global reach and 
total number of active users. According to Facebook as of April 2015, the site had 
more than 1.44 billion global monthly active users, representing a 13 percent 
increase year over year. In addition, 4.5 billion likes were generated daily as of May 
2013, which was a 67 percent increase from August 2012. Moreover, 3.93 million 
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people logged on to Facebook daily in March 2015, which was a 17% increase from 
the previous year.  
The second reason for choosing Facebook as the setting for this research was 
that Facebook is a less specialised platform. For example, Linkedin is mostly used by 
professionals, Snapchat is used by those concerned with privacy, Instagram is mostly 
a photo-sharing platform, and Twitter is mostly a microblogging tool. Facebook has 
a publicly open structure, looser behavioural norms and plenty of tools and features 
that members use to leave cues for each other (Papacharissi 2009). This made 
Facebook the perfect setting for studying the impact of source characteristics on 
users’ perceptions, judgments and susceptibility to social engineering victimisation 
in SNSs. 
8.7 Contribution to Knowledge (Theoretical Contribution) 
The findings of this study make a significant contribution, directly or 
indirectly, to the literature in several areas of study such as source credibility, 
deception, persuasion and information security management (e.g., phishing and 
insider threats). This research studied the impact of source credibility on deceptive 
persuasion, which is different from the focus in the majority of source credibility 
studies. The setting (Facebook) is also different to the settings in previous studies.  
Moreover, the findings of this study confirmed three previously identified 
dimensions of source credibility from human communication and marketing research 
(sincerity, competence and attractiveness), and proposed a new, fourth dimension, 
namely, perceived worthiness of the source. To the best of the author’s knowledge, 
this dimension has not been previously identified as a dimension of source credibility 
(Table 3.2 in Chapter 3 presented a summary of previous studies on source 
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credibility). The fact that perceived worthiness has not been reported as a dimension 
of source credibility in more than 30 studies conducted before this research, on many 
different types of contexts and sources, indicates a significant contribution by this 
study to existing knowledge about source credibility.   
The identification of a new dimension of source credibility in this study can be 
explained by at least one of two reasons. The first reason could be that social 
engineering on Facebook has unique specifications compared to the settings that 
were previously studied. The second reason could be that previous studies have 
relied on quantitative methods only, and such methods lack the exploratory feature of 
the qualitative methods which were used in the first phase of this research. 
Furthermore, while identifying the source credibility dimensions was an important 
achievement, the analysis of this study did not stop at the perception level, which is 
the case in the majority of previous source credibility studies. The analysis went 
further and explored 13 important Facebook-specific characteristics that influence 
the perception of these dimensions in the context of Facebook.  
The aims of this research, the methodology used and the findings help to fill an 
important gap in the information systems literature. As mentioned in previous 
chapters, Cao et al. (2014) concluded a review of SNS research published in major 
information systems journals between January 2004 and August 2013 with the call 
for future research to focus on the validation of constructs and development of 
theories that are specific to SNSs, to investigate the individual characteristics or 
factors that play a role in SNS research, and to employ multiple research methods 
including qualitative methods and data analytics.  
In terms of user susceptibility, several studies in information systems have 
investigated individuals’ susceptibility to security victimisation by studying 
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employees’ compliance with organisations’ security policies. This has been done by 
relying on a number of theories and techniques, such as protection motivation theory 
(e.g., (Johnston et al. 2015; Posey et al. 2013; Posey et al. 2014)), 
electroencephalography (e.g., (Vance et al. 2014)), technology threat avoidance 
theory (Herath et al. 2014), and routine activity theory (e.g., (Wang et al. 2015)). 
There seems to be a general agreement that an individual’s compliance with 
information security policies, or an individual’s compliance with attackers’ 
deceptions, is associated with making accurate judgments regarding threat. This 
study contributes to this stream of research by explaining the impact of source 
credibility on individuals’ compliance behaviours. The idea of addressing 
individuals’ susceptibility in this study appears to be unique, as previous studies 
focused on the perception of the threat, while this study focused on the perception of 
the credibility. 
Another aspect of the study’s contribution relates to the impact of the users’ 
demographics on susceptibility. The results of this research showed that demographic 
groups differ in their perceptions and behaviours toward social engineering requests. 
Although several studies have indicated that there is a relationship between falling 
victim to phishing emails and demographic variables, this study investigated the 
relationship between susceptibility to social engineering victimisation in a new 
environment, Facebook, and it went further by investigating the relationship between 
the demographic variables and the different tricks used by attackers to influence 
users. The results of the study showed that people are different in their judgments 
and vulnerabilities, and therefore measuring susceptibility should be done by using 
the type of trick and not only whether the user became a victim or not, as has been 
done repeatedly in phishing email studies.  
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8.8 Contribution to Industry (Practical Contribution) 
This study makes a significant contribution by attempting to understand and 
solve a serious problem in information security. Social engineering attacks pose 
significant security risks and are difficult to control (Hadnagy 2010; Twitchell 2006). 
The context of the study reflects another significance dimension of the contribution. 
SNSs are a common source of contemporary social engineering attacks (e.g., 
(Chitrey et al. 2012; Dimensional-Research 2011; Hogben 2007; Jagatic et al. 2007; 
Nagy and Pecho 2009)). 
SNS users have been found to be very vulnerable to falling victim to many 
social engineering tricks and attacks such as phishing, clickjacking, sexual abuse, 
financial abuse, identity theft, impersonation, physical crime, and many other forms 
of attack. As explained previously, the simple trick of offering free mobile phone 
minutes accounted for the largest number of attacks on Facebook users in 2013, 
increasing from 56% in 2012 to 81% in 2013 (Mazzuca 2014). The magnitude of the 
problem highlights the significant contribution of this study to the SNS industry. 
Moreover, recent research on SNS security showed that most social engineering 
threats, such as spamming, identity cloning and bots, rely on fake identities (Fire et 
al. 2014), and around 83 million Facebook accounts are estimated to be fake (Couper 
2013). This means that the focus of the study on the users’ susceptibility in relation 
to the source characteristics enabled the study to address the core of the problem. 
Furthermore, the contribution of this study appears to be unique and practically 
useful in addressing the high risk of social engineering in SNSs. This can be 
explained by comparing the findings of this study with other solutions that are 
proposed in the literature to address social engineering victimisation in SNSs. As 
discussed in the literature review presented in Chapter 3, the current solutions 
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proposed to address social engineering in SNSs can be classified into five types. This 
section provides a summary of those solutions and makes a comparison with the 
findings of this study.   
The first category of solutions comprises techniques to detect spamming 
messages. Research on this type of solution has investigated spam detection in SNSs 
using a content-based approach and achieved different accuracy results. Those 
approaches were mainly based on the characteristics of the URL links included in 
messages. However, the major limitation of these automatic methods is that they 
don’t work effectively in detecting low traffic spam campaigns. The second category 
of solutions comprises techniques to detect profiles (accounts) that are operated by a 
computer or program. Detecting this type of profile is done mainly based on the type 
of posts and messages that are sent or posted by that account. If the account posts or 
sends messages that can be classified as spam, the algorithm suggests that the profile 
is a computer. The limitation of the first and the second categories of solutions is that 
social engineering attackers are not necessarily computers. Social engineers are 
usually human. Therefore, the benefits of the findings from studies on solutions in 
these categories remain limited in terms of social engineering. 
The third category of solutions comprises techniques to detect cloned profiles. 
The general idea for detecting cloned profiles is based on measuring the similarity 
between the profiles. Some of these studies in this area have focused on the similarity 
of the content, and some have focused on the similarity of the click pattern. If two 
profiles reach the predetermined threshold, then one of them is more likely to be a 
cloned profile. The main limitation of this type of solution is that it relies on 
similarity. It is quite common that several people have similar attributes, friends or 
behaviours; and hence their identities in SNSs may be similar. Therefore, it is not 
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reliable to infer that all the similar identities are cloned profiles. The fourth category 
of solutions comprises techniques that classify the identity, mostly the gender, of 
profile owners. Despite the importance of the works that have been done in this 
regard, detecting deception involving the identity, such as the gender of the user on 
SNSs, is quite challenging. To date, there are no reliable indicators for detecting false 
information in users’ profiles.  
The fifth category of solutions – which would include the present study – 
comprises techniques to detect the users’ susceptibility to social engineering 
victimisation in SNSs. The previous categories of solutions focus on the technology, 
not on the weakness of the users. Despite the importance of those types, the fifth 
category of solutions focuses on the main and the weakest link. No social 
engineering-based attacks could succeed unless the users themselves accept, 
succumb and perform the requested action which harms them and benefits the 
attackers. Therefore, this study contributes to the main, and probably the most 
important, category of solutions. 
Furthermore, the contribution of this study appears to be unique and useful in 
relation to the prediction and detection of users’ susceptibility. The study identified 
13 Facebook-specific source characteristics that play a vital role in influencing users 
to accept social engineering attacks. In addition, this study identified the users who 
were most susceptible to those source characteristics or to victimisation in general. 
Most of those Facebook-specific source characteristics, or potential victims’ 
characteristics, are measurable or provided by the users, and therefore it would be 
possible to develop automated algorithms that can utilise the findings of this study to 
predict users’ susceptibility. This can be done through a mechanism that can classify 
users based on their susceptibility.  
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Profiling users is not only a theoretical idea, but it is a practical solution that 
has been established. Several studies in the literature have successfully established 
solutions based on Facebook user profiling for the purpose of managing relationships 
between users (e.g., (Baird and Parasnis 2013; Dam and Michel van de 2015; Ngai et 
al. 2009; Park et al. 2012)). These studies rely on users’ profiling to predict or 
understand influences on customer behaviour in order to improve customer 
acquisition and retention.  
Profiling users in SNSs goes further to predict users’ privacy behaviours or 
threats (e.g., (Erlandsson et al. 2012; Wisniewski et al. 2014)), to profile the user 
relationships according to sentiment classification (e.g., (Terrana et al. 2014)), to 
detect similar content, topics, sentiments and writing styles (e.g., (Terrana et al. 
2015)), and to predict social anxiety (e.g., (Fernandez et al. 2012)). Considering the 
Facebook-specific source characteristics or users’ characteristics (as potential 
victims) found in this study (Figure 8.2), it is clear that these findings provide 
reliable profiling information. At the same time, the characteristics (such as the 
number of friends, number of common friends, number of posts, educational level, 
beliefs, gender, number of likes reciprocated between users, and so on) are 
automatically measurable. 
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Figure 8.3 Using the Results for Profiling 
  
Identifying the links between the source characteristics and the users’ 
perceptions (as the receivers) is a crucial step in data science, because it provides a 
theoretical foundation for developing effective applications and user profiling 
mechanisms, which can automatically predict users’ susceptibility to social 
engineering attacks based on their demographics. The findings of this study are also 
crucial for organisational policy makers, who aim to control insider threats based on 
theoretical knowledge. While information systems research (e.g., (Cavusoglu et al. 
2015) has shown that information assets remain at risk unless users at all levels of the 
organisation are aware of their online behaviours and responsibilities with regard to 
security, the findings of this study provide a fuller picture of employees’ 
vulnerabilities regarding social engineering threats in SNSs.  
The findings of this study can also be helpful for software engineers and SNS 
providers, because they point out that the lack of authentication of identities, photos, 
applications and pages makes an SNS a dangerous weapon in the hands of scammers 
and social engineers who may take criminal advantage of users.  
Finally, the findings of this study are also useful for deriving a set of best 
practices such as SETA programs and computer monitoring, which have been 
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suggested as the best practices for deterring human-based information security 
incidents (D'Arcy et al. 2009). The set of best practices that have been derived from 
this research represent very valuable practical contribution toward individuals, 
organisations, and SNSs providers. Due to the importance of these recommended 
best practices, the following section present them in more details. 
8.9 Recommended Best Practices 
The findings of this research lead to several important recommended best 
practices. This section discusses the recommended best practices in three categories: 
recommendations for individuals, recommendations for organisations, 
recommendations for SNS providers. Although the recommendations are grouped 
into three categories, the recommendations provided in each category can also be 
useful for the other categories. 
8.9.1 Recommendations for Individuals 
The first and most important element in addressing social engineering is the 
individual user. This is because individuals are the weakest link that attackers rely on 
when launching social engineering attacks. Although the targets of the attackers are 
not always the individuals, the tricks that they use always go through individuals. 
The following recommendations are made for individuals: 
1. Individuals must realise that their ability to detect deception is very limited, 
and it is even more limited in a virtual environment such as Facebook. The 
observation in the qualitative phase of this study showed that several participants fell 
for social engineering deception easily. The same fact has been reported by several 
other studies.  
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2. Individuals must pay attention to the particular source characteristics that 
have been identified in this study, as their ability to make accurate judgments about 
deceptive practices by sources with these characteristics is even more limited than 
usual. 
3. Individuals are advised to use the results of this study, especially the results 
of the demographics analysis, in order to determine their special vulnerabilities.  
4. Individuals should not rely on, or fully trust, SNS providers in relation to 
their security and privacy protection. The priority of the majority of SNS providers is 
profit, which can be achieved by attracting as many users as possible, and therefore 
attracting more companies that advertise on their sites. This goal, however, 
sometimes contradicts the security of individuals. This can be observed in the case of 
creating a new account in Facebook, which requires only an email address for 
authentication. This allows attackers to create as many profiles as they want, 
including profiles with fake and impersonated identities. Therefore, individuals must 
control their activities and manage their relationship with others, especially strangers.  
5. Individuals need to pay attention to the specifications of the links that they 
encounter in SNSs, and need to avoid confusion regarding logos, photos or 
certificates that appear in persuasive messages. 
6. High numbers of friends or likes are not necessarily proof of trustworthiness. 
The friends might be fake, or they might also be victims. This also is applicable in 
the case of having common friends, using a name that looks real, and sharing a 
common belief with the persuasive sources. 
7. Individuals should be aware that social engineers are smart, and they embed 
their tricks in something that attracts the user, such as a picture of the user or 
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something the user wants, which usually seems to be too good to be true. This can be 
observed in the Facebook Black and Who-Viewed-Your-Profile scams.  
8.9.2 Recommendations for Organisations 
Several organisations have adopted SNSs to promote collaboration among 
employees, to communicate with their customers, and to advertise products and 
services. Other organisations allow their employees to use SNSs while at work. The 
following important recommendations are made for those organisations: 
  1. Most of the recommendations listed above for individuals are applicable 
and useful in the case of employees who use an SNS at work.  
2. It is important for organisations to utilise technical security defences, but in 
the case of social engineering, it is more important to utilise behavioural defences 
and improve employees’ capabilities to defend against such attacks. 
3. It has been suggested in the literature, and also observed in this study, that a 
high level of security knowledge and awareness is the most important 
countermeasure for social engineering victimisation in SNSs. Therefore, it is 
recommended that organisations consider the findings of this study to enhance 
employees’ awareness through professional training such as SETA programs. 
4. Effective policies and management practices have been suggested as 
important countermeasures to address social engineering (Gragg 2003; Kvedar et al. 
2010). Organisations must have a set of policies that govern how employees use 
SNSs while at work. It is recommended that organisations consider the source 
characteristics highlighted in this study when making policies, as they have been 
found to be very influential on users’ decisions to accept social engineering requests. 
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5. Among the source characteristics, authority was found to be the most 
influential. Therefore, organisations must make clear policies for their employees 
regarding how to distinguish real identities and fake identities. Using fake identities, 
attackers could impersonate the organisation to create a perception of authority and 
trick the organisation’s employees.  
6. Auditing and testing have also been suggested as important countermeasures 
to address the risk of social engineering (Mitnick and Simon 2001). Therefore, 
organisations are encouraged to use the source characteristics highlighted in this 
study when testing their employees’ abilities to discover social engineering 
deception. 
7. It is recommended that organisations use the findings of this study to recruit 
less susceptible employees (based on their demographics) for positions that involve 
responsibility for operating the organisation’s online pages and accounts or for 
communicating with customers and members of the public via SNSs. 
8. It is recommended that, when creating a policy, organisations consider the 
need to authenticate the customers to the organisation and the need to authenticate 
the organisation to the customers. Consideration of both sides of authentication is 
important as both parties can be impersonated, and both are susceptible to social 
engineering victimisation. Unfortunately, most organisations appear to focus on 
authenticating the customers to the organisation while overlooking the importance of 
the reverse authentication. 
8.9.3 Recommendations for SNS Providers 
SNSs implement a wide variety of technical features that enable individuals, 
companies, organisations and government agencies to perform a variety of actions 
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and services. This not only makes SNSs attractive to faithful users but also makes 
SNSs the perfect breeding ground for malicious users and attackers. There are 
several factors that can help attackers easily impersonate a credible source, abuse 
users’ behaviours, and mislead their judgment. These factors include the lack of 
authentication of identities, photos, stories, applications and pages; the lack of 
filtering for content, unsecure links, unsecure applications, fake profiles, pages and 
search engines; the lack of privacy with regard to frequently changed settings and 
unclear or complicated choices regarding privacy; the availability of a platform for 
all kinds of sources such as celebrities, politicians and brands; and the fast spread of 
tricks through sharing, liking, commenting or posting in a group or page. Therefore, 
the following recommendations are made for the SNS providers: 
1. The source characteristics highlighted in this study are freely available for 
attackers to adopt, they have a strong influence on the susceptibility of users to social 
engineering victimisation, and therefore they require urgent authentication solutions.  
2. SNS providers are encouraged to establish mechanisms that can help users 
make better judgments about the credibility of other users. 
3. Feasibility studies could be conducted to see whether providing some real 
information about SNS users (such as their location, frequency of use, and multiple 
profile usage) can reduce the risks associated with impersonation and identity theft in 
SNSs.  
4. Showing the friendship requests that the user has received and that the user 
has sent can also help those who rely on the number of friends (as a reputation clue) 
when they make judgments about the credibility of a source. 
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5. Applications that automatically friend others, create posts and send messages 
to other users must be controlled. 
6. Phone numbers, formal emails and other trusted mechanisms should be 
utilised to authenticate celebrities, public figures and organisations. 
 8.10 Future Research Directions 
While several recommendations and suggestions regarding future research in 
this area have been discussed already throughout the thesis, they can be summarised 
in the following points: 
1. Since this study focused on the impact of source characteristics on users’ 
susceptibility to social engineering victimisation, future research could focus on 
investigating message characteristics and their impacts on users’ susceptibility to 
social engineering victimisation. 
2. Since this study focused on Facebook as the context of the research, future 
research could focus on expanding the findings by utilising more samples that are 
representative of various SNSs. 
3. Since this study focused on Saudi Arabia in the quantitative phase, future 
research could expand the findings by utilising more samples that are representative 
of various countries and cultures. 
4. As every research has its limitations, future researchers can utilise other 
creative methodologies to avoid the limitations of this study (as discussed above in 
Sections 8.5 and 8.6) . For example, it would be interesting to run this study’s role-
play experiment, or part of it, in the actual Facebook environment in order to 
examine whether the findings from an experiment in the actual Facebook 
environment are different to the findings from the role-play experiment. 
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5. For those researchers who conduct experiments in the actual environment of 
Facebook or another SNS, it is important to take into consideration that users’ 
behaviour responses are likely to be biased by many external factors, which 
sometimes can be better controlled in role-play experiments. Therefore, it is always 
better to include a control group in an experiment to make sure that users’ responses 
have occurred due to the treatment of the experiment, and not due to some other 
external factors. This was discussed in detail in the review of the literature in Chapter 
3. 
6. Future researchers are encouraged to avoid the limitation of studies which 
measure the impact of demographics on susceptibility to social engineering 
victimisation in general or to one specific trick and then generalise the findings as if 
they apply for all demographics. This approach should be considered incomplete, as 
people are found to be different in their judgments toward different trick, and 
therefore in their vulnerabilities toward different trick. 
7. Research in the area of social engineering in SNSs is still limited and there 
are many challenging issues that should be addressed, such as identity theft, 
impersonations, cloning attacks, phishing and clickjacking. The research in these 
areas is multidisciplinary; therefore, more collaboration is highly recommended 
between the information ecology, data science and information security disciplines. 
8. One of the most important, and probably the most challenging, issue is how 
to detect attackers based on their activities in SNSs. Solutions in regard to this 
challenge are very valuable in the area of social engineering in SNSs. However, it is 
difficult to distinguish the activities of legitimate users and the activities of attackers, 
especially when legitimate users have recently joined a particular site such as 
Facebook. 
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8.11 Chapter Conclusion 
The overall results of this research highlight the simplicity with which 
individuals can be deceived in SNSs, the theoretical reasons for why and how 
individuals fall victim to social engineering attacks, and the ways in which 
organisations’ security defences can be compromised through such deceptions. This 
chapter has presented a detailed and integrated discussion and final conclusion of the 
thesis. The chapter presented a summary of the findings with reference to the 
research questions, an evaluation of the prediction and effect sizes found in this 
research, an evaluation of the demographic effects found in this research, the 
limitations of the first and second phases of the research, the theoretical and the 
practical contributions of the research, and finally the recommendations for 
individuals, organisations, SNS providers and future research directions. 
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Technology (QUT) 
 
DESCRIPTION 
This project is being undertaken as part of doctorate of information technology for Abdullah Algarni.   
 
The purpose of this project is to identify the socio-psychological factors that influence social 
networking sites’ users to fall victims for social engineering attacks, and find the relationship 
between each factor and user’s demographics such as age, gender, educational level, relationship 
status, and personality type. 
You are invited to participate in this project because you are  18 years old or over, and you have 
experienced social networking sites (e.g. Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter etc) for knowledge sharing, 
finding friend, or any other purpose. The research team requests your assistance because your input 
will be valuable in helping to develop a better understanding on how social networking sites’ users 
fall victims for social engineering tricks and attacks. 
 
PARTICIPATION 
Your participation will involve participating in an audio recorded interview, taking approximately one 
hour of your time. Interviews can be performed by phone, Skype, or in person should you be located 
in Brisbane Australia. Questions will include: 
1   What personal information do you usually provide in your profiles in social networking sites? 
Why?  
2   What information do you usually provide when you comment or ask questions or chat with 
others in SNSs? Why? 
3   Explain what privacy setting are you using? Why? 
4   What kind of contents (such as posts, tags, news, videos, etc.) you like often to read or watch? 
5   What kind of contents (such as posts, tags, news, videos, etc.) you like to share? Why do you 
think you share them? Can you describe your feeling? 
6   What kind of friendship invitations do you accept? Why? 
7   Have you had any bad experience in SNSs such as being attacked or deceived by any person or 
content? How did you respond to that? Can you please describe the feeling that motivated you 
to respond in such a way? 
 
The researcher would like to also observe your public Facebook profiles before the interviews are 
conducted. Only publicly accessible information will be observed such as number of followers, 
friends, comments, or posts. The purpose is to help the researcher to make better sense of what 
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participants say during interviews and to get an actual picture about their previous and actual 
behaviors. However, all data that are used in the research are based on the interviews only.  
Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. If you do agree to participate you can 
withdraw from the project without comment or penalty. If you withdraw, any identifiable 
information already obtained from you will be destroyed. Your decision to participate or not 
participate will in no way impact upon your current or future relationship with QUT or with your 
organisation. 
 
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
We would very much appreciate your participation in this research. The finding of this research will 
help SNSs’ users to understand how social engineers abuse human and social networking sites 
characteristics to deceive, manipulate, influence, and persuade users to accept attacks. Moreover, 
the research will help users to understand their vulnerabilities and weaknesses regarding social 
engineering tricks, and therefore increase their awareness about such threats.  
 
RISKS 
There are no significant potential risks associated with this research project. However, the interview 
process may cause participants to experience some levels of anxiety. Also, some anxiety may arise 
from a realization that the participants are vulnerable. However, participations are entirely voluntary 
and participants are not obliged to answer any questions they find objectionable and they have the 
right to stop the interview at any time without any penalty. No information collected will be 
reported to anyone who is in authority over them and participants. 
 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
All comments and responses will be treated confidentially. Your name is not required in any of the 
responses. However, any information obtained in connection with this research that can identify you 
will remain confidential. It will only be disclosed with your permission, subject to legal requirements. 
Any data collected as part of this project will be stored in non-identifiable form and securely as per 
QUT’s Management of research data policy.  
We plan to publically present and publish the results of this research as journal articles and 
conference proceedings. However, information will only be provided in a form that does not identify 
you. 
The interview will be audio recorded and the transcriptions will remove any identifying details. Only 
the researcher will have access to the audio tape. The audio tape will be destroyed at the conclusion 
of the project. The transcription of the interview will be sent to you before data analysis to be 
revised and where necessary rectified by you.  It is not possible for you to participate without being 
audio recorded. 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
We would like to ask you to sign a written consent form (enclosed) to confirm your agreement to 
participate. 
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT 
If have any questions or require further information please contact one of the research team 
members below. 
 
Abdullah Algarni Ass. Prof Yue Xu Prof Yuchu Tian 
0403 217 476 07 3138 1975 07 3138 2177 
abdullahayedm.algarni@student.qut.edu.au  yue.xu@qut.edu.au  y.tian@qut.edu.au  
 
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT 
QUT is committed to research integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  However, if you 
do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project you may contact the 
QUT Research Ethics Unit on 07 3138 5123 or email ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The QUT Research 
Ethics Unit is not connected with the research project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern 
in an impartial manner. 
 
Thank you for helping with this research project.  Please keep this sheet for your information.  
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Appendix C 
Consent Form for Interviews and Observation 
 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR QUT RESEARCH PROJECT 
– Interview – 
Social Engineering Threats in Social Networking Sites 
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1300000371 
RESEARCH TEAM CONTACTS 
Abdullah Algarni Ass. Prof Yue Xu Prof Yuchu Tian 
0403 217 476 07 3138 1975 07 3138 2177 
abdullahayedm.algarni@student.qut.edu.au  yue.xu@qut.edu.au  y.tian@qut.edu.au  
STATEMENT OF CONSENT 
By signing below, you are indicating that you: 
 
 Have read and understood the information document regarding this project. 
 Have had any questions answered to your satisfaction. 
 Understand that if you have any additional questions you can contact the research team. 
 Understand that you are free to withdraw at any time, without comment or penalty. 
 Understand that you can contact the Research Ethics Unit on 07 3138 5123 or email 
ethicscontact@qut.edu.au if you have concerns about the ethical conduct of the project. 
 understand that the project will include audio recording 
 Agree to participate in the project. 
  I AGREE to allow to the researcher to review my Facebook page (profile and timeline).  
 The researcher can find my account in Facebook using the name or email address. 
  I DO NOT agree to allow the researcher to review my Facebook page.  
 
 
 
Name 
 
 
 
Facebook 
name or email 
address 
 
 
 
 
Signature 
 
 
 
 
Date 
 
 
Please return this sheet to the investigator. 
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Appendix D  
An Example of the Observations’ Notes 
 
Figure 9.1 An Example of Observation Note 
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Appendix E 
Interviews Semi-Structured Questions  
 
These are the main semi-structured interview questions: 
 Tell me about your general experience in Facebook. 
 What personal information do you usually provide in your profiles? Why? 
 Do you use your real name or a nickname on Facebook? (Or maybe you have 
two accounts.) Why do you prefer using your real name or nickname? 
 Explain what privacy settings are you using (Do you make your profile 
available to the public, friends only, or friends of friends?) Why? 
 What kind of content (such as posts, tags, news, videos, etc.) do you like to 
read, write, or share often? 
 What kind of friendship invitations do you usually accept? What criteria 
would you use to decide whom to accept or reject? Why? 
 Can you tell me about your friends list or the people that you deal with or talk 
to on Facebook? Do you trust them? What criteria do you use to trust or not to 
trust? 
 If someone asks you on Facebook (during chatting, commenting, messaging, 
or posting) about some personal information, would you answer him/her? 
What criteria would you use to decide what information to reveal and to 
whom? 
 If someone asks you something about your work, would you answer? What 
criteria would you use to decide what information to reveal and to whom? 
 If someone asks you something about one of your friends or your family, 
would you tell him/her? What criteria would you use to decide what 
information to reveal and to whom? 
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 If someone asks you for a favor, such as a donation, document, software, or 
participation, would you accept? What criteria would you use to decide to help 
or not? 
 Sometimes we see posts or stories on Facebook that offer jobs, free products, 
prizes, or deals; have you seen anything like that? How do usually respond to 
those offers? (If you have not seen anything like that, how would you respond 
if you ran across something like that?) 
 Sometimes we see posts or stories on Facebook that ask for sharing or 
retweeting? How do you usually respond to those? 
 Sometimes we see posts or stories or we receive messages that include links to 
other pages or for downloading some software. How do you usually respond 
to those? 
 Have you had any bad experience on Facebook such as being attacked, 
hacked, or deceived by any person or content? How did you respond to that? 
Why did you respond in this way? 
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Appendix F 
Ethical Approval for Qualitative (Open-Ended) Questionnaire 
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Appendix G 
Participation Information for Open-Ended Questionnaire 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
– Open Ended Questionnaire – 
Social Engineering Threats in Social Networking Sites 
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1300000371 
 
RESEARCH TEAM   
Principal 
Researcher: 
Abdullah Algarni, Doctor of Information Technology Student, QUT  
Associate 
Researcher: 
Asso. Prof. Yue Xu, Principle Supervisor and Prof. Yuchu Tian, Associate 
Supervisor, QUT 
 
DESCRIPTION 
This project is being undertaken as part of doctorate of information technology for Abdullah Algarni.   
The purpose of this project is to identify the socio-psychological factors that influence social 
networking sites’ users to fall victims for social engineering attacks, and find the relationship 
between each factor and user’s demographics such as age, gender, educational level, relationship 
status, and personality type. 
Social engineering based attacks and tricks involve all social skills that deceive and persuade people 
as a way to gain information and unauthorized access privileges from them by building inappropriate 
trust relationships with them, or to perform an action that will benefit the attacker in some way. 
There are many commonly used techniques in social engineering, including phishing, impersonation, 
shoulder surfing, pretexting, and other techniques. Social engineering trick can be any dishonest 
persuasion, manipulation, dishonest trust exploitation, dishonest perception misleading, scam, or 
deception, with the potential to adversely impact individuals or organizational operations (including 
mission, functions, image, or reputation) via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, 
modification of information, and/or denial of service. A person has been tricked or attacked by social 
engineer when she has been exposed to a message intended to change her views or decisions in a 
way she would not accept if she were to think about it on the basis of good conditions. 
 
You are invited to participate in this project only if: 
1) You are 18 years old or over. 
2) You have one account or more in social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn. 
3) You have experienced social engineering based attacks or tricks in social networking sites. 
 
The research team requests your assistance because your input will be valuable in helping to develop 
a better understanding on how social networking sites’ users fall victims for social engineering tricks 
and attacks. 
PARTICIPATION 
Participation will involve completing four items anonymous questionnaire, with open ended 
questions, that will take approximately twenty minutes of your time. Questions will include: 
1. Have you experienced, faced, or run across any social engineering attack in (or caused by) 
Facebook, such as deception, abuse, damage, loss, fraud, or any other type of social engineering 
attacks? 
2.  What type of social engineering attacks have you run across? Please tell us your experience. 
3.  How did you respond to it? 
4.  Why did you respond to it in this way?  
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Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. If you agree to participate you do not have to 
complete any question(s) you are uncomfortable answering. Your decision to participate or not 
participate will in no way impact upon your current or future relationship with your current or future 
relationship with QUT or with your organisation. If you do agree to participate you can withdraw 
from the project at any time before submitting the questionnaire without comment or penalty. 
However as the questionnaire is anonymous once it has been submitted it will not be possible to 
withdraw. 
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
We would very much appreciate your participation in this research. The finding of this research will 
help SNSs’ users to understand how social engineers abuse human and social networking sites 
characteristics to deceive, manipulate, influence, and persuade users to accept attacks. Moreover, 
the research will help users to understand their vulnerabilities and weaknesses regarding social 
engineering tricks, and therefore increase their awareness about such threats.  
RISKS 
There are no risks beyond normal day-to-day living associated with your participation in this project. 
However, the open ended questions may cause participants to experience some levels of anxiety. 
Also, some anxiety may arise from a realization that the participants are vulnerable. However, 
participations are entirely voluntary and participants are not obliged to answer any questions they 
find objectionable and they have the right to withdraw from the questionnaire at any time before 
submitting the questionnaire without comment or penalty. No information collected will be reported 
to anyone who is in authority over them and participants. 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
All comments and responses will be treated confidentially. Your name is not required in any of the 
responses. However, any information obtained in connection with this research that can identify you 
will remain confidential. It will only be disclosed with your permission, subject to legal requirements. 
Any data collected as part of this project will be stored in non-identifiable form and securely as per 
QUT’s Management of research data policy.  
We plan to publically present and publish the results of this research as journal articles and 
conference proceedings. However, information will only be provided in a form that does not identify 
you. 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
Submitting the completed online questionnaire is accepted as an indication of your consent to 
participate in this project. 
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT 
If have any questions or require further information please contact one of the research team 
members below. 
Abdullah Algarni, Doctorate Student Ass.  Prof Yue Xu, 
Principal Supervisor 
Prof Yuchu Tian, Associate 
Supervisor 
Computer  Science –  Sc ience and Eng ineering Faculty  –  QUT 
0403217476 0731381975 073138 2177 
abdullahayedm.algarni@student.qut.edu.au  yue.xu@qut.edu.au  y.tian@qut.edu.au  
 
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT 
QUT is committed to research integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  However, if you 
do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project you may contact the 
QUT Research Ethics Unit on [+61 7] 3138 5123 or email ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The QUT 
Research Ethics Unit is not connected with the research project and can facilitate a resolution to 
your concern in an impartial manner. 
Thank you for helping with this research project.  
 Please keep this sheet for your information. 
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Appendix J 
Social Engineering Requests/Tricks Used in the Role-Play 
 
 
Figure 9.2 Social Engineering Request 1 
 
 
Figure 9.3 Social Engineering Request 2 
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Figure 9.4 Social Engineering Request 3 
 
 
Figure 9.5 Social Engineering Request 4 
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Figure 9.6 Social Engineering Request 5 
 
 
Figure 9.7 Social Engineering Request 6 
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Figure 9.8 Social Engineering Request 7 
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Appendix L 
Result of the Pilot Study Conducted Before the Role-Play Experiment  
 
 
Table 9.1 Exploratory factor analysis using principal component for the pilot study before correction 
 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 
Safe/ Dangerous .194 .853 .198 .192 
Believable/ Unbelievable .209 .860 .194 .189 
Real-account/ Fake-account .225 .848 .176 .193 
Authentic/ Not Authentic .192 .757 .184 .180 
Realistic/ Unrealistic .111 .593 .056 .144 
Unbiased/ biased .108 .577 .054 .143 
Honest/ Dishonest .189 .863 .187 .181 
Sincere/Insincere .209 .852 .187 .198 
Trustworthy/ Not Trustworthy .218 .850 .194 .183 
Powerful/ Powerless .107 .149 .892 .099 
Expert/ inexpert .106 .146 .806 .128 
Successful/ Unsuccessful .112 .150 .903 .097 
Skilled/ Unskilled .004 .198 .564 .119 
Professional/ Unprofessional .103 .154 .903 .101 
Competent/ Incompetent .104 .149 .904 .116 
Qualified/ Unqualified .101 .147 .905 .111 
Interesting/ Uninteresting .290 .209 .187 .817 
Cheerful/ Gloomy .267 .185 .187 .828 
Dynamic/ static -.017 .127 -.083 .235 
Exciting/ Dull .279 .210 .191 .829 
Impressive/ Unimpressive .272 .201 .174 .824 
Attractive/ Unattractive .289 .207 .190 .810 
Expressive/ Inexpressive .270 .192 .183 .729 
Appealing/ Unappealing .275 .211 .182 .820 
Deserving/ Undeserving .886 .178 .112 .181 
Important/Unimportant .892 .171 .120 .175 
Laudable/ Not Laudable .885 .181 .108 .184 
Vital/ not vital .492 .144 -.017 .325 
Worthwhile/Worthless .884 .175 .118 .173 
Advantageous/Disadvantageous .890 .172 .099 .185 
Beneficial/Unbeneficial .889 .171 .115 .183 
Useful/ Useless .790 .168 .095 .178 
Eligible/ Not Eligible .890 .182 .097 .166 
Valuable/ Invaluable .882 .184 .110 .188 
Profitable/ Unprofitable .449 .136 -.084 .325 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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Appendix M 
Ethical Approval for Role-Play Experiment 
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Appendix N 
Participation Information for Role-Play Experiment  
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
– Role-play Survey – 
Social Engineering Threats in Social Networking Sites 
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1300000371 
 
RESEARCH TEAM   
Principal 
Researcher: 
Abdullah Algarni, Doctor of Information Technology Student, QUT  
Associate 
Researcher: 
Asso. Prof. Yue Xu, Principle Supervisor. Prof. Yuchu Tian and Dr.Taizan Chan, 
Associate Supervisor, QUT 
 
DESCRIPTION 
This project is being undertaken as part of PhD research project for Abdullah Algarni.   
The purpose of this project is to identify the socio-psychological factors that influence social networking sites’ 
users to fall victims for social engineering attacks, and find the relationship between each factor and user’s 
demographics such as age, gender, educational level, relationship status, and personality type. 
Social engineering based attacks and tricks involve all social skills that deceive and persuade people as a way to 
gain information and unauthorized access privileges from them by building inappropriate trust relationships 
with them, or to perform an action that will benefit the attacker in some way. There are many commonly used 
techniques in social engineering, including phishing, impersonation, shoulder surfing, pretexting, and other 
techniques. Social engineering trick can be any dishonest persuasion, manipulation, dishonest trust exploitation, 
dishonest perception misleading, scam, or deception, with the potential to adversely impact individuals or 
organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation) via unauthorized access, 
destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service. A person has been tricked or 
attacked by social engineer when she has been exposed to a message intended to change her views or decisions 
in a way she would not accept if she were to think about it on the basis of good conditions. 
You are invited to participate in this project only if: 
1) You are 18 years old or over. 
2) You are from Saudi Arabia 
2) You have one account or more in Facebook. 
The research team requests your assistance because your input will be valuable in helping to develop a better 
understanding on how social networking sites’ users fall victims for social engineering tricks and attacks. 
PARTICIPATION 
Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. If you agree to participate you do not have to complete 
any question(s) you are uncomfortable answering. Your decision to participate or not participate will in no way 
impact upon your current or future relationship with your current or future relationship with QUT or with your 
organisation. If you do agree to participate you can withdraw from the project at any time before submitting the 
questionnaire without comment or penalty. However as the questionnaire is anonymous once it has been 
submitted it will not be possible to withdraw. 
There will be an opportunity to enter into a free prize draw to win a sulphone or 20 SAR for completing the 
survey. However, the participants will be eligible to enter into these free prizes draw only if they successfully 
answer some qualifying questions which require careful reading of the content of the questionnaire. 
Your participation will involve completing an anonymous on-line survey with measurement scale answers 
(Definitely, Probably, Maybe, Probably not, and Definitely not), as well as some rating different Facebook 
profiles based on different criteria such as honesty, trustworthiness, and safety. The aim of this role-play survey 
is to test the impact of source characteristics on social engineering victimization in Facebook. 20 images of 
Facebook profiles will be shown to every participant. Each image of profile represents one case, and each case is 
a combination of some factors.  These factors include the general characteristics of any user in Facebook such as 
number of friends, number of mutual friends, number of posts, belief, celebrity, looks, sexual compatibility, 
writing skills, and authority. The profiles will be shown in the survey as static images, along with scenarios that 
tell the participants some information about the people in profile if needed. The profiles shown in the images 
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and the scenarios are fictitious. In addition, there are 7 questions for every profile. These questions will measure 
the susceptibility to social engineering victimization in Facebook. The questions include some basic and 
advanced social engineering tricks such as gaining access, gaining sensitive information, phishing, downloading 
malware, and spam. The participants will be asked how they would respond to these examples if they see them 
on real life situation. Participation in this survey will take approximately 30 minutes of your time.  
The survey will discuss the following topics: 
1. The impact of source characteristics on users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimization in Facebook. 
2. The impact of receivers or users’ characteristics on susceptibility to social engineering victimization in 
Facebook. 
3. The impact of profiles’ characteristics on users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimization in Facebook. 
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
We would very much appreciate your participation in this research. There will be an opportunity to enter 
into a free prize draw to win a iPhone 6, or receive 20 SAR for completing the survey. However, the 
participants will be eligible to enter into these free prizes draw only if they successfully answer qualifying 
questions which require careful reading of the content of the questionnaire. 
RISKS 
There are no risks beyond normal day-to-day living associated with your participation in this project. 
However, the open ended questions may cause participants to experience some levels of anxiety. Also, 
some anxiety may arise from a realization that the participants are vulnerable. However, participations 
are entirely voluntary and participants are not obliged to answer any questions they find objectionable 
and they have the right to withdraw from the questionnaire at any time before submitting the 
questionnaire without comment or penalty. No information collected will be reported to anyone who is in 
authority over them and participants. 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
All comments and responses will be treated confidentially. Your name is not required in any of the 
responses. Optionally, you may provide your contact details to enter a free prize draw, however, these 
details will be held completely separately from the research data. Any information obtained in connection 
with this research that can identify you will remain confidential. It will only be disclosed with your 
permission, subject to legal requirements. Any data collected as part of this project will be stored in non-
identifiable form and securely as per QUT’s Management of research data policy.  
We plan to publically present and publish the results of this research as journal articles and conference 
proceedings. However, information will only be provided in a form that does not identify you. 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
Submitting the completed online questionnaire is accepted as an indication of your consent to 
participate in this project. 
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT 
If have any questions or require further information please contact one of the research team 
members below. 
Abdullah Algarni, Doctorate Student Ass.  Prof Yue Xu, 
Principal Supervisor 
Prof Yuchu Tian, Associate 
Supervisor 
Computer  Science –  Sc ience and Eng ineering Faculty  –  QUT 
0403217476 0731381975 073138 2177 
abdullahayedm.algarni@student.qut.edu.au  yue.xu@qut.edu.au  y.tian@qut.edu.au  
 
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT 
QUT is committed to research integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  However, if you 
do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project you may contact the 
QUT Research Ethics Unit on [+61 7] 3138 5123 or email ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The QUT 
Research Ethics Unit is not connected with the research project and can facilitate a resolution to 
your concern in an impartial manner. 
Thank you for helping with this research project.  Please keep this sheet for your information. 
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Appendix O  
Results of Normality of Error Distribution, Linearity, and Homoscedasticity Tests 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.9 Testing Regression Analysis Assumptions 
 
 
